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Abstract
Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets
by
Miguel Acosta Henao
Adviser: Professor Sangeeta Pratap
Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector I assemble
new cross-country evidence showing that contrary to the standard view, the relationship
between the size of the informal sector and tax rates is, at best, ambiguous. Law enforcement and informality also show no clear relation. Motivated by these findings, I augment
a standard two-sector (formal and informal) small open economy model with endogenous
law enforcement that depends on the size of the informal sector (measured by its assets)
and government expenditure. I use a micro-dataset from Colombia to show that both
taxes and law enforcement are necessary to match the the size of the informal sector
observed in the data. In the absence of law enforcement, tax evasion incentives imply a
counterfactually large informal sector. However, law enforcement motivates households
to reduce the supply of capital to the informal sector, hence decreasing the probability
of detection. The dependence of the latter on government expenditure creates a nonlinearity between tax rates and the size of the informal sector through a Laffer curve.
The model implies that lowering tax rates would not necessarily reduce the size of the
informal sector since there is a trade-off with the capability of law enforcement.
Chapter 2. News chocks across countries: An empirical investigation We
estimate the role of news shocks to total factor productivity, foreign interest rates and
commodity terms of trade in explaining the variance of output and other macro aggregates
in a large sample of countries. To correct for the small-sample bias of the variance decomposition estimates we develop a Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap method. We find that the
mean difference of variance share of output explained by news shocks between developing
and developed countries is: I) Negligible for news shocks to total factor productivity.
II) Positive for news shocks to foreign interest rates (6 p.p) and to commodity terms
of trade (8.3 p.p). Using cross-sectional data, we find that countries with less financial
development have a larger share of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign
interest rates, and countries with higher total trade of commodities to output ratio and
less developed financial markets exhibit a larger share of output variance explained by
news shocks to commodity terms of trade. These results suggest that to study the role of
news shocks in the economy, one-sector models with only shocks to total factor productivity are not adequate, and that there must be a structural distinction regarding financial
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markets’ development when modeling developing countries as opposed to developed in a
general equilibrium framework.
Chapter 3. Financial participation, hedging, and news shocks Recent empirical
findings show that news shocks to foreign interest rates and commodities’ terms of trade,
explain a larger share of variance of both output and consumption in developing countries
than in developed. I build a two-sector (final goods and commodities) small open economy
model with financially excluded households, and hedging against commodity price risk.
Due to consumption-smoothing motives, a higher share of financially included households
leads to a lower share of variance in output and consumption explained by news shocks to
foreign interest rates. Likewise, due to the transmission channel via demand for inputs, a
larger share of commodity exports that can be hedged leads to a lower share of variance
in output and consumption explained by news shocks to commodity prices.
Chapter 4. Sticky capital controls There is much ongoing debate on the merits of
capital controls as effective policy instruments. The differing perspectives are due in part
to a lack of empirical studies that look at the intensive margin of controls, which in turn
has prevented a quantitative assessment of optimal capital control models against the
data. We contribute to this debate by addressing both positive and normative features
of capital controls. On the positive side, we build a new dataset using textual analysis,
from which we document a set of stylized facts of capital controls along their intensive
and extensive margins for 21 emerging markets. We document that capital controls are
“sticky”; that is, changes to capital controls do not occur frequently, and when they do,
they remain in place for a long time. Overall, they have not been used systematically
across countries or time, and there has been considerable heterogeneity across countries in
terms of the intensity with which they have been used. On the normative side, we extend
a model of capital controls relying on pecuniary externalities augmented by inclusion of an
(S, s) cost of implementing such policies. We illustrate how this friction goes a long way
toward bringing the model closer to the data. When the extended model is calibrated for
each of the countries in the new dataset, we find that the size of these (S, s) costs is large,
thus substantially reducing the welfare-enhancing effects of capital controls compared
with the frictionless Ramsey benchmark. We conclude with a discussion of the structural
interpretations of such (S, s) costs, which calls for a richer set of policy constraints when
considering the use of capital controls in models of pecuniary externalities.
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Chapter 1
Law enforcement and the size of the
informal sector
Author: Miguel Acosta Henao (CUNY)

1.1

Introduction

The size of the informal sector in emerging markets is large, accounting for more than
one-third of output (Vuletin, 2008) and more than 30 percent of employment (Todaro
and Smith, 2015). This is consistent with the fact that developing countries have a larger
share of labor working in the informal sector, and are less productive than developed
countries (Pratap and Quintin, 2006b). This sector emphasizes small-scale, self-financed,
and unskilled labor-intensive economic activities (Pratap and Quintin, 2006a).
Some governments consider the large share of the informal sector in the economy to be
a problem for long-run economic growth and the sustainability of public finances. To
address this issue, some countries have implemented policies that encourage firms to hire
workers by decreasing the taxes that these firms have to pay per worker.1 However, those
policies are based on the assumption that taxes on formal wages are the main determinant
of the size of the informal sector, without considering the effects of other possible dis1

One example is the case of Colombia, where such tax reform was implemented in 2012. This reform
seems to have had an impact on reducing the share of workers in the informal sector by 2.3 percentage
points (Osorio-Copete, 2016).
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tortions such as: taxes on capital to formal firms, taxes on formal income to households,
and the probability that the government fines informal firms by confiscating a fraction
of their output (i.e., law enforcement). The latter is specially important considering that
other policies could prove to be more relevant in reducing the size of the informal sector
than only lowering tax rates, as shown by Quintin (2008).2 This study indicates that
policies taken by governments in emerging markets are still far from being as deep and
effective as they could be. As a result, it is important to understand the determinants
of the size of the informal sector in an environment richer than one with only distorting
taxes.
Additionally, mainly due to different measurement challenges, previous literature has
focused on explaining the size of the informal sector in terms of labor or output, but, with
a few exceptions, not in terms of the capital stock. In this study, I focus on the relative
size of the informal sector in terms of the capital stock as well as output. An important
contribution in this area is the work by Leal Ordonez (2014), who shows in the case of
Mexico that the formal sector is usually more productive, implying that the allocation of
capital across formal and informal firms might be an important source of misallocation
and therefore lower output.3 This author includes endogenous law enforcement, where
the probability of detection depends on the informal capital stock, such that informal
firms have incentives to remain small. I complement that framework by making the
probability of detection endogenous not only to the informal capital stock, but also to
government expenditure, which creates a trade-off between tax policies, law enforcement,
and informality.
I use cross-country data to show that the relationships between tax rates and informality
2

The mechanism in Quintin (2008) is via enforcement of contracts, such that agents who choose to
operate in the informal sector can evade taxes, but they have no access to official means of contract
enforcement. Even though that mechanism is not explored in this paper, it is useful to illustrate how
policies other than tax policies applied to the formal sector might be more effective in reducing its size.
3
Leal Ordonez (2014) focuses on the role of imperfect enforcement in generating missallocation of
capital across sectors, which leads to output losses. Along the same line, Lopez-Martin (2019) studies
different missalocation effects of different policies aimed at lowering the size of the informal sector.
These works are in the spirit of the frameworks developed by Restuccia and Rogerson (2013), Bento
and Restuccia (2017), among others. For a thorough literature review on missallocation see Hopenhayn
(2014).
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and law enforcement and informality are ambiguous. These results are at odds with
the standard view that tax rates and law enforcement are, respectively, positively and
negatively correlated with the size of the informal sector.4 In other words, there does not
seem to be a clear role for tax policies and law enforcement in determining the size of the
informal sector.5
This paper attempts to untangle those relations by showing how law enforcement, defined
as the probability an informal firm is audited and fined, contributes to explaining the relative size of the informal sector in terms of the capital stock and output. For this purpose,
I build a standard two-sector (formal and informal) small open economy model where
the formal sector is regulated through taxes, but it has higher total factor productivity
(TFP) than the informal sector (as in Fernández and Meza 2015). Operating informally
implies a probability of being audited and fined that is increasing in the informal capital
stock and government expenditure (i.e., law enforcement). Using a micro-dataset from
Colombia that allows me to infer the formal and informal capital stock, I show that the
model can better account for the relative size of the informal sector than a framework
without law enforcement. The mechanism is that endogenous law enforcement creates a
wedge that increases with more informal capital stock and government expenditure, between the marginal productivity of informal capital and the rate of return; which lowers
the relative size of the informal sector compared to a framework without this mechanism.
I perform policy experiments that suggest reducing tax rates is not always effective in
reducing the size of the informal sector since the effectiveness of law enforcement is
related to tax collection. In terms of tax policies, considering taxes on firms’ capital
returns, labor, and income, marginal reductions in income tax rates are effective up
to a given level due to the aforementioned non-linearity, which resembles a standard
Laffer curve. Reducing the tax rate on capital paid by firms always decreases the size
of the informal sector, and changes in the payroll taxes have negligible effects. Finally,
4

See Pratap and Quintin (2006b) for further detail on the standard view.
Additionally, I build cross-country evidence that shows that countries with a larger informal sector
have lower GDP per capita (as seen in previous literature, e.g., Maloney 2004, Schneider 2004, Schneider
and Buehn 2017), and that countries with better quality institutions have a smaller informal sector (as
predicted by Quintin 2008).
5
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exogenous improvements in the institutional efficiency of law enforcement reduces the
size of the informal sector, but these must be accompanied by reductions in other tax
rates to avoid hindering aggregate output. Otherwise, excessive monitoring generates
large disincentives in the supply of capital and labor to the informal sector, which are
not offset by incentives to supply both inputs to the formal sector.
This paper contributes to at least three strands of the literature: First, to the empirical
literature dedicated to measure the size of the informal sector and its relation with the
economy (e.g. Schneider and Enste 2002, Maloney 2004). I provide a new measure of
law enforcement based on cross-country microdata. I show how this measure is different
from the quality of institutions and has no clear relation with the size of the informal
sector or taxes, which creates a puzzle. Second, I contribute to the theoretical strand
of literature that models the informal sector, its determinants, and the implications for
the macroeconomy (Loayza 1999, Pratap and Quintin 2006b, Amaral and Quintin 2006,
Quintin 2008, Hamann et al. 2011,Leal Ordonez 2014, Lopez-Martin 2019, among others)
by developing a framework that augments an otherwise standard two-sector model with
endogenous law enforcement that better matches the relative size of the informal sector
in terms of capital stock and output. Within this literature, I expand the previous frameworks that studied the role of law enforcement in determining the size of the informal
sector in terms of labor (Ihrig and Moe 2004, Posada and Mejı́a 2012, Restrepo-Echavarria
2014, Bardey and Mejı́a 2019, Samaniego and Bujanda 2020) by showing how law enforcement that depends on the informal capital stock and government expenditure affects
the allocation of capital stock across sectors. Third, I contribute to the small open economy (SMOE) literature by developing a model for that type of economy, which includes
the informal sector and allows for the study of business cycle features in the presence
of informality (Restrepo-Echavarria 2014, Finkelstein Shapiro 2014, Finkelstein Shapiro
2015, Fernández and Meza 2015).6
6

The mainstream small open economy business cycle theory developed by Mendoza (1991) and then
pursued by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and others is the base for the
model here. However, I do not focus on business cycle analysis, even though the model performs well
in replicating standard business cycle facts in emerging markets (i.e., formal consumption that is more
volatile than output and countercyclical trade balance).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows cross-country empirical
regularities regarding the size of the informal sector and its relationship with output,
taxes, and law enforcement. Section 3 provides evidence of the relative size of the informal
sector in terms of capital stock (as well as output and labor) using microdata from
Colombia. Section 4 develops the model. Section 5 shows the quantitative analysis with
the model calibrated to Colombia. Section 6 performs policy experiments and within each
of these the implications are discussed. Section 7 provides a discussion of the normative
and positive implications of the model as well as future venues of research. Section 8
concludes.

1.2

Stylized Facts

In this section, I use cross-country data to summarize four relevant stylized facts about
the relation between the informal sector, output, tax rates, and law enforcement and
highlight that the relation between informality and tax rates, and informality and law
enforcement, is ambiguous. Section A.1 in the Appendix describes the sources of the
cross-country data used in this section.

1.2.1

Fact 1: Countries with higher informality exhibit lower
levels of per capita GDP

In line with previous literature, I find that per capita GDP and the size of the informal
sector are inversely correlated. Clearly there is nothing new about this fact, but it is
relevant in light of any modeling strategy that aims to rationalize the relative size of the
informal sector, such that this negative correlation should be an outcome of any model.
The upper panel in Figure 4.1 shows per capita GDP on the horizontal axis and the
share of GDP produced by the informal sector on the vertical axis. The figure on the
left in the upper panel uses per capita GDP in 2016 and the figure on the right uses
average per capita GDP between 1991 and 2016. The lower panel in Figure 4.1 shows the
same relationship but uses the share of informal workers as a measure of size. For both
Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector
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measures of informality the correlation with per capita GDP is negative and the slope is
significant at the 5% level.
Figure 1.1: Per capita GDP (PPP) vs. Size of the informal sector

Notes: Upper panel: Left figure shows the size of per capita GDP (PPP) in 2016 vs. The informal sector
measured as a share of output (vertical axis). The right figure shows the same relationship but now per
capita GDP is, for each country, the average between 1991 and 2016.
Lower panel: Left and right figures are similar to those in the upper panel but now the size of the
informal sector is measured as the share of labor working in the informal sector (vertical axis).
∗∗∗
The linear regression represented by the fitted line in each panel is significant at a 99% level.

1.2.2

Fact 2: The relationship between informality and tax
rates is, at best, ambiguous

Contrary to the standard view that lower tax rates imply lower levels of informality (see
Pratap and Quintin 2006b), I find evidence (with no causal claim) pointing out that such
a relationship is not clear. Figure 4.6 shows that this relationship is, at best, ambiguous:
the left panel shows that countries with lower personal income tax rates (horizontal axis)
have higher informality (the fitted line is significant), and the right panel shows that there
Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector
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is no clear relationship between corporate income tax rates and informality (the fitted
line is not significant). This suggests that, given the fact that higher tax rates provide
incentives to operate informally, there must be an offsetting force that is not allowing the
relationship between taxes and informality to be positive.
Figure 1.2: Personal income tax rates and corporate tax rates vs. Size of the informal
sector

Notes: The figure on the left shows the relationship between the personal income tax rates and the size
of the informal sector (vertical axis). The figure on the right shows the relationship between corporate
tax rates and the size of the informal sector (vertical axis).
∗∗∗
The linear regression represented by the fitted line in the first figure is significant at a 99% level.
The linear regression represented by the fitted line in the second figure is not significant at any standard
level.

1.2.3

Fact 3: The relationship between informality and law enforcement is ambiguous

The left panel of Figure 1.3 shows the relation between law enforcement and the size of
the informal sector, where law enforcement is defined as the unconditional probability
of being audited by the government for tax compliance purposes. I find that the corre-
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lation between these variables is positive, albeit not significant, implying an ambiguous
relationship between law enforcement and informality. The right-hand panel shows an
alternative measure of law enforcement, which is the average frequency of inspections
per firm. The slope of this graph is not significant at any standard level. Contrary to
the standard belief that simply more law enforcement implies lower levels of informality,
cross-country data show that such correlation is not evident.
Figure 1.3: Law enforcement vs. Size of the informal sector

Note: The figure on the left shows the relationship between law enforcement (i.e., the share of firms
inspected by the government each year) and the size of the informal sector (vertical axis). The figure on
the right shows the relationship between the average frequency of inspections of a firm per year and the
size of the informal sector (vertical axis).
The linear regressions represented by the fitted lines in both figures are not significant at any standard
level.

1.2.4

Fact 4: Countries with higher informality exhibit lower
quality of institutions

Due to the government-operated nature of law enforcement, the law enforcement variable is closely related to institutional quality. One possible reason why the relationship
Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector
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between law enforcement and informality is ambiguous (as documented in Fact 3) is because of the inconclusive relation between institutional quality and informality. However,
considering qualitative measures of institutional quality, such as judicial efficiency and
control of corruption, I find that countries with higher quality of institutions exhibit
lower informality. Figure 1.4 shows these relations. This finding is in line with the view
that better institutions provide benefits to formal firms (e.g. Amaral and Quintin 2006).
In other words, the puzzle found in Fact 3 is not driven by an inconclusive relationship
between the quality of institutions and informality.
Figure 1.4: Strength of institutions vs. Size of the informal sector

Note: The figure on the left shows corruption efficiency as a proxy for strength of institutions vs. the
size of the informal sector (vertical axis). The figure on the right uses control of corruption vs. the size
of the informal sector (vertical axis).
∗∗∗
The linear regression represented by the fitted line in each figure is significant at a 99% level.

1.2.5

Takeaways

From the stylized facts documented above, the main takeaway is that there is no clear
direct negative relationship between informality and law enforcement, let alone a clear
Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector
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positive relationship between taxes and informality. However, given that measures of
institutional quality are negatively correlated with informality, and that law enforcement
is under the pursuance of the government, there is a trade-off between fiscal policy and
law enforcement for a given efficiency of the law enforcement. This motivates the need to
disentangle these interacting forces to understand how they affect the size of the informal
sector. The main purpose of this work is then to understand the reasons behind Facts 2
and 3, that is, the lack of a strong relationship between informality and fiscal policy and
informality and law enforcement. This necessarily involves understanding the relation
between fiscal policy and law enforcement and how that relates to the size of the informal
sector. The next section provides specific measures of the size of the informal sector
in terms of labor, output, and, more importantly, capital stock using microdata from
Colombia.

1.3

Informal capital stock: The case of Colombia

One of the contributions in this paper is to study the role of law enforcement in determining the size of the informal sector, especially in terms of the capital stock. However,
estimating the informal capital stock has usually been a challenge because of the lack of
information on informal assets, which are, by definition, unreported. To my knowledge,
there is no cross-country dataset that documents the informal capital stock. Notwithstanding these limitations, some exceptions exist that focus on specific countries, such
as Leal Ordonez (2014) in the case of Mexico, and Hamann et al. (2011) in the case of
Colombia. Given the limited data to measure the size of both the formal and informal
sector in terms of the capital stock (as well as in terms of output and labor), I follow
the techniques employed by the latter authors and also use confidential microdata from
a survey held in Colombia, which allows me to differentiate between formal and informal
firms.
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Microdata

I use a confidential database from the Colombian office of statistics, DANE, named “Microestablishments Survey”. This survey follows initially randomly chosen businesses over
a number of years with a confidentiality clause such that businesses cannot be fined or
monitored directly as a result of any of the answers provided. The data I use are for
the year 2016 because this is the only period where the survey asks each firm about the
value of total assets (i.e., the measure of capital stock). I drop the companies that did
not report any asset or any workers (if only the owner works for the firm, the number
of workers reported is one). This yields a total 33, 013 firms that are spread out among
the main metropolitan areas, proportional to their population, and across the three main
sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) proportional to their
participation to output. Aside from allowing for the identification of firms’ assets, this
dataset permits the classification of firms among formal or informal according to different
definitions. In subsection 1.3.2 below I explain how I do this classification.
This dataset has an important caveat: The firms surveyed have less than 10 workers,
leaving out some medium and large size firms. In spite of this, there are reasons to believe
that this dataset is representative of the informal sector: First, as in most developing
countries, Colombian official statistics show that more than 80% of firms are small and
medium sized. Second, Maloney (2004) shows that in the informal sector, at least 80%
of the firms have less than 10 workers. Thus, most likely, disciplining a model with this
data is leaving out big formal firms, which would understate the size of the formal sector.
However, since large firms in Colombia by law have more than 200 workers (and exhibit
higher rates of survival than less productive firms, as shown by Eslava et al. 2013, which
usually are small and medium firms), I do not focus on them and for the sake of the
analysis focus only on firms of the type shown in the microdata.
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Identifying informal firms

As pointed out by Busso et al. (2012), informal firms are those that even though they
engage in legal activities, do not pay social security to workers and do not comply with
taxes or other regulation. The data allows us to identify informality with three questions.
The survey asks firms if they paid social security to workers in 2016 (and how much) and
if they are registered in the official system by the Colombian internal revenue authority
(named DIAN). Firms were also asked if they officially reported bookkeeping records of
their income statements and balance sheets. I define an informal firm as a firm that
does not pay social security to its workers, is not registered, and does not report any
bookkeeping records.7

1.3.3

Empirical findings

For each firm, I calculate the capital stock, value added, and number of workers. The
capital stock is computed as the value of assets. Value added is calculated as total revenue
minus the cost of intermediate inputs. The number of workers is the number of employees
reported by the firm. Since our objective is to obtain observed statistics of the relative
size of the informal sector, for each sector I take the average of the capital stock and
output, and compute the formal to informal ratios. For the size of the informal sector in
terms of labor, I simply calculate the share of labor working in each sector.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for each sector, I use the average total
payment received by workers to recover the elasticity of output with respect to capital and
labor. I use this result to compute each sector’s TFP and to calculate the relative TFP
of the formal sector with respect to the informal. Table 1.1 shows the main moments
for the key variables. The mean relative size of the formal sector with respect to the
informal sector in terms of the capital stock k F /k I and output y F /y I are 2.94 and 2.1,
respectively.8 The share of labor in the formal sector is 0.51. The mean elasticities of
7

Alternative definitions of informality could be defined by relaxing one or more of the three aforementioned questions to determine whether a firm is informal or not. See Hamann et al. (2011) for a
detailed breakdown of different degrees of informality with this data.
8
These relative sizes are, respectively, the ratios of the mean formal sector capital stock to the mean
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formal and informal output to their respective capital stock are 0.29 and 0.15, and the
mean relative TFP of the formal sector is 1.19. Table 1.1 shows also the median and
standard deviation of each statistic. As expected, the mean (and median) size of the
formal sector is larger both in terms of capital and output than in the informal sector,
however roughly half of the labor force works in each sector (which is consistent with
households’ survey data for Colombia in 2016).
A successful model should perform well in matching the relative capital stock and relative
output. Thus, the results in the first two rows in Table 1.1 serve as a benchmark to
evaluate the performance of the model in the next session.9
Table 1.1: Summary of the key statistics in the Microdata
Key Variable
k F /k I
y F /y I
nF /n
αF
αI
z F /z I

Definition
Relative capital stock:
formal to informal sectors
Relative output stock:
formal to informal sectors
Share of formal labor
Formal output elasticity
to capital stock
Informal output elasticity
to capital stock
Relative TFP:
formal to informal sectors

Mean

Median

Std. Dev

2.94

3

0.88

2.1

1.7

0.7

0.51

0.5

0.03

0.29

0.18

0.01

0.15

0.1

0.002

1.19

1.1

0.02

Notes: The table shows, for each formal to informal key ratio in the first three rows, their median,
mean, and standard deviation. The last three rows show the same moments for key parameters of the
production function. All moments and parameters are described in the second column.

1.4

Baseline model

I build a small open economy model with two sectors, formal and informal. Households are
identical and supply labor and capital to both sectors. There are two goods, one for each
sector, which are imperfect substitutes and are produced respectively by a representative
informal sector capital stock, and the mean formal sector output to the mean informal sector output.
9
Alternatively, one could define a successful model one that matches relative output and the share
of total labor working in both sectors. Since my focus is on the size of the informal sector in terms of
the capital stock, I will use the share of labor working in both sectors as a target moment to calibrate
the model and leave the relative capital stock and output free to be matched.
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formal firm and by households using constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies. The
formal sector is regulated, thus the households’ formal income is subject to an income
tax rate, τY . The representative formal firm face tax rates on the use of labor, τW , and
capital, τr . In spite of these costs, operating in the formal sector has the benefit that it
is exogenously more productive. Operating informally implies not paying taxes on the
use of inputs and informal income, but is subject to imperfect law enforcement: There
is a probability of being audited and fined when operating in the informal sector, which
is increasing in terms of both informal capital stock and government expenditure. In the
absence of enforcement, the model is akin to the framework developed by Fernández and
Meza (2015).10

1.4.1

Households

There is a continuum of identical households of mass 1 that derive utility from a consumption composite, ct , and disutility from aggregate labor, nt . Thus, the expected present
value of utility at time zero is:

E0

∞
X

β t U (ct , nt )

(1.1)

t=0

Where β ∈ (0, 1) is the standard discount factor. As it is standard for SMOEs, the utility
function features Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences (see Aguiar and Gopinath 2004):
U (ct , nt ) =

(ct −(nt )ω )1−σ −1 11
.
1−σ

The parameter ω is the labor supply elasticity to wages and

σ is the degree of relative risk aversion. The consumption composite is described by the
CES aggregator:
ct = A(cFt , cIt ) = [a(cFt )ρ + (1 − a)(cIt )ρ ]1/ρ

(1.2)

10
Although in the present model, contrary to Fernández and Meza (2015), shocks only come from the
formal TFP process, and there is no direct propagation mechanism of TFP shocks across sectors. The
main purpose of the work by these authors is to explain business cycle properties in the informal sector
as a result of imperfect propagation of shocks to the formal sector.
11
As is well known, these type of preferences shut down the wealth effect on the labor supply such
that the latter only depends on the wage. For emerging SMOEs such as Colombia, Chang and Fernández
(2013) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show that these preferences explain business cycle comovements
observed in the data better than preferences with active wealth effects on labor supply.
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with cFt and cIt being the consumption of formal and informal goods, respectively. The
parameter a is the weight that households give to formal goods in aggregate consumption,
and ρ is the parameter that governs the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
the two goods. Aggregate labor is the sum of labor supplied to both sectors:

nt = nFt + nIt

(1.3)

Informal income and law enforcement
Households have access to the following CRS technology for producing informal goods:

ytI = F I (ktI , nIt ) = ztI (ktI )αI (nIt )1−αI

(1.4)

where ytI , ktI , and nIt are respectively, informal: output, capital stock, and labor. The
parameter ztI in the equation is the exogenous TFP of the informal sector, and αI is the
informal output elasticity to informal capital stock.
I introduce law enforcement as defined in section 1.2, that is, the probability of being
audited and fined when operating informally.12 This variable is a bivariate c.d.f. denoted
by H(ktI , gt ), such that H1 (ktI , gt ) > 0, H2 (ktI , gt ) > 0, H(0, 0) = 0 and 0 ≤ H(ktI , gt ) ≤ 1.
Thus, households’ informal income at period t is random with the following expected
value:

E(incomeIt ) = ytI [1 − τY φ]H(ktI , gt ) + ytI [1 − H(ktI , gt )]

(1.5)

where φ ≥ 1 is the additional penalty for being informal (i.e., the fine). The first term
on the right-hand side of Equation 1.5 is households’ income from producing informal
output when they are audited and fined by the government, and the second term is the
informal income when they are not audited.
12

I assume that all audits to the informal sector lead to a fine. Therefore, there is no room for bribery.
However, in practice the bribe acts as a tax.
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Households’ problem
Households can borrow from abroad by issuing one period non-state contingent bonds.
International borrowing can only be in formal goods, meaning that only those goods can
be traded in international markets. This debt is denoted by dt+1 with price qt at period
t. The households’ budget constraint is:

cFt + pt cIt + iFt + pt iIt + dt = (wt nFt + rt ktF )(1 − τY ) + pt ytI [1 − τY φH(ktI , gt )] + qt dt+1 + Tt
(1.6)

The right-hand side of Equation 1.6 represents the households’ stream of income. The
first term is the formal income, taxed at a rate τY , where wt is the wage paid to formal
workers, and rt is the return to capital in the formal sector. The second term represents
the expected informal income in Equation 1.5. The third term is the period-t value of debt
to be paid the next period, and the last term is the (exogenous) rebate that households
get from the government. The left-hand side of Equation 1.6 represents the households’
stream of expenditure and contains, respectively, consumption and expenditure in both
types of goods, and dt , the stock of debt acquired at period t − 1 that is due on period
t. Both the stream of income and the stream of consumption are expressed in terms of
formal goods, such that pt is the relative price of informal goods with respect to formal
goods. The law of motions for capital stock in both sectors are:

F
kt+1
= iFt + ktF (1 − δ)

(1.7)

I
kt+1
= iIt + ktI (1 − δ)

(1.8)

where δ is the depreciation rate, which is assumed to be the same for both sectors.13
The households’ problem is then to maximize the expected net present value of utility
13

There is no compelling empirical evidence to assume that δ is different in both sectors.
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described by 3.1, subject to Equations 1.2 to 1.4, 1.6, and the no-Ponzi constraint:

lim qtt Dt ≤ D̃

t→∞

1.4.2

(1.9)

Formal firm

There is a representative formal firm that is regulated, and it pays taxes on the use of
labor, τW , and capital, τr . For every period the representative formal firm chooses ktF
and nFt to maximize its profits, πt :

πt = ytF − (1 + τW )wt nFt − (1 + τr )rt ktF

(1.10)

Output is produced with the following CRS technology:

ytF = F F (ktF , nFt ) = ztF (ktF )αF (nFt )1−αF

(1.11)

The parameter αF is the formal output elasticity to formal capital stock. The parameter
ztF is the formal’s sector TFP, and it is the sole source of uncertainty in the economy. It
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the form:

ln(ztF ) = ρF ln(ztF ) + t ;

t ∼ i.i.d(0, (σ F )2 )

(1.12)

Parameters ρF and σ F are respectively the first order autocorrelation of ztF and the
standard deviation of the unexpected shock t .

1.4.3

Government and interest rates

In each period, the government follows a balanced budget rule of the form:

F
τY φH(ktI , gt )pt ytI + τW
wt nFt + τrF rt ktF + τY (wt nFt + rt ktF ) = gt + T

Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector

(1.13)

27

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

The first term on the right-hand side of Equation 1.13 is the fine paid by the informal
sector in terms of formal goods, the second and third terms are the tax collection paid
by the formal firm, and the last term is the tax collection on formal income paid by
households.
As is standard in small open economies, the interest rate is determined by the (gross)
foreign interest rate, R∗ , and a debt-elastic interest rate premium. Following SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2003), this is:

1
¯
= R∗ + ψ[e(dt+1 −d) − 1]
qt

(1.14)

The left-hand side of Equation 1.14 is the gross domestic interest rate. The second term
on the right-hand side of the equation is the debt-elastic interest rate premium with
parameters ψ, the sensitivity of the domestic interest rate to the debt premium, and D̄,
the exogenous steady state level of (net) foreign debt in the economy.

1.4.4

Market clearing

By defining gtF as the government’s revenue from the formal sector and gtI as the one
from the informal sector (in terms of formal goods), we have:

F
gtF = τW
wt nFt + τrF rt ktF + (wt nFt + rt ktF )τY

(1.15)

gtI = τY φH(ktI , gt )pt ytI

(1.16)

gt + T = gtF + gtI

(1.17)

The market clearing conditions of the baseline model are:
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ytF = cFt + iFt + gtF + dt − qt dt+1

(1.18)

ytI = cIt + iIt + gtI

(1.19)

nxt =

ytF − cFt − iFt − gtF
ytF

yt = ytF + pt ytI

(1.20)
(1.21)

Equations 1.18 and 1.19 represent, respectively, the supply and demand equilibrium in
the formal and informal sectors. Equation 1.20 is the trade balance as a share of formal
output, and equation Equation 1.21 is aggregate output in terms of formal goods.14

1.4.5

Optimality and equilibrium

The first order conditions (F.O.Cs) of the households’ problem are:

[cFt ] :

Uc (cFt , cIt , nFt , nIt )A1 (cFt , cIt ) = λt

(1.22)

Uc (cFt , cIt , nFt , nIt )A2 (cFt , cIt ) = λt pt

(1.23)

Un (cFt , cIt , nFt , nIt )ω(nFt + nIt )ω−1 = λt (1 − τY )wt

(1.24)

[cIt ] :

[nFt ] :

[nIt ] :

Un (cFt , cIt , nFt , nIt )ω(nFt + nIt )ω−1 = λt pt [1 − τY φH(ktI , gt )]F2I (ktI , nIt )

[Dt+1 ] :

λt qt = βEt (λt+1 )

(1.25)

(1.26)

14

I introduce the trade balance for completeness because it is an important object of study in small
open economies, albeit the study of this variable is not within the scope of this work.
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λt = βEt (λt+1 [(1 − τY )rt+1 + 1 − δ])

(1.27)

I
I
, hIt+1 )+1−δ]}
λt pt = βEt {λt+1 pt+1 [(1−τY φH(ktI , gt ))F1I (kt+1
, hIt+1 )−τY φH1 (ktI , gt )F I (kt+1

(1.28)
Combining Equations 1.22 and 1.23 yields:

pt =

A2 (cFt , cIt )
A1 (cFt , cIt )

(1.29)

The first order conditions of the households’ problem are standard, with λt being the
Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. However, it is worth pointing out some
important features: First, from Equation 1.24, the disutility of labor supplied to the
formal sector is equal to the wage net of income taxes in utility units, meaning that
income taxes distort the labor supply to this sector. Second, from Equation 1.25, the
disutility of labor supplied to the informal sector is equal to the marginal productivity of
labor (MPL) in the informal sector net of the fine paid by operating informally, measured
in utility units. This MPL net of the fine is equivalent to the informal wage, but it is
seen directly in Equation 1.25 because the household has direct access to the informal
production technology. Since the fine is proportional to the income tax, such tax also
distorts the labor supply to the informal sector. Third, from Equation 1.28, which is
the Euler equation for informal capital stock, the marginal cost of accumulating informal
capital stock is equal to: the expected marginal productivity of capital (MPK) in the
informal sector net of the fine, the additional cost brought about by law enforcement
due to future capital accumulation in the informal sector, and depreciation, all in utility
units. This implies that law enforcement and capital accumulation in the informal sector
have dynamic effects over the allocation of capital across different periods.
The F.O.Cs of the formal firm’s problem are:
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F
, hFt+1 ) = (1 + τr )rt
F1F (kt+1

(1.30)

F
, hFt+1 ) = (1 + τW )wt
F2F (kt+1

(1.31)

Clearly, both taxes to capital and labor paid by the formal firm act as wedges between the
marginal products of each input and their respective rental rate, distorting the optimal
allocation of both inputs. The competitive equilibrium is:
Definition 1.4.1. Competitive equilibrium: Given the initial conditions k0F , k0I and d0 ,
and the stochastic process for t , a competitive equilibrium is a set state-contingents alloI
F
, λt , nxt and prices wt , rt , pt , qt
, kt+1
cations: ct , cFt , cIt , nt , nFt , nIt , dt+1 , iFt , iIt , yt , ytF , ytI , gt , kt+1

such that:
I Given prices and law of motions for the stock of capital in both sectors given by
Equations 1.7 and 1.8, the allocations solve the households’ problem: Equations 1.2
to 1.4, 1.6, 1.9, and 1.23 to 1.29.
II Given prices, the allocations solve the formal firm’s problem: Equations 1.30 and
1.31.
III The government satisfies its budget constraint each period described by Equation 1.13
IV Domestic interest rates satisfy the debt-elastic interest rate condition in Equation 1.14.
V Markets clear for capital, labor, and goods in all sectors of the economy: Equations
1.18 to 1.21.
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Quantitative analysis

I evaluate the models’ performance by its accuracy in matching the relative size of the
formal to informal sector, as measured by ratios

ktF
pt ktI

and

ytF
pt ytI

observed in the data.

The first ratio is the relative formal to informal capital stock, and the second is relative
formal to informal output. Thus, I focus on the model’s steady state.15 I solve for the
non-stochastic steady state using standard non-linear numerical methods. I also solve
the stochastic model by standard perturbation methods and obtain the policy functions
for each variable. The mean of the ergodic distribution for both ratios using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo Simulations yield virtually the same results as the analysis of the
non-stochastic steady state.16

1.5.1

Calibration

The parameter a is calibrated to match the share of formal labor observed in the data
(0.51). The steady state level of debt, D̄, is calibrated to match the average net foreign
debt to GDP ratio for Colombia, taken from the updated version of the dataset developed
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The parameters of the AR(1) process for ztF , ρF and
σ F are calibrated to match the first order autocorrelation and volatility of Colombia’s
yearly GDP. The parameters σ is taken from the SMOEs literature. The yearly depreciation rate, δ, is taken from the Colombian series of aggregate capital stock developed
by Fernández Martin et al. (2017). Parameters αI and αI are taken from the microdata,
as shown in Table 1.1. The mean of ztF is set to 1.19, and the value of ztI is set to one.
In this way, the relative TFP is normalized to match the one observed in the data. Tax
rates for Colombia in 2016 are obtained from Rincón-Castro et al. (2017). The value of
σ in the utility function is set to 2, which is standard in the business cycle literature
15

Section A.3 in the Appendix provides the system of equilibrium equations in steady state.
The fact that the simulation based-results yield the same as the non-stochastic steady state implies
that the role of uncertainty is negligible. However, even if the purpose of the model is to analyze static
moments, the stochastic process is useful if one wants to match important business cycle moments.
Indeed, as it is standard in emerging small open economies (e.g., Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Uribe and
Yue 2006 ,Aguiar and Gopinath 2007) the model yields a countercyclical trade balance, and when only
the formal sector is measured, consumption is more volatile than output, in line with the results of
Restrepo-Echavarria (2014).
16
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for SMOEs. Parameters ω, and R∗ are set equal to 1.4, and 1.0145, and are taken from
Fernández and Meza (2015). The discount rate β is calibrated to be 1/R∗ so the model
is stationary. The parameter ρ is set to match an intratemporal elasticity of substitution
of 0.875, which is standard for this type of economies in the literature.
I assume that law enforcement follows the simple functional form that ensures that
I

H(ktI , gt ) has the properties described in section 1.4.1: H(ktI , gt ) = 1 − e−γ(kt +gt ) , where
γ can be interpreted as the exogenous efficiency of law enforcement (e.g., a measure of
institutional quality). The parameter γ is calibrated to match, in steady state, the fact
that HH(k I , g) = 0.27 in Colombia, as observed in the cross-country data. Table 1.2
summarizes the parametrization of the model.
Table 1.2: Calibration
Parameter
a
ρ
τY
αI
αF
τW
τr
D̄
ω
R∗
σ
ρF
σF
δ
z¯F
z¯I
β
γ

Value
0.6
1-1/0.875
0.092
0.29
0.15
0.104
0.062
0.062
1.4
1.0145
2
0.78
0.007
0.035
1.19
1
0.9857
1.3908

Source
Calibration
SMOE literature
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Calibration
Fernandez and Meza (2015)
Fernandez and Meza (2015)
SMOE Literature
Calibration
Calibration
Data
Data
Data
Calibration
Data

Notes: The table shows, for each parameter in the model (first column), its value (second column), and
whether it is calibrated, taken from the data, or taken from the literature (third column).

1.5.2

Results

Table 1.3 shows how the model performs at matching both ratios,

ktF
pt ktI

and

ytF
,
pt ytI

as well as

the value of aggregate output generated by the model, all described in the first column.
Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector

33

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

Column 2 shows the data, and the last column shows the results of the baseline model.
In terms of capital stock, which is our main focus, the model generates a relative formal
capital stock of 2.83, compared to 2.94 in the data (see Table 1.1), meaning it explains
96% of the relative size of the informal sector in terms of the capital stock. With respect
to relative formal output, the model yields a value of 1.85, compared to 2.1 in the data,
explaining 88% of the relative size of the informal sector in terms of output.
Alternatively, the third column in Table 1.3 shows the results of a model without law
enforcement (H = 0).17 This framework explains 65% of the relative formal capital
stock (1.92 in the model compared to 2.94 in the data), and in terms of output this
simple model yields a relative formal output equal to 0.76. In other words, absent of law
enforcement, the model considerably overstates the output of the informal sector, such
that it is higher than in the formal sector. This suggests that tax evasion in itself is
not sufficient to explain the size of the informal sector. In subsection 1.5.4 I discuss the
results of alternative specifications of law enforcement.
Table 1.3: Baseline model vs Alternative models vs Data

Alternative Alternative
model 1
model 2

Alternative
model 3

Baseline
model

Unmatched
variable

Data

H=0

H=θ

H = H(k I )

H = H(k I , g)

kF
pkI
yF
py I

2.94
2.10

1.92
0.76
0.31

2.11
1.05
0.14

2.32
1.39
0.28

2.83
1.85
0.35

y

Notes: The table shows for each formal to informal sector ratio (first column) how the results in different
specifications of the model match the data observed in Table 2 (second column). The last column
shows the results of our baseline model with law enforcement endogenous to informal capital stock and
government expenditure. The third, fourth and fifth column show the results of, respectively: A model
without law enforcement, a model with constant law enforcement, a model with law enforcement only
depending on informal capital stock. The table also shows the value of output (last row) generated by
each model. All results correspond to the steady state.
17

Section A.2 in the Appendix shows the equilibrium conditions and the steady state for the model
without law enforcement.
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Inspecting the mechanism

Equations 1.25 and 1.28 demonstrate why the model with law enforcement can match the
data better than the model without. Equation 1.25 shows that law enforcement creates
a wedge between the marginal product of labor and its cost, reducing labor supply to
the sector. Equation 1.28 shows the disincentive effects of law enforcement on informal
capital. Not only does law enforcement lower the marginal product of capital today, but
capital accumulation carries with it the penalty of a greater detection probability in the
future.

1.5.4

Law enforcement and government expenditure

In this section I explore two alternative specifications of law enforcement. First, as in
Leal Ordonez (2014), I assume that H = H(k I ). The results are shown in the fifth column
of Table 1.3 (i.e., Model 3). Here, the main mechanism of the baseline model operates,
such that there is a wedge between the marginal products of labor and capital, and their
costs. In this case, the model explains 79% of the relative size of the informal sector in
terms of capital stock, and 66% in terms of output. Despite the good performance of this
model in matching the relative size of the informal sector, there are two shortcomings of
this approach. First, the baseline model performs better because the wedge created by
law enforcement is exacerbated by the boost that government expenditure gives to law
enforcement. Second, the absence of government expenditure in law enforcement does
not provide a mechanism through which we will have a trade-off between tax rates and
law enforcement, so the puzzles documented by stylized facts 2 and 3 cannot be solved.
Providing a rationale for such puzzles is the purpose of the next section.
The second alternative specification of law enforcement that I explore is simply assuming
that it is constant, such that H = θ. The fourth column in Table 1.3 shows the results
for this framework (i.e., Model 2). Compared to the model without law enforcement, this
model performs better in matching the relative size of the informal sector, both in terms
of capital stock and output. However, it predicts a relative formal to informal output that
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is close to 1, roughly half the one observed in the data. Moreover, this setup generates an
output of 0.14 (third row), compared to 0.31 in the framework without law enforcement
and higher informality. Based on the first stylized fact described in section 1.2, this is
counterfactual.

1.6

Law enforcement, tax rates, and informality

In this section I show how different tax rates affect the relative size of the informal
sector, and through what channels we can obtain non-monotonic relationships between
tax rates and informality, and law enforcement and informality. Given that in the data
a clear negative relation between taxes and informality occurs with respect to the tax on
income, namely τY in the model, I explore how higher income tax rates can generate, in
some regions, lower informality in terms of capital stock. This due to the fact that the
fine is proportional to the income tax, such that there is a non-linearity when increasing
taxes: lower incentives to operate in the formal sector, but also higher law enforcement
due to more government’s revenue. I also explore how changes in the remaining tax rates
and the parameter of the law enforcement function (i.e., institutional quality) affect the
relative size of the informal sector.

1.6.1

Changes in τY

The value of the personal income tax, τY , is 0.092 in the data. I experiment with values
between 0.01 and 0.3, separated equally by one percentage point. The left-hand side of
the first row in Figure 1.5 shows the relative size of the informal sector (vertical axis) for
different values of τY (horizontal axis). The dots represent steady state values for each
tax rate. The right-hand side of the first row maps output with the same set of values
for the tax. The second row shows, in its first plot, the government expenditure (and
revenue) on the vertical axis for different values of τY . The second plot of the same row
shows H(k I , g) in the vertical axis for different values of τY . The last two figures show,
respectively, the values of formal and informal capital stock for different values of the tax
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on formal income.
Figure 1.5: Experiment 1 - Changes in τY

Notes: The figure shows the steady state values of different key variables for different tax rates on income,
τY , shown on the horizontal axis. The first row shows, respectively, the relative size of the informal sector
in terms of the capital stock and GDP. The second figure shows, respectively, government’s expenditure
(and revenue), and law enforcement. The last row shows, respectively, formal and informal capital stocks.

Here we observe the most interesting result among the policy experiments: There is a
range of the income tax rate where its further increases actually reduce the size of the
informal sector. That range is all tax rates in the neighborhood of 0.15. Increasing the
tax rate from the baseline value, 0.09, to 0.15 minimizes the size of the informal sector;
however increasing it more leads to the standard result in the literature where higher
taxes imply a higher size of the informal sector. On the other hand, decreasing the tax
rate to a level lower than the baseline value will increase the size of the informal sector.
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This result relates directly to the left panel in Figure 4.6, where the personal income tax
rate seems to have a counterintuitive negative correlation with informality. Here we can
see that, for any country where the income tax rate is constrained by some lower and
upper bounds, it is possible to reduce such tax rate and increase the size of the informal
sector. In other words, this result is able to match the fact that, in the data, there is
an inverse relation between personal income taxes and the size of the informal sector.
However, were those taxes to be higher than a certain threshold (0.15 in our case), this
relationship would invert and become as expected: higher taxes imply higher informality.
Why does the capital stock fall faster in the informal sector than in the formal sector
when the tax rate increases? The increase in tax rate creates a wedge between the MPK
of both sectors and its cost. However, the wedge is larger for the informal sector because
of the tax penalty φ in case of detection, the increase in the probability of detection itself
as a result of an increase in gt , and the dynamic effect of the increase in the probability
of future detection.
The second row of Figure 1.5 shows what happens with government expenditure (and
revenue). The first plot in this row is a Laffer curve, where increasing taxes generate more
tax collection in spite of lower output; however, for tax rates above 0.15, the decrease in
output is so large that the total tax collection falls with higher tax rates. Even though law
enforcement decreases with higher tax rates, due to lower informal capital the increased
government expenditure up to the threshold keeps law enforcement higher than what
it would be if it did not depend on g (in section A.4 of the Appendix I explore the
results of this experiment when we assume that g is constant, and show how and why the
mechanism flips). This mechanism contributes to generate a sharper fall in the informal
capital stock than in the formal one for tax rates between 0.01 and 0.15. For rates beyond
this last value, g decreases and the mechanism flips. The reason why law enforcement
decreases with higher tax rates is because there is lower informal capital stock. This
channel generates a positive correlation between law enforcement and informality within
the range of tax rates such that higher income tax rates imply lower informality, as
documented in stylized fact 3. Thus, the model not only matches the relative size of the
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informal sector better than a framework without endogenous law enforcement, but it also
provides a rationale for the apparent counterintuitive relationships between income tax
rates, law enforcement, and the size of the informal sector.
The main implication here is that law enforcement, depending on both informal capital
and government expenditure, induces a non-linearity that could have different policy
implications than the traditional view. For instance, in the Colombian case there seems to
be room for an income tax increase that fosters formality. However, such increase should
not be more than approximately six percentage points if the objective is to minimize the
size of the informal sector.

1.6.2

Changes in τr

The value of τr is 0.062 in the data. I use the same grid as in the previous two experiments.
The structure of Figure 1.6 is the same as Figure 1.5, but now the horizontal axis has
τr . Changing τr does not bring a trade-off with law enforcement. The reason why this
happens is that τr only affects the formal firm. By reducing it, the demand for formal
capital increases, and with a higher level of formal capital stock comes a higher level of
formal labor. Production increases considerably such that tax collections are higher than
before and enforcement does not decrease in this case.
The main result of this policy experiment is that lowering the tax rate on capital paid by
firms (e.g. corporate tax rates) unambiguously reduces the relative size of the informal
sector while increases aggregate output.18

1.6.3

Changes in τW

I also use the same grid for τW than the one for τY . Figure 1.7 shows the results for this
experiment in the same order as Experiment 1, except that now the horizontal axis has
τW instead of τY .
18

The value of τr that minimizes the relative size of the informal sector is 0. However one could think
that there exists a hypothetically exogenous lower bound for such tax, τ r , such that the minimizing tax
rate is τr =τ r .
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Figure 1.6: Experiment 2 - Changes in τr

Notes: The figure shows the steady state values of different key variables for different tax rates on income,
τr , shown on the horizontal axis. The first row shows, respectively, the relative size of the informal sector
in terms of the capital stock and GDP. The second figure shows, respectively, government’s expenditure
(and revenue) and law enforcement. The last row shows, respectively, formal and informal capital stocks.

Even though it seems that the relative size of the informal sector decreases with higher
tax rates on labor paid by firms, zooming in on the vertical axis of the first plot in
Figure 1.7, one can notice that the quantitative different across points is almost nil.
Combining equations Equation 1.24 and Equation 1.25 from the household problem and
the first order conditions of the formal firm we note that:

(1 − τY )

F2F (ktF , nFt )
) = pt (1 − τY φ)H(ktI , gt )F2F (ktI , nIt )
1 + τW
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Figure 1.7: Experiment 3 - Changes in τW

Notes: The figure shows the steady state values of different key variables for different tax rates on income,
τW , shown on the horizontal axis. The first row shows, respectively, the relative size of the informal sector
in terms of the capital stock and GDP. The second figure shows, respectively, government’s expenditure
(and revenue) and law enforcement. The last row shows, respectively, formal and informal capital stocks.

An increase in payroll tax therefore redirects labor from the formal to the informal sector
and wages fall. Since the TFP in the informal sector is lower, it also implies a loss in
output and capital accumulation. The effects are quantitatively small though, because,
with flexible wages, the labor flows are small.
Payroll taxes are often increased, which is a major cause of informality. In the case of
Colombia, recent research by Bernal et al. (2017), Fernández and Villar (2017), Kugler
et al. (2017), and Morales and Medina (2017) show the positive impact of a tax reform
in 2012 in reducing informality. This tax reform included a payroll tax reduction. In the
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way taxes are mapped here, a fraction of those payroll contributions is captured by τY ;
so there could be room for further reductions in that type of tax. However, the results of
this experiment suggest that in this environment if such reductions were to be continued,
they would not have further significant impact on reducing informality.

1.6.4

Changes in γ

I interpret γ as the efficiency of law enforcement. Since the functional form of law enforcement is akin to a bivariate exponential distribution, a higher value of γ implies a
lower expected value of informal capital stock.19 Nevertheless, it is not easy to quantitatively interpret an increase in γ. For this reason, I create a grid for this parameter
between 0.5 and 3 (the baseline value is 1.39) and map it into the value of H(k I , g) in the
stochastic steady state. This results in almost monotonic increases in law enforcement
between 0.27 and 0.5. Figure 1.8 shows the graphs with the same structure as before but
now the policy variable in the horizontal axis is γ. The second plot of the second row
in the figure shows that every increase in γ of 0.5 is approximately an increase of ten
percentage points in H(k I , g).
Increasing the quality of institutions mildly decreases the size of the informal sector, as
shown in the first plot of Figure 1.8. However, it has negative effects on aggregate output.
The reason is that a higher γ implies lower MPL and MPK in the informal sector. The
lower MPK is offset by a reduction in informal capital stock, and the lower MPL lowers
labor supply to the informal sector. For wages to equilibrate, the wealth effect dominates,
and the labor supply in the formal sector also decreases. As a result, the MPK in the
formal sector decreases, which is offset by a decrease in the supply of capital stock to the
formal sector. Altogether, this implies lower output in both sectors, hence lower total
output. This results means that in the new equilibrium taxes are too high given a higher
level of enforcement for each scenario, which deter capital accumulation in the formal
sector as well as labor supply to it. This combination hinders aggregate output given the
19

Recall that for any standard exponential distribution with parameter γ, the expected value of the
random variable is 1/γ.
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Figure 1.8: Experiment 4 - Changes in γ

Notes: The figure shows the steady state values of different key variables for different tax rates on income,
γ, shown on the horizontal axis. The first row shows, respectively, the relative size of the informal sector
in terms of the capital stock and GDP. The second figure shows, respectively, government’s expenditure
(and revenue) and law enforcement. The last row shows, respectively, formal and informal capital stocks.

set of taxes. The main takeaway of this experiment is that an improvement in the quality
of institutions that leads to more efficiency of law enforcement must be accompanied by
a corresponding reduction in taxes.

1.7

Discussion

There are three main lessons from the results above: First, the baseline model is able to
match the relative size of the formal sector better than a model without law enforcement
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up to a point that it explains a considerable fraction of relative capital stock (about 0.96)
and relative output (about 0.88). Second, the baseline model is not able to fully explain
the data. This is in line with the literature in the sense that there are other factors
that are absent in the model that help to determine the size of the informal sector, such
as enforcement of contracts (Quintin, 2008), provision of public goods (Loayza, 1999),
and, entry/exit costs, and financial frictions (Hamann et al., 2011). Third, in terms of
optimal policy, decreasing tax rates is not always optimal since there is a trade-off with
enforcement that, as a result, creates a bounded range within which (income) tax rate
increases are optimal to reduce informality.
In the present model, the observed relative TFP is not able to capture all those other
characteristics of the economy that would fully contribute to match the relative size of
the informal sector. In spite of these limitations, it is an important tool for positive
analysis because it shows that law enforcement plays an important role in determining
the relative size of the informal sector, both in terms of the capital stock and output.
Informal firms have incentives to remain small to escape detection, and taxes contribute
to increase such probability by funding government expenditure that is positively related
to the degree of law enforcement.
In terms of normative analysis, the model serves as a point of reference to measure
the impact of different fiscal and institutional policies, given a set of tax rates. The
rationale provided by the model to explain the puzzles observed in the cross-country data
highlights two important venues of research: First, the literature where more government
expenditure provides a benefit to the formal sector, usually through the provision of
public goods (see Bardey and Mejı́a 2019, Posada and Mejı́a 2012, and Loayza 1999), in
the context of law enforcement, usually assumes labor as the only input in the production
function of the informal sector. Embedding this type of framework with law enforcement
that depends on capital stock could be promising in deriving Ramsey-optimal policies.
Moreover, considering the evidence from Leal Ordonez (2014) and Lopez-Martin (2019)
where informal capital stock is an important source of misallocation, and considering that
monitoring plays an important role in that distortion, our framework is a step forward
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to understand how the government can directly quantify such misallocation outcome.
This can be accomplished by weighting the trade-offs between the benefits of increasing
taxes (more enforcement) against its costs. Second, since this work shows how imperfect
law enforcement distorts the marginal productivity of capital and labor in the informal
sector through general equilibrium effects, it is appealing to study the role of imperfect
enforcement in a more granular way. For instance, not all firms may have a symmetric
reaction to law enforcement, and more importantly, there could be a mismatch between
firms’ productivity and enforcement (e.g. firms with higher informal capital stock could
not necessarily be more productive than smaller informal firms), implying lower levels of
informal and aggregate output.

1.8

Conclusion

I build a two-sector (formal and informal) small open economy model augmented with law
enforcement, whereby the effectiveness of this variable depends on the informal capital
stock and government expenditure. I show that the model matches more accurately
the relative size of the informal sector in terms of the capital stock and output than a
framework without law enforcement. I highlight the fact that incorporating this type
of law enforcement is important to match the relative stock of capital in the informal
sector because it provides incentives to remain small to reduce the probability of being
detected in that sector. Simultaneously, the government’s role in law enforcement implies
that tax revenues are non-linear in tax rates, in the form of a Laffer curve. This implies
that tax reductions do not automatically decrease the size of the informal sector. The
model is able to explain standard facts related to informality based on cross-country data,
especially the counter-intuitive findings that show income tax rates and informality are
negatively correlated and law enforcement and informality are positively correlated.
Policy experiments suggest that there are a range of personal income taxes for which the
relation between informality and tax rates is decreasing, which is in contrast with the
standard view. However, the policy that guarantees lower informality and higher output
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is reducing the corporate tax rate. The model suggests that the quality of institutions
plays an important role in determining optimal tax policies. However, it is still not clear
what policies determine the quality of institutions. Moreover, in a context where other
factors that determine the size of the informal sector are not considered in the economy,
the quality of institutions could be explained by other approaches developed in previous
works, such as the endogenous degree of contract enforcement or the provision of public
goods. Embedding those factors into a dynamic framework would contribute to a better
understanding of the determinants of informality and the design of optimal policies to
reduce the size of the informal sector without hindering output and welfare.
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Appendix 1
Cross-country data

Size of the informal sector
To measure the size of the informal sector, I follow Benton and Portes (1989), Pratap
and Quintin (2006b) and Medina and Schneider (2018) to define informality: “Informal
activities are a process of income-generation that is unregulated by the institutions of
society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated.”
Measures of the size of the informal sector in each country are usually either estimates
of informal output as a share of total GDP or estimates of the share of labor that is
informal, which are usually taken from household survey data. The former can be estimated through direct or indirect methods. However, due to the unobserved nature of the
informal sector, cross-country data that is comparable using direct methods may yield
spurious relations. On the other hand, indirect methods, such as the Multiple Indicators
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) relies on standardized observable variables across countries to
estimate the size of the informal sector, which is a latent variable. In this direction,
Medina and Schneider (2018) developed an improved MIMIC procedure that uses light
intensity as one of the determinants of the informal sector instead of the commonly used
aggregate GDP, contributing to a cleaner estimation of the size of informal activity.20
Thus, as measures of the size of the informal sector I use two: First, the aforementioned
estimation from Medina and Schneider (2018), which provides for a set of 158 country
estimates of informal output as a share of total GDP. The second is the standard measure
of informal labor as a share of the total labor force, which I take from the World Bank
Development Indicators (WDI) database.21 This last indicator, however, is restricted to
a subset of 39 countries. For both indicators of informality I calculate the size of the
20

Recent relevant literature such as Schneider and Enste (2002), Schneider (2004), Feld and Schneider
(2010), Schneider and Buehn (2017) discuss where we are in terms of measuring the size of the informal
sector. See also Pratap and Quintin (2006b) for a discussion on different approaches on how to measure
the informal sector.
21
Usually, this data is estimated using monthly survey data of the labor market. Informal workers
are those who do not contribute by any means to social security (specifically, health and pension).
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informal sector for 2016 as well as the average between the 1991 and 2016.
Aggregate economic activity
Aggregate economic activity is measured by per-capita real GDP in PPP terms. The
source is also the WDI database. Those values are calculated for 2016 and the average
of 1991 to 2016.
Law enforcement, quality of institutions, and tax rates
Traditional institutional measures of the quality of institutions or effectiveness of law
enforcement are useful to make qualitative comparisons across countries through rankings
of different categories (such as corruption perception, efficiency of the justice system,
enforcement of property rights, etc.). However, measures that are of a quantitative nature
that can later be mapped into a model are hard to obtain. Therefore, I follow Ihrig
and Moe (2004) and Restrepo-Echavarria (2014) to develop a simple definition of law
enforcement that allows me to obtain a cross-country comparable measure to be mapped
into the model: law enforcement is the probability that any firm or establishment is
audited and fined (by assumption, there is now bribery in this definition).
Following this, I gather data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), which
has firm-level data on 104 countries for one to three years.22 Among the questions in the
survey, aside from the standard ones such as income, number of workers, and others, I
focus on the one that asks whether the firm was audited or not by a government official
during that year. Then, defining Ins as a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the firm
was inspected and 0 when not, the unconditional probability, H, of firm i being inspected
in a given country j at year t is:

PNj,t
Hi,j,t =

Insi,j,t
Nj,t

i=1

Where Nj,t is the total number of firms surveyed in country j at year t. Then, for each
22

The time periods are not the same for each country, for example, Colombian firms appear for the
years 2014 and 2017 but Swedish firms only appear in 2014.
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country, our measure of law enforcement is the average of Hi,j,t across the available years
for such country:

PT
Hi,j =

Hi,j,t
T

t=1

This H is our measure of law enforcement, which follows the definition aforementioned
in this section. Thus, this variable and law enforcement are assumed to be isomorphic.
Additionally, I obtain data to measure the quality of institutions that allow me to untangle
the relationship between the quality of institutions and informality and the one between
law enforcement and informality. These measures are the judicial efficiency index and
control of corruption index, which I take from the World Economic Forum for a subset
of 42 countries in 2016.
Finally, to get the relationship between tax policies, the size of the informal sector, and
law enforcement, I obtain cross-country data on corporate and income tax rates. I use
the data set constructed by Vegh and Vuletin (2015), who develop a data set for tax
rates between 2009 and 2013 that includes corporate taxes, personal income taxes, and
value-added taxes. Since I am not studying the effects of value added taxes in distorting
consumption decisions from households, I only focus on the first two. I use the tax rates
in 2013.

1.9.2

Equilibrium and non-stochastic steady state in a model
without law enforcement

Equilibrium equations in a model without law enforcement
The model with no law enforcement has the following 21 endogenous variables (state and
F
I
controls): cFt , cIt , ct , nFt , nIt , nt , dt+1 , kt+1
, kt+1
, pt , rt , wt , qt , gt , iFt , iIt , ytF , ytI , yt , nxt , λt .

Using the functional forms described in section 1.4, the full system of 21 equilibrium
equations in the standard model is the following:

Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector

49

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

ct = [a(cFt )ρ + (1 − a)(cIt )ρ ]1/ρ

nt = nFt + nIt

(1 − τ y )(wt nFt + rt ktF ) + pt ytI + gt + qt dt+1 = dt + cFt + pt cIt + iFt + pt iIt

ytI = ztI (ktI )αI (nIt )1−αI

F
kt+1
= iFt + (1 − δ)ktF

I
kt+1
= iIt + (1 − δ)ktI

(ct − (nt )ω )−σ [a(cFt )ρ + (1 − a)(cIt )ρ ]1/ρ−1 a(cFt )ρ−1 = λt

pt = (

1 − a cFt 1−ρ
)( I )
a
ct

(ct − (nt )ω )−σ ω(nFt + nIt )ω−1 = λt (1 − τ y )wt

(ct − (nt )ω )−σ ω(nFt + nIt )ω−1 = pt λt (1 − αI )ztI (ktI )αI (nIt )−αI

λt qt = βEt (λt+1 )
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λt = βEt {λt+1 [(1 − τ y )rt+1 + 1 − δ])}

I
I
I
)1−αI + 1 − δ])}
)αI −1 (kt+1
(kt+1
λt pt = βEt {pt+1 λt+1 [αI zt+1

ytF = ztF (ktF )αF (nFt )1−αF

αF ztF (ktF )αF −1 (nFt )1−αF = (1 + τ r )rt

(1 − αF )ztF (ktF )αF (nFt )−αF = (1 + τ r )wt

τW wt nFt + τ r rt ktF + τ y (wt nFt + rt ktF ) = gt

1
¯
= R∗ + ψ[edt+1 −d − 1]
qt

ytI = cIt + iIt

ytF − cFt − iFt − gt
tbt =
ytF

yt = ytF + pt ytI
The competitive equilibrium, as defined by Definition 1.4.1, is a set of policy functions for
the described endogenous variables such that given prices, pt , rt and wt , and the stochasChapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector
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tic process for ztF , it solves the system of equations above and the no-Ponzi constraint
described by Equation 1.9.

Non-stochastic steady state in a model without law enforcement
I drop the time subscript and the expectations operator from all variables to find the
non-stochastic steady state in the standard model. Since solving this non-linear system
of equations requires the use of standard numerical methods, I collapse the system of
equations into a 16-variable system (which is the minimum number of variable needed to
solve the whole system) such that its solution is computationally more efficient. The 16
variables to solve in the non-stochastic steady state are: cF , cI , nF , nI , d, k F , k I , p, r,
w, q, g, iF , iI , y F , y I . The system of 16 equations is the following:

(1 − τ y )(wnF + rk F ) + py I + g + (q − 1)d = cF + pcI + iF + piI

y I = z I (k I )αI (nI )1−αI

k F = δk F

k I = δk I

1 − a cF 1−ρ
)( I )
p=(
a
c

ω(nF + nI )ω−1 = (c)1−ρ a(cF )ρ−1 (1 − τ y )w
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ω(nF + nI )ω−1 = (c)1−ρ (1 − a)(cI )ρ−1 (1 − τ y )(1 − αI )z I (k I )αI (nI )−αI

q=β

1 = β[(1 − τ y )r + 1 − δ]

1 = β[αI z I (k I )αI −1 (nI )1−αI + 1 − δ]

y F = z F (k F )αF (nF )1−αF

αF z F (k F )αF −1 (nF )1−αF = (1 + τ r )r

(1 − αF )z F (k F )αF (nF )−αF = (1 + τW )w

τW wnF + τ r rk F + τ y (wnF + rk F ) = g

d = d¯

y I = cI + iI

With this system of equations we can directly obtain the non-stochastic steady state
values by simply plugging the values found here in the rest of the non-stochastic steady
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state equations of the equilibrium system described in the previous section.

1.9.3

Equilibrium and non-stochastic steady state in the Baseline model

Equilibrium equations - Baseline model
I

Recall that H(ktI , gt ) = 1 − eγ(kt +gt ) . By using this functional form directly in the model,
the baseline model has the same 21 endogenous variables (state and controls) than the
I
F
, pt , rt , wt , qt , gt ,
, kt+1
model without law enforcement: cFt , cIt , ct , nFt , nIt , nt , dt+1 , kt+1

iFt , iIt , ytF , ytI , yt , tbt , λt . However, even though the c.d.f of law enforcement is exogenous,
the probability of being caught and fined operating informally is endogenous. Therefore,
whenever this probability needs to be found, I consider H(ktI , gt ) as endogenous and add
the equation of its functional form to find it. The 21-variable system of equilibrium
equations is then:

ct = [a(cFt )1/ρ + (1 − a)(cIt )1/ρ ]ρ

nt = nFt + nIt

F

(1 − τ y )(wt nFt + rt ktF ) + [1 − τ y φ(1 − eγ(kt +gt ) )]pt ytI + gt + qt dt+1 = dt + cFt + pt cIt + iFt + pt iIt

ytI = ztI (ktI )αI (nIt )1−αI

F
kt+1
= iFt + (1 − δ)ktF
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I
= iIt + (1 − δ)ktI
kt+1

(ct − (nt )ω )−σ [a(cFt )ρ + (1 − a)(cIt )ρ ]1/ρ−1 a(cFt )ρ−1 = λt

pt = (

1 − a cFt 1−ρ
)( I )
a
ct

(ct − (nt )ω )−σ ω(nFt + nIt )ω−1 = λt (1 − τ y )wt

I

(ct − (nt )ω )−σ ω(nFt + nIt )ω−1 = pt λt [1 − τ y φ(1 − e−γ(kt +gt ) )](1 − αI )ztI (ktI )αI (nIt )−αI

λt qt = βEt (λt+1 )

λt = βEt {λt+1 [(1 − τ y )rt+1 + 1 − δ])}

I

I
I
)αI −1 (hIt+1 )1−αI
pt λt = βEt {pt+1 λt+1 [1 − τ y φ(1 − e−γ(kt+1 +gt+1 ) )]αI zt+1
(kt+1
I

I
I
(kt+1
)αI (hIt+1 )1−αI γe−γ(kt+1 +gt+1 ) + 1 − δ}
− zt+1

ytF = ztF (ktF )αF (nFt )1−αF

Chapter 1. Law enforcement and the size of the informal sector

55

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

αF ztF (ktF )αF −1 (nFt )1−αF = (1 + τ r )rt

(1 − αF )ztF (ktF )αF (nFt )−αF = (1 + τ r )wt

I

τW wt nFt + τ r rt ktF + τ y (wt nFt + rt ktF ) + τ y φ(1 − e−γ(kt +gt ) )pt ytI = gt

1
¯
= R∗ + ψ[edt+1 −d − 1]
qt

I

ytI = cIt + iIt + τ y φ(1 − e−γ(kt +gt ) )ytI

tbt =

ytF − cFt − iFt − gt
ytF

yt = ytF + pt ytI
The competitive equilibrium in the baseline model follows Definition 1.4.1.

Non-stochastic steady state - baseline model
Again, for the non-stochastic steady state I drop the time subscripts and the expectations
operators and collapse the system to the following 16 endogenous variables: cF , cI , nF ,
nI , d, k F , k I , p, r, w, q, g, iF , iI , y F , y I . The system of equations that I solve using
numerical methods is:

(wnF + rk F )(1 − τ y ) + [1 − τ y φ(1 − e−γ(k

I +g)

)]py + g + (q − 1)d = cF + pcI + iF + piI
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y I = z I (k I )αI (nI )1−αI

k F = δk F

k I = δk I

p=(

1 − a cF 1−ρ
)( I )
a
c

ω(nF + nI )ω−1 = (c)1−ρ a(cF )ρ−1 (1 − τ y )w

ω(nF + nI )ω−1 = (c)1−ρ (1 − a)(cI )ρ−1 [1 − τ y φ(1 − e−γ(k

I +g)

)](1 − αI )z I (k I )αI (nI )−αI

q=β

1 = β[(1 − τ y )r + 1 − δ]

1 = β{[1−τ y φ(1−e−γ(k

I +g)

)]αI z I (k I )αI −1 (nI )1−αI −τ y φγ(1−e−γ(k

I +g)

)z I (k I )αI (nI )1−αI +1−δ}

y F = z F (k F )αF (nF )1−αF
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αF z F (k F )αF −1 (nF )1−αF = (1 + τ r )r

(1 − αF )z F (k F )αF (nF )−αF = (1 + τW )w

τW wnF + τ r rk F + τ y (wnF + rk F ) + τ y φ(1 − e−γ(k

I +g)

)py I = g

d = d¯

y I = cI + iI + τ y φ(1 − e−γ(k

I +g)

)y I

Once this system is solved, the non-stochastic steady state solution for the rest of the
variables can be obtained by plugging directly into the deterministic steady-state version
of the rest of the equations shown in the previous section.

1.9.4

Changes in τ Y when g is constant

To understand better the role of endogenous government expenditure in affecting law
enforcement and the size of the informal sector, here I assume that g = ḡ. Figure 1.9
shows the result of changes in τ Y . The structure of the figure is the same as in Figure 1.5.
Now, the relationship between the income tax rate and the size of the informal sector
inverts and it is positive for the plausible range of taxes according to the data, which is
counterfactual. The reason why this happens is that whenever the tax increases, revenue
is not increasing, meaning that now government expenditure does not act as a break that
curbs the reduction in law enforcement due to the lower informal capital stock.
Table 1.4 quantifies the differences between the results in Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.9. When
g is endogenous, for the range of income tax rates between 0.01 and 0.15, the table shows
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Figure 1.9: Changes in τ y with constant g

Notes: The figure shows the steady state values of different key variables for different tax rates on income,
τ Y , shown on the horizontal axis. The first row shows, respectively, the relative size of the informal sector
in terms of the capital stock, and GDP. The second figure shows, respectively, government’s expenditure
(and revenue) and law enforcement. The last row shows, respectively, formal and informal capital stocks.

in the second column that the fall in the informal capital stock is larger than the fall in
the formal capital stock (56.07% vs. 51.96%). This yields a fall in the relative size of the
informal sector of 8.55%. This happens because even though law enforcement decreases
39% due to the lower informal capital stock, g increases 51%, curbing the reduction in H.
For the range above the tax rate that maximizes revenue (third column), 0.15, government
expenditure falls and the formal capital stock now falls more than the informal capital
stock, which flips the relationship between income tax rates and informality to the one
in the standard view. On the other hand, when g is exogenous, government expenditure
does not change, thus the fall in H shown in the fourth column for the range of τ Y
between 0.01 and 0.15 is larger than when g is endogenous. Therefore, the decrease in
the informal capital stock is now lower than in the formal sector, which increases the
relative size of the informal sector.
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Table 1.4: The effects of changes in τ Y with endogenous and exogenous g
Change in
τY
kI
kF
pk I /k F
H
g

Endogenous g
0.01-0.15 0.15-0.4
-56.07%
-72%
-51.96%
-77%
-8.55%
22%
-39%
-49%
51%
-36%

Constant g
0.01-0.15 0.15-0.4
-64.42%
-67%
-67.05%
-65%
7.98%
-6%
-46%
-39%
0%
0%

Notes: The table shows for each variable from the second to the last row in the first column what the
percentage change is in its level between the two level of taxes displayed in the second row. Columns
two and three show the case of endogenous government expenditure, and columns four and five show the
case for constant government expenditure.
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Chapter 2
News shocks across countries: An
empirical investigation
Authors: Miguel Acosta Henao (CUNY), and Marius Mihai (CUNY)

2.1

Introduction

The study of the role of news shocks (i.e. anticipated changes to the future state of fundamentals) to total factor productivity (TFP) and other variables in explaining business
cycle fluctuations has been, with a few exceptions, mainly focused on the U.S. economy.
Even though the literature of news shocks can be traced back at least to Pigou (1927),
their study recently became relevant with the seminal work of Beaudry and Portier (2006),
who developed an identification scheme using a vector error correction model where shocks
to TFP are orthogonal to shocks to stock prices. Motivated by them, Barsky and Sims
(2011) developed an alternative identification method that relies on less restrictions than
Beaudry and Portier (2006) to identify news shocks to TFP using a vector autoregression
(VAR) framework. On the structural side, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012), Khan and
Tsoukalas (2012), among others, use Bayesian methods to estimate a medium-scale DSGE
model for the U.S. economy and gauge the role of news shocks in explaining the variance
of output and other macro aggregates. All these studies have the common finding that
the share of output variance explained by news shocks is sizable at different horizons
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(ranging from 15 to 50 p.p.)1 . Regarding the role of news shocks in other countries, Zeev
et al. (2017) use a methodology similar to the one in Barsky and Sims (2011) to identify
commodity terms of trade (CToT) news in a small set of emerging economies, and find
that news shocks of this type explain a sizable fraction of output variance at different
horizons. In the same line, Kamber et al. (2017) used a method akin to Beaudry and
Portier (2006) to identify news shocks to TFP in a small set of developed small open
economies, and show that news shocks to TFP are an important driver of business cycles
in those countries. Departing from the time-series identification approach, Arezki et al.
(2017) identify giant oil and gas discoveries as news shocks about future production of
oil and gas; and find that for a large panel of countries such announcements generate
important movements in current macroeconomic aggregates.
Despite those efforts to quantify the role of news shocks in explaining the variance of
macroeconomic variables, several questions remain in terms of the scope and outreach of
the data used for the previous studies: What is the variance share of output and other
macro aggregates explained by news shocks to TFP across a large set of countries? How
relevant are other type of news shocks in those countries? Are there any differences in the
role of different type of news shocks on the economy between developing and developed
countries? If so, what are the main possible reasons of such differences? Furthermore,
there is an important methodological question for time-series frameworks: How can we
correct for the small-sample bias of the variance decomposition of news shocks identified
using VAR methods?
In this paper we aim to answer those questions2 . For this purpose we use the method
developed by Barsky and Sims (2011) to identify news shocks to TFP, foreign interest
rates and CToT in a large number of countries, and estimate the share of variance in
1

See Beaudry and Portier (2014) for a thorough literature review on the study of news shocks.
An important discussion regarding news shocks in the economy is about whether these type of
shocks can drive business cycles. Theoretically, a simple RBC model generates a recession in response to
good news about future TFP. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose a model for closed economies where
positive news about TFP generate a boom, which is applied to small open economies in Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2008). Nonetheless, we depart from this discussion and focus on the contribution of news shocks
to explain the variance of output and other macro aggregates.
2
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output and other variables explained by the aforementioned news shocks. Since the time
series for cross-country macroeconomic data are relatively short, it is well known that
OLS-VAR estimates of a system based on these data are usually prone to small-sample
bias (Fernández et al., 2017). We develop a simple Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap correction
method to correct for the small sample bias of the estimates. Then, based on our (biascorrected) country-by-country sequential estimation of the the variance share of different
macroeconomic aggregates explained respectively by news shocks to TFP, foreign interest
rates and CToT, we explore the differences among developing and developed countries.
Finally, we perform a simple cross-country OLS estimation to determine, for each share of
output variance explained by each type of news shock, what drives the differences found
between the two types of countries.
Our main findings are that the difference in output variance explained by news shocks
to TFP between developing and developed countries is negligible, whereas the same differences for news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT are both positive. Based on
cross-country estimations using a wide set of variables, we found that the differences of
variance shares of output explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT
between developing and developed countries depend, respectively: Negatively on the level
of financial development and positively on the average net foreign asset position, and positively on both the commodities total trade to GDP ratio and the level of development
in financial markets.
Our results suggest that standard one-sector closed economy business cycle models with
only shocks to TFP are insufficient to study the role of news shocks in the economy, and
that foreign variables seem to be appealing sources of news shocks. However, differences
on the share of output variance explained by news shocks between developing and developed countries arise mainly due to financial markets development and incompleteness,
suggesting that models used to study the effects of news shocks—especially in developing
countries—should not abstract from those features.
The rest of the document is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the empirical strategy,
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consisting on the identification method and the small-sample bias correction method. Section 3 describes the data we use and shows the results for the estimated variance share
of output explained by news shocks across countries. In section 4 we estimate crosscountry regressions to explain what determines the differences of the role of news shocks
in explaining output variance between developing and developed countries, and provide
a short discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes.

2.2

Empirical Strategy

To identify news shocks we follow closely the econometric strategy developed by Barsky
and Sims (2011), where the news shock is identified as the the shock orthogonal to the
innovation in current TFP that best explains variation in future TFP. The underlying
idea behind this procedure is due to Uhlig (2004), who aimed to identify the lowest possible number of structural shocks that could explain the majority of the k-step ahead
prediction error variances in real GNP for horizons up to five years. As mentioned above,
the first ones to develop an empirical methodology to identify news shocks were Beaudry
and Portier (2006). However, our choice of using the method of Barsky and Sims (2011)
relies on the fact that, as explained by them and mentioned by Kurmann and Otrok
(2013), this methodology has embedded the conditions needed for Beaudry and Portier’s
identification to be valid and it is less restrictive with the data. This implies that we can
estimate the system in levels without imposing any type of cointegration relation on the
variables.
In our case, we identify news shocks to three different variables: TFP, foreign interest
rates and CToT. These are variables that have been identified as relevant business cycle
drivers in the international economics literature (see, among others, Shousha 2016 and
Fernández et al. 2018). TFP is usually assumed to be exogenous to a set of standard
macroeconomic variables such as consumption, hours, output and trade balance. Likewise, foreign interest rates and CToT are usually considered exogenous to each country’s
macroeconomic aggregates. However, those three variables could be endogenous among
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them. For instance, there is evidence that commodity prices are inversely related with
foreign interest rates (Fernández et al., 2017), and with country spreads in developing
countries (Drechsel and Tenreyro, 2018); as well as evidence that in economies with financial frictions TFP and foreign interest rates might be inversely related (see Neumeyer
and Perri 2005 and Uribe and Yue 2006). Thus, we perform a sequential estimation
for each country, where the most exogenous variable in the VAR system is only one of
the three aforementioned variables per estimation. This means that for each country we
identify the news shock to each variable by sequentially replacing them in the system
(first TFP, then foreign interest rates instead of TFP and then CToT instead of foreign
interest rates). For the purpose of describing the identification methodology we refer to
either TFP, foreign interest rates, and CToT simply as the exogenous variable.
The exogenous variable is characterized by a dynamic process driven by two shocks. The
first one is the surprise shock which has a contemporaneous effect on the level of the exogenous variable. The second one is the news shock which is observed h years in advance
and it is not allowed to have a contemporaneous effect on the exogenous variable. As
pointed out by Barsky and Sims (2011), a system with one endogenous variable and two
structural shocks is underidentified, which makes it impossible to extract and analyze
the effect of news. This implies that news shocks must originate from other macroeconomic drivers other than the exogenous variable. Hence, our system must be a vector
autoregression with the exogenous variable ordered first, where the news shock is identified as the linear combination of reduced form innovations orthogonal to the exogenous
variable’s innovation which maximizes the share of variance of the exogenous variable at
a finite horizon not explained by its own (contemporaneous) innovation.

2.2.1

Methodology

We define xt to be the k × 1 main vector of macroeconomic variables of length T . Let
the VAR be specified as follows:

xt = A0 + A1 xt−1 + A2 xt−2 + . . . + Ap xt−p + t = A(L)t
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Where p represents the number of lags, A0 is a vector of constants, and Σ = E(t 0t ) is
the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovations. The structural moving
average representation of the VAR is:

xt = B(L)et

(2.2)

Here B(L) are k × k matrices representing moving average coefficients, and et is an array
of structural shocks. The linear mapping between innovations t and structural shocks et
is given by:
t = W0 et

(2.3)

Where B(L) = A(L)W0 and et = W0−1 t . We use a Choleski decomposition of the
innovation covariance matrix Σ = W0 W00 to determine W0 . The share of forecast error
variance of variable i due to structural shock j at horizon h is:
Ph
Ωi,j (h) =

0
Bi,τ W0 γγ 0 W00 Bi,τ
Ph
0
τ =0 Bi,τ ΣBi,τ

τ =0

(2.4)

The term γ is the j − th column of D, W0 γ represents the k × 1 impulse vector, and Bi,τ
selects the i-th row of the matrix of moving average coefficients. Since we are interested
in identifying news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates, and CToT, we have to order
each of this exogenous variables first in their respective VAR system. As the exogenous
variable is driven by two structural shocks it must be that the surprise shock and news
shock drive all of its variation:

Ω1,1 (h) + Ω1,2 (h) = 1

(2.5)

Such that Ω1,1 (h) is the share of variance explained by the surprise shock, and Ω1,2 (h) is
the share of variance explained by the news shock. Since the relationship above cannot be
expected to hold at all horizons h when adding more variables to the system, the idea is to
bring it as close to one as possible by choosing a γ ∗ that maximizes the contribution of the
news shock in the variance decomposition of Equation 2.4. Therefore, the optimization
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problem is:

∗

γ = max

H
X

Ω1,2 (h) =

h=0

H
X

Ph

0
Bi,τ W0 γγ 0 W00 Bi,τ
Ph
0
τ =0 Bi,τ ΣBi,τ

τ =0

h=0

s.t. γ 0 γ = 1

(2.6)

γ(1) = 0
W0 (1, j) = 0
Where the first constraint ensures that γ has unit length (such that it belongs to an
orthonormal matrix), and the other two do not allow for a contemporaneous effect of the
news shock on the exogenous variable. Details on solving the above optimization problem
can be found in the appendix of Uhlig (2004). The solution resumes to the identification
of γ ∗ as the first principal component of the observed exogenous variable orthogonalized
with respect to its own innovation.

2.2.2

Small sample bias correction

Due to the small-sample nature of macroeconomic time series (specially at yearly frequencies, which is our case), OLS estimates of VAR coefficients are prone to small sample bias.
As a result, estimated impulse responses and variance decomposition at any horizon inherit the same issue.
We develop a bias correction algorithm which is based on the Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
method developed by Kilian (1998). This method was originally applied to correct for
small sample bias in impulse responses. Since the share of variance due to news shocks
in Equation 2.4 depends directly on the estimated impulse response at horizon h, this
method can be easily applied to obtain a bias corrected estimate of Ω1,2 . Kilian (1998)
shows how this method outperforms standard Bootstrap or Monte Carlo correction methods3 . Even in VAR systems with potentially cointegrated and non-stationary variables,
3
As Kilian (1998) mentions, standard Bootstrap methods are not valid in models with exact unit
root. Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017) provide an extensive treatment of Bootstrap correction methods for
VAR systems, they show how standard methods are not valid for VARs in levels.
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where standard bootstrap methods are not considered to be valid, multiple simulations
show that Killian’s method is better than its competitors when it comes down to correcting the small sample bias. This last feature is, for our case, the main advantage of the
Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap method and it is the main reason of basing our algorithm on
it, because the methodology developed by Barsky and Sims (2011) has the advantage that
it can be estimated for VARs in levels without imposing any cointegration restrictions.
The algorithm is the following:

Step 1.
1A. Estimate the VAR in Equation 2.1: xt = A0 + A1 xt−1 + A2 xt−2 + . . . + Ap xt−p + t .
Define Âp as the matrix of OLS coefficients for lag-p variables, and ˆt as the OLS estimated
vector of standard errors at period t. Use these estimates to generate a time series for xt
of size T (the number of periods in the data) by predicting xt as: x̂t B = Â0 + Â1 xt−1 +
B
is the bootstrap-predicted value of xt using the
Â2 xt−2 + . . . + Âp xt−p + ˆB
t . Where x̂t

OLS coefficients in Â, ˆB
t is the the vector of bootstrapped standard errors (ˆt ) for every
t = 1, 2...T obtained by resampling (with replacement).
1B. Use the predicted series x̂t B to re estimate the VAR as follows: x̂t B = A0 B +A1 B xt−1 +
B
A2 B xt−2 + . . . + Ap B xt−p + B
t . Which yields the matrix of estimated coefficients Â =
B

B

B

B

[Â0 Â1 ......Âp ]. Store ÂB as Âj .
1C. Repeat steps 1A and 1B 1000 times, then calculate Â∗ =

P1000
j=1

B

Âj /1000. The

theoretical bias term is Ψ = E(Â − A), thus the bias estimate is E(Ψ̂) = E(Â∗ − Â),
which means that the bias estimate is: Ψ̂ = Â∗ − Â

Step 2.
2A. Define mod(Â) as the absolute value of the maximum eigenvalue of the companion
matrix of Â. If mod(Â) > 1, then the bias corrected estimate of A is Ã = Â− Ψ̂(1−0.01i),
where i = 1, 2, 4... is the ith iteration such that mod(Ã) ≤ 1. If after 100 iterations
mod(Â) > 1, then pick Ã with the minimum mod(Â) among all iterations. If mod(Â) ≤ 1,
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then the corrected bias estimate of Â is Ã = Â − Ψ̂ = 2Â − Â∗ . This step avoids getting
explosive estimates in further iterations.
2B. Use Ã to re estimate the standard errors such that xt − Ãxt = BB , where BB denotes
the re estimated standard errors.
by standard resampling (with replacement), this is the
2C. Use Ã and BB to build xBB
t
Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap new series for xt .
2D. Estimate again the VAR model in Equation 2.1, and store the matrix of coefficients
as ÃBB
k . Repeat steps 2C and 2D 2000 times.
Step 3.
3A. For each matrix ÃBB
re calculate the bias, such that the new Bootstrap-afterk
Bootstrap bias is now: ΨBB
= ÃBB
− Ã. Use this result to calculate Bootstrap-afterk
k
Bootstrap corrected estimates of coefficients (BBC): ÃBBC
= 2Ã − ÃBB
k
k
3B. For k = 1, 2, ...2000 plug each ÃBBC
coefficient into the VAR model to compute
k
the BBC estimates of the standard errors, BBC
, and their respective variance-covariance
k
matrix, ΣBBC
.
k
3C. For k = 1, 2, ...2000 use the methodology from Barsky and Sims (2011) described in
subsection 2.2.1 to estimate the BBC share of variance explained by both the surprise
BBC
shock, ΩBBC
1,1,k , and the news shock, Ω1,2,k .

3D. Calculate the mean BBC estimate of the share of variance explained by news shocks:
P
BBC
Ω̄BBC
= 2000
1,2
k=1 Ω1,2,k /2000
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Estimation
Data

We put together a comprehensive data set for a large number of countries. For this
purpose we start by gathering data on output, Yt , aggregate private consumption, Ct ,
trade balance to GDP ratio, T Bt , and labor Ht . The time subscript t has a yearly
frequency, and all series are available from 1950 to 2017. Aside from T Bt , which is a ratio,
all the macroeconomic variables are in real PPP terms (except for Ht which is the size
of the labor force). We obtain these series from the 9.1-Version of the Penn World Table
(Feenstra et al., 2015)4 . We use our small-sample biased correction algorithm to estimate
the share of variance of the aforementioned variables explained, separately, by three
exogenous variables: T F Pt , Rt∗ , and CT oTt . For the total factor productivity, T F Pt , we
use the country-by-country estimates from the Penn World Table. For the foreign interest
rate, Rt∗ , we build an ex-post real interest rate series using the 2-year American T-Bill
and the CPI (this series is common for all countries). For the commodity terms of trade,
CT oTt , we use the comprehensive data set developed by Gruss and Kebhaj (2019), who
built a country-by-country commodity terms of trade series for 182 countries covering
the period 1962-2018. Finally, to classfy countries between developed and developing,
we use the World Bank’s income classification system. Countries consider high-income
economies are considered developed, the rest are considered developing.
We only consider time series that start at the latest in the year 1970. Due to having
different sources of data, and considering that the Penn World Table lacks of a TFP
estimate for a few countries since 1970 (or before), the number of countries available to
perform the estimation is not the same for each exogenous variable. Table 2.1 summarizes,
for each exogenous variable (first column), the total number of countries available for
estimation and the number of countries by our two categories of study (developed and
developing). For TFP we have 83 countries, 42 developed and 41 developing; for the
4

The Penn World Table provides a unique comparable source for all variables, even though the
frequency is yearly and not quarterly.
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foreign interest rate we have 106 countries, 46 developed and 60 developing; and for
CToT we have 103 countries, 43 developed and 50 developing.
Table 2.1: Countries available for estimation by each exogenous variable
Exogenous Variable
T F Pt
Rt∗
CT oTt

Total Countries
83
106
103

Developed Countries
42
46
43

Developing Countries
41
60
60

Notes: The table reports in the second column, for each exogenous variable (first column) the total
amount of countries we have available to perform country-by-country estimations of the output variance
share of the variables in the VAR explained by news shocks. The third and fourth columns break down
the total number of countries by type of country.

2.3.2

VAR system

We build a 5-variable VAR system as the one described in Equation 2.1, where xt =
[Et , Ct , Ht , Yt , T Bt ]0 . The exogenous variable Et comes from the vector Et = [T F Pt , Rt∗ , CT oTt∗ ]0 .
The first four variables are the same as in Barsky and Sims (2011) (though they only use
TFP as exogenous variable in their estimation), and we include T Bt to factor in the current account dynamics, which is crucial to understand business cycles in open economies.
We sequentially apply the identification technique described in subsection 2.2.2 to identify news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates, and CToT, and estimate the forecast error
variance decomposition (FEVD) for each variable at a 5-year horizon5 . As usual in VARs
at yearly frequencies using macroeconomic data, the number of lags is 1. The order of
the VAR is the same as the order of the variables in xt 6 .

2.3.3

Results

We report our results focusing on the (bias-corrected) share of output variance explained
by news shocks to each exogenous variable, ΩBB
1,2 , in developed and developed countries.
First, in Table 2.2, we report the size of the small sample bias. There, for each type
5

Our results are similar across 1-year and 3-year horizons.
In terms of ordering the variables, the only thing that matters is that Et is the first one, which is
standard given that TFP, foreign interest rates and CToT are assumed to be exogenous in the business
cycle literature. The order of the other variables in the VAR is irrelevant for the FEVD with respect to
the news shock.
6
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of country, we report in the third column of the table the cross-country mean share of
output variance explained by news shocks to each exogenous variable estimated using the
regular Barsky and Sims’ method, Ω1,2 . In the fourth column of the table we report the
boostrap-after-bostrap bias corrected estimate, ΩBB
1,2 . In the last column of Table 2.2 we
report the mean cross-country small sample bias for each exogenous variable: ΩBB
1,2 − Ω1,2 .
From Table 2.2 there are two results that are worth noticing: 1) The small sample
bias for each exogenous variable by each type of country is not symmetric (albeit for
TFP is very similar). While for TFP, foreign interest rates and CToT, it is respectively
(in p.p.) 1.9, 5.8, and -4.9; for developed countries it is respectively 2.6, 2.3 and 1.1. Since our focus is the difference of the importance of news shocks in explaining
output variance between developing and developed countries, the heterogeneity in the
bias matters towards quantifying this difference. 2) As observed in the bias of CToT for
both types of countries, the direction of the bias is not necessarily positive. Fernández
et al. (2017) mention an upward small-sample bias in variance decomposition estimates
of VAR models; however in our case from Equation 2.4 there is no guarantee that the
bias must have one unique direction. This result stresses even further the importance
of correcting for small-sample bias when analyzing differences among the two types of
countries.
Table 2.2: Cross-country mean estimates of: Ω1,2 , ΩBB
1,2 , and small sample bias (all in
p.p.)
Country
Type
Developed

Developing

Exogenous
Variable
T F Pt
R∗
CT oTt
T F Pt
R∗
CT oTt

Cross-Country Cross-Country
Cross-Country
BB
Mean Ω1,2
Mean Ω1,2
Mean Small Sample Bias
12.8
14.7
1.9
12.2
18
5.8
20.3
15.4
-4.9
13
15.6
2.6
22.1
24
2.3
24.8
23.7
-1.1

Notes: For each type of country (first column) the table reports: In the third column, the cross-country
mean (uncorrected) share of output variance explained by news shocks to each exogenous variable in the
second column. In the fourth column, the cross-country mean of bias-corrected share of output variance
explained by news shocks to each exogenous variable in the second column. The last column shows the
respective mean small sample bias of each estimate.

Second, for each exogenous variable and type of country, we report in Table 2.3 both
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the mean (third column) and median (last column) Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap bias corrected estimates of the share of output variance explained by news shocks, ΩBB
1,2 , as well
as the difference between developing and developed countries. Notice that the share of
output variance explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT is sizable,
and always greater than the estimates for TFP. The mean differences of ΩBB
1,2 for TFP,
foreign interest rate, and CToT are respectively (in p.p.) 0.9, 6 and 8.3. The median
differences are respectively -0.8, 4.7 and 12 p.p. Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show the crosscountry Kernel densities of the mean ΩBB
1,2 for each shock in each type of country. From
Figure 2.1 we can observe that the mean difference of share of output variance explained
by news shocks to TFP is negligible, and the densities of both developed and developing
countries are similar. However, in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 the result is different, supporting
the findings on Table 2.3. In Figure 2.2 the difference in means for the share of output
variance explained by foreign interest rates between developing (dashed line) and developed countries is that the distribution of ΩBB
1,2 in developing countries has lower kurtosis
and a fatter right tail than the density for developed countries. This means that there is
a group of developing countries that drives this difference in spite of the distribution for
developed countries also having a relatively fat right tail. In Figure 2.3, the difference
of output variance explained by news shocks to CToT is driven also by a lower kurtosis
in the density of developing countries and a fatter right tail. It is worth noticing that
the density of developed countries in Figure 2.3 is not unimodal, and there is a group
of countries with high share of output explained by news shocks to CToT. Were this
group not be part of the sample, the gap among developing and developed countries for
ΩBB
1,2 with respect to CToT would be even wider, as shown by the difference in medians
documented in Table 2.3 (12 p.p.).
From these set of results we summarize our main findings as: 1) The share of output
variance explained by shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT is considerable when
contrasted to the estimates for TFP. 2) The difference between developing and developed
countries of the share of output variance explained by TFP is negligible. 3) The mean
difference between developing and developed countries of the share of output variance
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Table 2.3: Mean and median estimates of ΩBB
1,2 by country type, and differences between
developing and developed countries (all in p.p.)
Exogenous
Variable
T F Pt

R∗

CT oTt

Country
Type
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed

Cross-Country Cross-Country
Mean ΩBB
Median ΩBB
1,2
1,2
14.7
12.3
15.6
11.5
0.9
-0.8
18
13.8
.
24
18.5
6
4.7
15.4
6.8
23.7
18.8
8.3
12

Notes: For both developed and developing countries, the table reports the cross-country mean and median
bias-corrected shares of output variance explained by news shocks, ΩBB
1,2 , to each exogenous variable in
the first column. Within each exogenous variable, the third row reports the difference between developing
and developed countries for the mean (third column) and median estimates of ΩBB
1,2

Figure 2.1: Cross-country mean distribution ΩBB
1,2 for TFP by type of country

Notes: The figure shows the cross-country Kernel distributions of, respectively, the share of output variance explained by news shocks to Total Factor Productivity in both developed and developing (dashedline) countries. Vertical bars represent the mean of each distribution.
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Figure 2.2: Cross-country mean distribution ΩBB
1,2 for Foreign Interest Rate by type of
country

Notes: The figure shows the cross-country Kernel distributions of, respectively, the share of output
variance explained by news shocks to the Foreign Interest Rate in both developed and developing (dashedline) countries. Vertical bars represent the mean of each distribution.

explained by foreign interest rates is 6 p.p. 4) The difference between developing and
developed countries of the share of output variance explained by CToT is 8.3 p.p. We show
in the appendix that these patterns regarding the differences of share of variance explained
by news shocks between both types of countries hold also for aggregate consumption, and
the trade balance to GDP ratio; but do not hold for labor7 .
7

In the appendix we provide a plausible explanation of why the difference of the share of variance
in labor explained by news shocks between developed and developing countries does not follow the same
patterns than the rest of the macroeconomic variables. We also report the country by country Boostrapafter-Boostrap bias corrected estimates ΩBB
1,2 for each exogenous variable.
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Figure 2.3: Cross-country mean distribution ΩBB
1,2 for CToT by type of country

Notes: The figure shows the cross-country Kernel distributions of, respectively, the share of output
variance explained by news shocks to Commodity Terms of Trade in both developed and developing
(dashed-line) countries. Vertical lines represent the mean of each distribution.

2.4

Explaining the Relevance of News Shocks

It is well known in the business cycle literature that developing countries have a more
volatile business cycle than developed countries. Our findings in the previous section
suggest that news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT have an active role in driving
output variance to a higher extent in developing countries than in developed. Therefore,
in this section we attempt to shed light on what determines the share of output variance
explained by both news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT. In other words, we
dig one layer deeper into understanding what measures of economic development lie
behind the relevance such type of news shocks8 . We estimate the following cross-country
regression:
8

Since there are no differences between developed and developing countries in the share of output
variance explained by news shocks to TFP, we do not explore the determinants of these type of shocks.
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βji Zji + ui

(2.7)

j=2

Where i ={Foreign interest rate, CToT}, ΩBB,i
is the share of output variance explained
1,2
by news shocks to variable i, β0i is the intercept, D is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the country is developing and 0 if it is developed, β1i is the coefficient of D,
βji is the j th coefficient corresponding to the independent variable zji for the regression
with independent variable i. The last term, ui , is the normally distributed mean-zero
disturbance. For each i we run different regressions, with different independent variables
that vary within and across each variable.
To choose the vector of dependent variables, Z i , that will be part of different regressions
within each i we use a set of possible dependent variables that capture the level of financial development, financial constraints, commodities trade, institutional quality and
structural change of each country. In the appendix we provide details on the sources of
these data. After trying out different variables we report regressions with those coefficients that turned out significant, which are: 1) For news shocks to the foreign interest
rate, Z 1 =[Net foreign assets/GDP, Domestic credit provided by financial sector/GDP].
The first variable represents the country average between 1970 and 2017 of net foreign
assets to GDP ratio. The second variable represents the 1960 to 2017 country average
of domestic credit provided by the financial sector to GDP ratio. 2) For news shocks to
CToT, Z 2 =[Commodities total trade/GDP, Stocks market cap/GDP]. The first variable
is the 1960 to 2017 country average total trade of commodities (i.e. exports plus imports)
to GDP ratio. The second variable is the 1960 to 2017 country average stock market capitalization to GDP ratio9 .
For both types of news shocks, we try four different regressions where the intercept is
always assumed to be different than zero. In the first regression (Reg 1) we assume that
9

For each variable that we averaged during the full available period in their original set there is crosscountry heterogeneity on the first period from when data is available. We use the maximum number of
periods available for each country.
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only β1 6= 0. In the second regression (Reg 2) we assume that only β1 6= 0 and β2 6= 0.
In the third regression (Reg 3) we assume that all coefficients are different than zero. In
the fourth regression (Reg 4) we shut down the dummy, such that we assume β1 = 0, and
explore the effect of the other coefficients without it.

2.4.1

Determinants of output variance explained by news shocks
to foreign interest rates

Table 2.4 shows the results for each of the four regressions above in the case where the
independent variable is the share of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign
interest rates. We report the coefficients with their associated level of significance and (in
parenthesis) their correspondent robust standard errors. In the first column we have D
and the variables in Z. The last row shows the R squared for each regression. In the first
regression (second column of the table) we can see, as expected based on the results in the
previous section, that the coefficient of D is positive, significant at a 5% level and virtually
equal to the difference in mean ΩBB
1,2 between developing and developed countries reported
in Table 2.3. The results of the second regression show that D remains significant at a
5% level but now the average net foreign assets to GDP ratio is significant and positive.
This can be interpreted as lower levels of net external debt imply higher relevance of
news shocks to foreign interest rates in explaining output volatility. This can be related
to the literature of sudden stops and overborrowing, where countries that have more
net foreign debt exhibit financial collateral constraints and less average capital mobility
(see Mendoza 2010 and Bianchi 2011) than less constrained economies. Countries where
there is more financial mobility, due to less levels of foreign indebtedness, seem to react
more to news shocks to foreign interest rates. The third regression, shown in the third
column of Table 2.4, shows that once we include the domestic credit provided by the
financial sector to GDP ratio, not only it is not a significant variable at any standard
level of significance, but also D is not significant anymore. Thus, we run the fourth
regression (fifth column), where we assume that β1 = 0. In this case the net foreign
assets to GDP ratio remains significant but now the new variable is also significant at a
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5% level. Its coefficient is negative, meaning that less financially developed countries are
expected to react more in terms of output to news shocks to foreign interest rates. This
corroborates the fact that the financial frictions channel is relevant to explain business
cycles in developing countries, and that an important part of shocks transmissions in less
financially developed economies is trough the effect of news shocks10 . Since removing the
dummy variable generated a significance of the domestic credit provided by the financial
sector to GDP ratio, we suspect that the latter is a good predictor of the former (i.e.
there could be high colineality between those two variables). Therefore, we regress D with
respect to the last variable of the model, and report the result in the last column of the
table. The coefficient is significant at all standard levels, and the R squared is relatively
high, confirming that high levels of financial development are related lower probability
of being a developing country11 . This result is standard in the development literature.
In other words, the difference of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign
interest rates between developing and developed countries stems mainly from the level of
financial development.
Table 2.4: Cross-country regression: ΩBB
1,2 - Foreign interests rates
Dependent Variable
ΩBB,i
- i = Foreign Interest Rates
1,2
Independent Variable Z
Developing
Dummy

Reg 1

Reg 2

Reg 3

5.93*

9.12**

5.20

(3.50)

(3.89)
4.84***
(1.68)

(5.04)
4.64***
(1.56)

3.62***
(1.33)

-0.06

-0.09**

-0.0061***

(0.04)
0.072

(0.04)
0.062

(0.0007)
0.400

Net foreign assets/GDP
Domestic credit provided
by financial sector/GDP
R-squared

0.024

0.057

Reg 4

Developing
Dummy
Reg 5

Notes: ***,** and * are are significant at, respectively, 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. Regressions 1 to 4 correspond to the model in Equation 2.7. The last
column regresses the Development Dummy against the Domestic credit provided by financial sector to
GDP ratio.
10

See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), and Chang and Fernández (2013) for referents
in the literature regarding the role of financial frictions and business cycles.
11
In this regression the dependent variable is a dummy, so the estimated model by OLS is standard
a linear probability model.
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Determinants of output variance explained by news shocks
to foreign interest rates

Table 2.5 shows the result for each of the four regressions when the dependent variable
is the share of output variance explained by news shocks to CToT. The structure of the
table is the same than the one in Table 2.4. As in the case of foreign interest rates,
regression 1 yields a coefficient that is significant at a 5% level and its value is the
same as the difference in Ω1,2 between developing and developed countries for CToT.
Adding the total trade of commodities to GDP ratio does not change the relevance of
D in the estimation. This ratio is also significant at the 5% level and supports the
hypothesis that countries with more trade of commodities are affected more by shocks
to commodity prices12 . Even though this result is not novel, it does shed light on two
important issues: First, not only news shocks to commodities terms of trade are important
drivers of the business cycles in developing countries (in line with the findings of Zeev
et al. 2017), but they are also relevant for developed countries. Second, some studies
focus on gauging the role of commodity terms of trade shocks in explaining the business
cycle in commodity exporting economies, while we find that also factoring imports of
commodities is of high relevance (for instance in Singapur, news shocks to commodity
terms of trade explain 33% of the variance in output, even though the country is a net
importer of commodities). In regression three the stock market capitalization to GDP
ratio is significant at the 5% level, but now D is not, which make us suspect that the effect
of the variation in the latter is being annulled by the one in the former. When removing
D, regression 4 shows that both remaining dependent variables are significant (at 1% and
5% levels respectively). Regressing D with respect to the stock market capitalization to
GDP ratio yields a significant coefficient at the 5% level, which now shows that the
level of development explains differences if the role of news shocks to CToT between
developing and developed countries through the degree at which financial markets are
developed. Considering that trading commodities (specially oil) is usually related with
trade of financial instruments, having more developed financial markets brings about
12

See Shousha (2016), Fernández et al. (2018), and Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018).
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more possibilities of hedging against market risk. Borensztein et al. (2013) show sizable
welfare gains for commodity exporters by hedging against changes to commodity prices
in financial markets. Our results point out to the same direction, but focused on the
role of news shocks. Indeed, news shocks to CToT would theoretically have zero effects
on output in a world with fully complete markets, thus getting closer to that scenario
through more developed financial markets related to commodity prices could in principle
lead to a lower share of output variance explained by news shocks to CToT.
Table 2.5: Cross-country regression: ΩBB
1,2 - Commodity terms of trade
Dependent Variable
ΩBB,i
- i = CToT
1,2
Independent Variable Z
Developing
Dummy

Reg 1

Reg 2

Reg 3

8.37**

7.30**

1.24

(3.47)

(3.37)

(3.63)

0.46**

0.57***

0.57***

(0.18)

(0.17)

(0.17)

-0.14**

-0.14**

-0.0035**

(0.06)
0.187

(0.06)
0.186

(0.001)
0.074

Commodities
total trade/GDP
Stocks
market cap/GDP
R-squared

0.053

0.117

Reg 4

Developing
Dummy
Reg 5

Notes: ***,** and * are are significant at, respectively, 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. Regressions 1 to 4 correspond to the model in Equation 2.7. The last
column regresses the Development Dummy against the Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio.

2.5

Conclusion

News shocks to commonly known drivers of the business cycle have been studied in
the literature for a small set of countries, focused mostly on news shocks to TFP, are
prone to small-sample bias, and have not been compared in terms of their importance
to the business cycle between developing and developed countries. We contribute to the
literature by addressing these issues. We develop a simple Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
bias correction method to estimate the role of news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates
and CToT in explaining output (as well as other macroeconomic aggregates) variance
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for a large sample of countries. We show that while the importance of news shocks
to TFP in explaining the business cycle is similar between developing and developed
countries, it is higher for news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT in developing
countries than in developed. The main drivers of these differences are, for foreign interest
rates, the level of financial development and net foreign indebtedness; and for CToT,
the total trade of commodities to GDP ratio and the degree to which financial markets
(i.e. stock markets and those others related to them) are developed. From a theoretical
perspective, our results suggest that studying the role of news shocks in business cycles
with one-sector models with only TFP shocks may fall short in gauging correctly the
importance of such shocks. Moreover, for developing countries, when studying news
shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT, financial frictions and market incompleteness
are relevant features that should generate endogenously more importance of news shocks
to these variables than in developed countries. Understanding to what degree news shocks
contribute to higher output and consumption volatility, specially in developing countries,
through these channels in a general equilibrium setting could probe useful to quantify
welfare implications of smoother business cycles in those economies.

Chapter 2. News shocks across countries: An empirical investigation

82

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

2.6
2.6.1

Miguel Acosta Henao

Appendix 2
Estimation of ΩBB
1,2 for the other variables in the VAR system.

Here we report the results in Table 2.3 extended to the share of Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
bias corrected estimates of the share of variance in, respectively, consumption, labor and
trade balance, explained by each type of news shock.
Table 2.6 shows these results, where the structure is the same as in Table 2.3 but for each
of the macro aggregates in the VAR aside from the exogenous variable. For consumption
and trade balance the difference of output variance explained by news shocks to exogenous
variables between both types of countries remains qualitatively similar than that for
output. However, it is worth noticing that for the trade balance, news shocks to CToT
seem to have the same effect on developed than developing countries.
Contrary to what happens with the aforementioned aggregates and output, for labor
(H) the mean share of variance explained by news shocks in all variables is higher in
developed countries than in developing. This is aligned with the view that labor supply
has a higher elasticity in developed countries than in developing countries. Also, for news
shocks to generate comovements in the aggregates the wealth effect over labor supply is
crucial (see Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009). When such effect is relatively high, positive
news about TFP generate a recession. Our results suggest that ad-hoc shut downs of this
effect in models to study news shocks in developed countries might artificially lead to
inadequate impulse responses to news shocks; and support conducting prior estimation
of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wealth before performing counter factual
exercises with the model.

2.6.2

Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB
1,2

In this section we report the country-by-country estimates of ΩBB
1,2 for each endogenous
variable in the VAR system to news shocks in each exogenous variable. Table 2.7, TaChapter 2. News shocks across countries: An empirical investigation
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ble 2.8, and Table 2.9 report, respectively, the results for news shocks to TFP, foreign
interest rates and CToT. The second column of each table shows the income classification
according to the World Bank, where the highest possible value is 4 and this is equivalent
to being a developed country in our classification. The other income classifications, 1-3,
are categorized in our estimations as developing countries. The last five columns of each
table represent, respectively, the share of variance of the exogenous variable, consumption, labor, output and trade balance (as a share of output) that is explained by the news
shock to the exogenous variable.

2.6.3

Details on the data for the Cross-Country regression.

We have a set of candidate variables, starting with those related to financial development
measures: Domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP, net foreign
assets as a share of GDP, stocks market capitalization as a share of GDP, and net stock
of derivatives as a share of GDP. For commodities trade we use total trade (exports plus
imports) in commodities as a share of output. For institutional quality we use the Doing
Business score. For variables of structural change we use the share of value added in
industry and service sectors.
The net foreign assets to GDP ratio for each country is taken from the data set developed
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018). To calculate the commodities total trade to GDP
ratio we use the United Nations Comtrade database. From it we calculate the share
of commodities trade (identified as those commodities that have an international price
reported in the World Bank Pink Sheet) over total trade of goods and services. We use
the SITC classification. Then, for each country c, we calculate the share of total trade
in commodities over total trade as αc =

PN

EXPic +IM Pic
,
EXP c +IM P c

i=1

where EXPic and IM Pic are

exports and imports of commodity i, and EXP c + IM P c is the total trade in country c, and then the share of total trade in commodities to GDP ratio in country c as:
c

c

+IM P
Commodities total tradec /GDPc = αc ∗ EXPGDP
. We calculate the average total trade
c

of commodities to GDP ratio between 1960 (or later depending on the country) and 2017
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for each country. The rest of the variables are taken from the World Bank Development
Indicators.
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Table 2.6: Mean and median estimates of ΩBB
1,2 for each endogenous variable in the VAR
by country type, and differences between developed and developing countries
VAR
Variable

Exogenous
Variable
T F Pt

C

R∗

CT oTt

T F Pt

H

R∗

CT oTt

T F Pt

Y

R∗

CT oTt

T F Pt

TB

R∗

CT oTt

Country
Type
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing-Developed
.

Cross-Country Cross-Country
Mean ΩBB
Median ΩBB
1,2
1,2
18.1
14.7
21.0
14.3
2.89
-0.31
14.1
12.6
23.9
13.3
9.7
0.7
18.7
13.9
23.2
15.8
4.53
1.85
23.3
20.0
19.4
11.3
-3.94
-8.67
17.3
11.8
14.6
13.3
-2.72
1.45
22.8
15.0
18.1
11.5
-4.69
-3.52
14.7
12.3
15.6
11.5
0.9
-0.9
18.0
13.8
24.0
18.5
6
4.7
15.4
6.8
23.7
18.8
8.3
12.1
28.43
21.58
28.41
26.48
-0.02
4.90
29.29
21.95
35.01
30.50
5.72
8.55
26.32
18.17
26.39
22.64
0.07
4.47

Notes: For both developed and developing countries, the table reports the cross-country mean and
median bias-corrected shares of the variance of each macro aggregate in the first column explained by
news shocks, ΩBB
1,2 , to each exogenous variable in the second column. Within each exogenous variable,
the third row reports the difference between developing and developed countries for the mean (third
column) and median estimates of ΩBB
1,2
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Table 2.7: Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB
1,2 for TFP as exogenous variable
Country
Income Class TFP
C
H
Y
TB
Burkina Faso
1
7.18 14.47 9.37 12.81 2.38
Mozambique
1
2.63
4.44 8.79 6.23 10.3
Niger
1
52.67 14.49 54.38 65.95 5.28
Senegal
1
78.23 42.41 9.19 32.56 81.95
Tanzania
1
12.38 38.03 2.15 1.34 34.59
Zimbabwe
1
13.46 10.62 7.2 11.46 49.69
Angola
2
9.14 69.23 4.13
9.5 29.76
Bolivia
2
10.49 10.53 52.57 5.53 26.64
Côte dIvoire
2
1.23
6.96 7.52 5.74 57.56
Cameroon
2
24.63 28.05 40.78 23.63 49.44
Egypt
2
29.38 1.38
61
3.89 10.05
Honduras
2
22.82 14.03 9.61 0.48 35.76
Indonesia
2
51.12 8.56 41.82 39.91 20.34
India
2
6.92 14.22 0.61 3.15 26.32
Kenya
2
24.34 52.96 2.1
1.64 14.25
Sri Lanka
2
12.95 10.92 61.57 4.24 13.28
Morocco
2
2.77
5.54 20.13 11.47 28.4
Nigeria
2
11.59 18.78 9.05 11.47 58.72
Philippines
2
18.2 11.97 54.38 13.64 36.87
Sudan
2
18.53 63.44 4.43 44.64 2.77
Tunisia
2
19.41 9.66 7.73 14.18 18.73
Bulgaria
3
32.86 18.88 39.39 9.15 29.68
Brazil
3
14.98 40.23 35.16 19.12 14.09
China
3
1.92
9.83 11.34 16.64 22.59
Colombia
3
23.05 30.95 20.3 28.42 22.43
Costa Rica
3
21.53 19.95 1.89 18.23 51.01
Dominican Republic
3
11.33 18.76 16.76 12.67 27.84
Ecuador
3
28.35 9.35 45.76 14.99 0.61
Guatemala
3
15.39 5.46 11.23 13.1 23.18
Iran
3
23.18 26.26 2.74 40.77 37.4
Iraq
3
9.4
4.54 13.49 7.67 27.75
Jamaica
3
11.32 16.84 3.89 1.43 9.28
Jordan
3
65.49 80.01 19.94 52.91 30.73
Mexico
3
24.74 38.44 5.09 10.1 58.58
Malaysia
3
19.26 7.76 2.96 4.01 48.53
Peru
3
31.27 21.59 18.98 19.32 71.76
Paraguay
3
25.31 7.57 15.04 14.36 4.51
Romania
3
17.77 23.78 7.88 27.24 16.01
Thailand
3
8.64 13.92 15.93 10.01 9.99
Turkey
3
6.55
13.3 43.91 5.34 5.91
Venezuela
3
1.82 18.84 1.67
1.9
3.45
South Africa
3
20.34 4.15 12.05 2.49 64.67
Argentina
4
7.1
37.1 7.26 20.43 22.9
Australia
4
10.88 5.21 0.63 6.63 49.88
Austria
4
12.04 16.13 14.04 4.83 2.86
Belgium
4
25.79 14.11 36.68 8.91 76.29
Bahrain
4
10.47 13.27 40.55 42.83 56.05
Barbados
4
23.97 0.34 18.31 6.61 34.34
Canada
4
27.82 1.67 13.02 5.61 10.41
Switzerland
4
31.59 3.65 14.68 7.81 7.54
Chile
4
26.19 38.44 14.61 2.25 65.07
Cyprus
4
20.47 12.97 20.86 7.93 28.65
Germany
4
6.93 13.46 20.21 13.73 7.62
Denmark
4
25.15 19.84 44.57 3.34 26.24
Spain
4
34.13 7.34 30.19 18.17 42.01
Finland
4
17.56 7.72 23.42 16.5 85.54
France
4
34.72 10.19 22.82 6.43 50.9
United Kingdom
4
17.19 17.87 22.97 22.91 68.85
Greece
4
9.75 10.22 13.73 19.44 12.99
China, Hong Kong SAR
4
9.5
16.72 13.61 12.01 17.5
Hungary
4
27.82 6.81
40
2.59 2.04
Ireland
4
3.2
1.43 10.51 2.98 9.87
Iceland
4
15.76 16.53 27.34 15.03 5.72
Israel
4
10.31 10.97 2.62 12.74 11.85
Italy
4
53.03 26.66 74.62 25.52 28.33
Japan
4
15.36 28.88 11.82 22.29 62.01
Republic of Korea
4
13.71 14.65 53.72 11.89 4.56
Kuwait
4
53.99 40.46 10.53 54.42 54.25
Luxembourg
4
9.21
3.71 3.58 3.55 13.09
Malta
4
21.62 25.04 5.31 19.46 13.52
Netherlands
4
43.37 41.35 10.28 17.42 10.81
Norway
4
10.43 33.87 24.93 13.37 6.76
New Zealand
4
57.43 63.61
7
43.2 5.31
Panama
4
12.94 31.09 23.11 16.48 5.59
Poland
4
25.39 18.76 47.08 6.83 42.83
Portugal
4
6.01
5.16 4.88 3.07 58.1
Qatar
4
23.66 23.81 19.95 34.59 8.35
Saudi Arabia
4
8.58 23.19 16.47 28.03 40.47
Singapore
4
5.3
24.6 16.13 12.33 23.65
Sweden
4
6.69
7.15 67.18 2.74 35.91
Trinidad and Tobago
4
2.62
5.52 22.36 4.68 18.78
Taiwan
4
6.84
0.64 24.11 6.46 16.67
Uruguay
4
32.3 41.54 60.37 17.72 21.58

Notes: For each country, the table reports the bias-corrected estimates of the share of variance of each
variable in the VAR system (TFP, consumption, labor, output and trade balance to GDP ratio) explained
by news shocks to TFP. Developed countries are those with an income classification class in the second
column equal to 4 (high income). The rest are classified as developing countries.
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Table 2.8: Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB
1,2 for foreign interest rate as exogenous
variable
Country
Income Class Foreign Interest Rate
C
H
Y
TB
Burkina Faso
1
11
29.54 10.68 24.35 27.65
D.R. of the Congo
1
4.4
54
20.22 33.34 41.19
Ethiopia
1
7.35
0.5
2.37 5.31 90.16
Haiti
1
4.19
9.12 49.58 19.28 7.69
Madagascar
1
21.97
63.07 5.28 15.92 15.91
Mali
1
6.96
0.82 0.32 24.86 8.78
Mozambique
1
10.9
1.32 1.24 37.03 66.58
Malawi
1
13.62
47.86 13.4 9.15 53.05
Niger
1
20.74
17.35 0.99 10.65 37.68
Senegal
1
21.47
8.49 14.01 14.34 24.62
Syrian Arab Republic
1
22.79
84.06 14.32 10.96 23.03
Tanzania
1
3.61
32.49 4.2 19.21 61.35
Uganda
1
22.89
24.36 0.48 80.68 22.15
Zimbabwe
1
12.74
10.56 26.05 7.63
29
Angola
2
4.85
78.5
0.7 34.34 0.7
Bangladesh
2
12.32
10.29 26.43 1.55 30.5
Bolivia
2
11.26
9.95 25.72 2.42
3.5
Côte dIvoire
2
41.58
69.06 20.64 38.9 29.13
Cameroon
2
21.08
70.16 4.2 43.08 9.31
Egypt
2
4.31
0.92 46.32 0.99 22.53
Ghana
2
26.73
34.02 17.61 63.85 26.13
Honduras
2
6.95
9.58 29.86 2.87 20.2
Indonesia
2
4.65
20.04 36.18 3.73 33.74
India
2
7.92
48.98 20.19 28.56 58.11
Kenya
2
12.07
12.9 2.15 62.37 41.68
Cambodia
2
3.63
1.48 8.82 4.84 3.32
Sri Lanka
2
25.42
13.44 0.79 2.67 83.16
Morocco
2
4.93
0.78 22.55 4.51 39.12
Myanmar
2
1.77
7.11 3.44 10.49 49.56
Nigeria
2
6.46
85.9 1.06 50.54 2.9
Pakistan
2
22.26
3.04 11.42 4.46 31.73
Philippines
2
8.33
3.53 12.58 37.93 27.16
Sudan
2
17.74
25.34 32.77 28.89 31.66
Tunisia
2
11.96
33.25 5.01 9.43 2.02
Vietnam
2
11.72
13.25 23.57 27.06 21.73
Zambia
2
12.45
40.61 0.97 23.35 2.22
Albania
3
20.85
17.8 83.53 11.49 42.11
Bulgaria
3
1.18
66.44 38.61 56.63 89.61
Brazil
3
3.79
5.24 5.64 10.44 17.67
China
3
6.55
23.21 20.17 50.59 38.1
Colombia
3
8.07
5.24 0.81
5.3
49.8
Costa Rica
3
1.37
25.96 1.14 18.5 53.58
Dominican Republic
3
27.93
2.03 5.47 70.92 52.07
Algeria
3
8.18
2.78 1.84 21.45 15.39
Ecuador
3
14.41
4.02 1.61 12.47 93.51
Guatemala
3
6.47
8.19 13.91 4.46 1.17
Iran
3
19.75
71.49 2.32 74.7 49.62
Iraq
3
7.39
8.66 17.12 66.95 53.27
Jamaica
3
19.74
81.94 10.67 30.59 65.42
Jordan
3
3.06
28.25 17.63 28.29 52.66
Saint Lucia
3
18.15
13.49 8.71 27.7 2.57
Mexico
3
0.45
4.27 1.43 11.35 28.21
Malaysia
3
22.79
10.66 15.35 13.95 66.39
Peru
3
20.46
12.82 27.49 6.71 8.75
Paraguay
3
49.77
13.43 3.99 38.46 89.06
Romania
3
12.7
21.44 2.35 22.07 10.23
Suriname
3
20.42
3.43 11.45 1.15 28.78
Thailand
3
29.55
7.21 48.53 1.27 44.83
Turkey
3
12.61
2.75 1.45 10.48 60.05
Venezuela
3
4.12
9.13 1.94 9.37 36.98
South Africa
3
1.61
30.37 32.38 56.28 6.86
United Arab Emirates
4
20.35
13.68 16.2 23.12 23.27
Argentina
4
12.51
9.23 1.87 6.76 19.33
Australia
4
6.41
23.73 30.5 44.22 11.54
Austria
4
8.5
16.79 38.58 18.56 61.75
Belgium
4
18.5
6.02 23.26 8.34 32.27
Bahrain
4
16.68
51.57 32.55 61.98 19.31
Bahamas
4
7.53
12.61 1.13 24.86 64.19
Barbados
4
17.46
14.88 2.05 2.09 17.98
Canada
4
4.68
19.51 2.49 30.88 0.64
Switzerland
4
9.49
2.18 15.46 15.65 45.51
Chile
4
8.41
38.16 0.74 50.9
2.3
Cyprus
4
17.82
6.27 11.8 29.7 21.13
Germany
4
5.87
6.69 8.28 13.83 66.39
Denmark
4
4.63
9.91 40.29 9.33 36.81
Spain
4
9.18
30.03 77.56 20.09 37.69
Finland
4
4.47
1.63 52.75 2.97 21.95
France
4
5.8
12.58 17.84 12.13 13.73
United Kingdom
4
25.68
3.32 39.92 1.74 34.05
Greece
4
2.81
13.5 7.57 16.92 37.19
China, Hong Kong SAR
4
21.67
19.54 15.16 9.95 24.32
Hungary
4
27.99
7.12 9.68 1.54 3.42
Ireland
4
14.7
8.19 30.88 15.31 48.24
Iceland
4
15.64
8.72 6.41 21.63 20.62
Israel
4
30.66
2.74 19.86 3.09 60.13
Italy
4
30.37
5.29 12.97 7.32 71.81
Japan
4
23
11.18 16.81 19.34 36.2
Republic of Korea
4
12.72
11.18 2.2
4.38 19.6
Kuwait
4
29.19
15.07 3.11 38.06 18.78
Luxembourg
4
21.69
19.15 8.79 11.53 14.78
Malta
4
18.74
35.03 50.72 9.09 4.93
Netherlands
4
6.2
3.36 12.93 6.39 19.23
Norway
4
5.2
1.5
2.4
4.89 44.73
New Zealand
4
9.64
21.81 5.94 26.42 5.13
Oman
4
9.47
4
6.1
3.23 72.58
Panama
4
12.46
1.52 2.97 1.83 32.63
Poland
4
15.86
1.58 5.08 6.59 24.55
Portugal
4
32.72
31.33 14.33 6.3 18.68
Qatar
4
11.19
25.76 17.97 48.3 7.83
Saudi Arabia
4
12.49
4.79 2.33 32.67 41.6
Singapore
4
33.68
17.39 5.47 30.78 84.44
Sweden
4
7.42
3.55
9.2 22.65 5.31
Trinidad and Tobago
4
25.15
26.59 10.32 24.34 45.76
Taiwan
4
9.75
20.48 21.08 11.95 19.11
Uruguay
4
8.28
21.44 0.74 7.89 4.47
United States
4
28.71
15.21 65.74 41.39 2.22

Notes: For each country, the table reports the bias-corrected estimates of the share of variance of each
variable in the VAR system (foreign interest rate, consumption, labor, output and trade balance to GDP
ratio) explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates. Developed countries are those with an income
classification class in the second column equal to 4 (high income). The rest are developing countries.
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Table 2.9: Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB
1,2 for CToT as exogenous variable
Country
Income Class
Burkina Faso
1
D.R. of the Congo
1
Ethiopia
1
Haiti
1
Madagascar
1
Mali
1
Mozambique
1
Malawi
1
Niger
1
Senegal
1
Syrian Arab Republic
1
Tanzania
1
Uganda
1
Zimbabwe
1
Angola
2
Bangladesh
2
Bolivia
2
Côte dIvoire
2
Cameroon
2
Egypt
2
Ghana
2
Honduras
2
Indonesia
2
India
2
Kenya
2
Cambodia
2
Sri Lanka
2
Morocco
2
Myanmar
2
Nigeria
2
Pakistan
2
Philippines
2
Sudan
2
Tunisia
2
Vietnam
2
Zambia
2
Albania
3
Bulgaria
3
Brazil
3
China
3
Colombia
3
Costa Rica
3
Dominican Republic
3
Algeria
3
Ecuador
3
Guatemala
3
Iran
3
Iraq
3
Jamaica
3
Jordan
3
Saint Lucia
3
Mexico
3
Malaysia
3
Peru
3
Paraguay
3
Romania
3
Suriname
3
Thailand
3
Turkey
3
Venezuela
3
South Africa
3
United Arab Emirates
4
Argentina
4
Australia
4
Austria
4
Bahrain
4
Bahamas
4
Barbados
4
Canada
4
Switzerland
4
Chile
4
Cyprus
4
Germany
4
Denmark
4
Spain
4
Finland
4
France
4
United Kingdom
4
Greece
4
China, Hong Kong SAR
4
Hungary
4
Ireland
4
Iceland
4
Israel
4
Italy
4
Japan
4
Republic of Korea
4
Kuwait
4
Malta
4
Netherlands
4
Norway
4
New Zealand
4
Oman
4
Panama
4
Poland
4
Portugal
4
Qatar
4
Saudi Arabia
4
Singapore
4
Sweden
4
Trinidad and Tobago
4
Uruguay
4
United States
4

CToT
26.1
13.23
3.52
12.3
7.37
17.39
2.85
23.61
33.64
5.75
44.75
3.63
16.52
8.47
4.08
1.6
9.32
2.32
36.45
22.68
41.98
8.49
14.74
34.57
19.9
12.98
29.76
21.45
17.78
12.42
11.97
45.14
5.27
47.69
37.78
44.02
20.91
24.22
13.5
23.24
15.35
17.34
4.86
33.11
28.13
7.04
11.4
24.21
1.31
3.42
9.82
33.11
25.47
47.1
11.53
10.38
16.35
18.63
0.71
8.54
5.5
31
6.56
4.44
7.47
34.3
13.94
32.11
19.26
24.01
27.56
18.11
1.54
7.45
11.42
1.21
13.56
26.2
6.31
24.22
20.85
16.1
26.4
14.41
0.81
38.26
17.21
13.43
1.73
8.14
42.22
9.76
22.73
14.66
9.87
11.1
18.59
17.93
49.2
8.28
13.94
2.93
6.18

C
47.09
11.2
15.75
12.36
4.01
12.4
7.31
36.73
15.28
3.32
36.69
53.28
32.08
15.3
15.48
9.27
3.48
3.77
73.88
21.17
44.38
68.41
2.83
0.56
36.08
39.83
32.86
6.98
54.6
26.18
1.16
45.39
2.25
48.67
52.72
59.54
16.39
12.27
7.77
22.7
14.13
18.5
2.63
31.22
45.56
18.4
4.96
26.64
3.99
8.96
8.34
45.83
30.24
30.79
8.59
3.12
19.15
4.26
4.54
60.85
13.94
18.01
12.57
7.87
11.17
16.99
11.21
38.08
7.04
1.91
15.78
3.5
2.6
34.37
3.7
14.95
7.66
7.59
2.56
34.47
25.89
18.75
66.18
19.49
10.35
3.7
2.63
50.27
12.86
31.46
61.71
2.31
17.27
51.41
17.8
20.65
23.12
6.31
46.27
6.15
32.62
3.1
2.5

H
12.89
1.72
1.18
13.66
1.56
16.14
3.49
2.7
10.49
28.02
3.25
9.95
4.12
21.12
9.09
32.49
24.24
8.28
2.62
2.81
6.99
4.62
6.85
0.96
0.32
6.33
37.88
45.27
24.6
17.01
39.16
60.48
2.37
22.28
21.89
11.52
34.09
68.68
6.12
30.65
5.86
62.73
13.4
7.34
10.63
21.02
1.78
13.87
3.59
17.67
7.01
1.23
25.74
23.62
30.85
76.89
65.8
23.6
22.41
0.53
8.19
32.28
9.74
33.21
13.31
11.07
1.9
17.32
15.04
24.12
15.49
4.96
34.68
5.22
4.49
4.39
14.29
74.05
42.7
15.04
82.62
11.05
34.75
25.95
56.42
60.73
4.9
20.78
13.58
4.74
16.91
59.97
9.19
0.6
5.8
53.18
72.55
15.08
9.43
16.05
1.56
5.92
0.48

Y
58.02
3.73
43.65
2.07
18.06
1.96
12.98
6.16
61.83
12.38
56
35.48
44.94
13.61
12.28
2.77
23.08
25.35
55.57
2.77
19.75
38.81
16.53
5.41
9.01
19.64
18.37
11.29
30.56
27.91
2.99
60.94
33.44
42.91
24.72
20.32
6.95
15.46
18.82
21.18
34.57
5.8
0.88
67.38
41.31
35.99
4.49
51.06
17.66
13.83
40.78
27.31
28.7
16.39
8.26
2.36
46.93
8.09
4.53
38.45
14.94
39.4
1.36
6.52
9.27
3.92
1.38
62.46
6.28
1.12
13.84
4.7
9.76
6.38
2.55
5
14.06
6.54
6.04
13.04
6.67
12.45
49.91
2.88
16.31
4.98
3.36
62.63
47.13
9.64
38.23
12.72
30.88
29.01
6.85
5.52
33.04
4.15
32.96
8.13
4.55
6.64
2.7

TB
32.4
52.09
6.78
3.72
26.6
39.18
44.54
27.52
15.14
4.57
1.55
18.88
61.16
13.15
47.3
4.36
11.49
1.62
16.67
11.9
64.62
6.04
45.28
16.12
52.39
23.85
59.83
1.29
20.33
64.13
19.48
44.72
65.86
15.03
19.83
2.85
28.15
15.57
24.23
38.56
19.74
35.63
31.46
11.37
3.56
36.13
40.53
44.31
24.34
22.64
18.31
69.13
26.67
38.27
25.04
21.1
10.32
3.99
7.29
3.96
47.11
15.36
73.64
13.52
2.49
53.37
6.82
84.61
9.59
18.21
3.41
66.78
5.02
18.13
6.13
54.7
15.09
2.15
19.91
23.21
56.34
25.77
32.66
13.73
31.19
10.08
52.94
20.43
46.06
3.49
39.98
24.02
9.14
10.44
44.71
6.28
15.73
24.67
64.42
43.48
16.14
15.11
6.4

Notes: For each country, the table reports the bias-corrected estimates of the share of variance of
each variable in the VAR system (CToT, consumption, labor, output and trade balance to GDP ratio)
explained by news shocks to CToT. Developed countries are those with an income classification class in
the second column equal to 4 (high income). The rest are developing countries.
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Chapter 3
Financial participation, hedging, and
news shocks
Author: Miguel Acosta Henao

3.1

Introduction

Recent empirical evidence (Acosta-Henao and Mihai, 2019) stresses that news shocks to
foreign interest rates and commodities terms of trade explain a larger share of output
and consumption variances in developing than developed economies. Such evidence points
out to two mechanisms to explain those facts: financial inclusion, and access to financial
markets. A larger level of both reduces the share of output and consumption variances
explained, respectively, by news shocks to foreign interest rates and commodity terms of
trade.
In this paper I develop a two-sector, final goods and commodities, small open economy
model (SMOE) with financially included and financially excluded households, and hedging against market risk in commodity prices. The model provides a rationale for the
empirical evidence. Via greater financial inclusion (i.e., a larger share of households that
have access to accumulate capital and to borrowing in international financial markets),
fewer households react to news shocks by altering dramatically both their labor supply
and demand for final goods. This reduces the share of aggregate output and consumption
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variance explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates. Greater access to financial
markets (i.e., a larger share of commodity prices hedged against market risk) lowers the
firms’ demand for inputs in response to news shocks in spot commodity prices. As a
result, greater access to financial markets, through hedging, lowers the share of aggregate
output and consumption variances explained by news shocks to commodity prices.
This paper contributes to at least two strands of the literature. First, it adds to the
SMOE class of models as in Mendoza (1991), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007), Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), and, among others, Drechsel and Tenreyro
(2018). I expand on the latter, which is a two sector SMOE with production of final
goods and commodities, by adding two unique features: financial inclusion, and hedging.
Second, it contributes to the literature that studies the role of news shocks in the economy
using a structural framework, such as in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2012), Kamber et al. (2017), Zeev et al. (2017). I expand on them by studying
the effects of financial inclusion and access to hedging against commodity price risk in
the role that news shocks to fundamentals have in explaining output and consumption
volatility.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the model, Section 3 explains
the results and their mechanism, and Section 4 concludes.

3.2

Model

I extend the two-sector model developed by Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018) to consider
financial inclusion, and hedging in commodity markets. The environment is a SMOE
with two types of infinitely-lived households. There are financially included households
(f ) of mass Γ, and no-financially included households (nf ) of mass (1 − Γ). While the
former have access to capital accumulation and borrowing in international bond markets,
the latter are hand to mouth households. There are also two sectors in the economy, one
producing final goods, sector 1, and the other producing commodities, sector 2. Both
sectors use capital and labor, and sector 1 uses commodities as an additional input. Thus,
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production of commodities is destined to the production of final goods, and to export
them to the rest of the world. Both sectors have access to a derivatives market where
they can partially hedge against market risk in the spot price of commodities.

3.2.1

Households

3.2.2

Household’s problem

The objective of type-i household, i ∈ {f, nf }, is to maximize:

E0

∞
X

β t U (Cti , Nti )

(3.1)

t=0

The utility function features Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences:

U (Cti , Nti ) =

(Cti − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,i )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,i )ω2 )1−σ − 1
1−σ

(3.2)

Where θ, ω1 , ω2 and σ, are respectively the parameter that governs the weight on the
relative disutility of labor, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to the final-goods sector,
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to the commodities sector, and the constant relative
risk aversion. Variables Cti , Nt1,i , and Nt2,i , are respectively the consumption of the final
good, the labor supply to the final-goods sector, and the labor supply to the commodities
sector, all for the type-i household. The variable Xt is the labor-augmenting technological
progress, with a stochastic growth rate gt , and a steady state value of g, such that
Xt /Xt−1 = gt .1
The maximization is subject to the type-dependent sequential budget constraint. For
financially included households, which have access to accumulate capital stock in each
sector, Kt1,f and Kt2,f , and issue one-period bonds, Dtf , that pay an interest rate of rt ,
this is:
1

The presence of Xt−1 in the utility function ensures a constant labor supply to each sector along
the balanced growth path (see Aguiar and Gopinath 2004).
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f
f
Dt+1
φ K
f
f
f
2 f
2 2,f
1 1,f
2 2,f
1 1,f
N
+(1−δ)K
+
N
+w
K
+w
Ctf +Kt+1
+ ( t+1
K
+r
−g)
K
+D
=
r
t
t
t
t
t
t t
t t
t
t
2 Ktf
1 + rt
(3.3)

The third term of the equation above represents the convex costs of adjustment to capital
accumulation, with a parameter φ. The returns to capital and labor in both sectors are,
respectively, rt1 , rt2 , and wt1 , wt2 .
Since capital stock is supplied to both sectors, and measured in terms of the final good,
the total capital supplied by the financially included household is:

Ktf = Kt1,f + Kt2,f

(3.4)

The total labor supplied by the financially included household is:

Ntf = Nt1,f + Nt2,f

(3.5)

Non-financially included households do not have access to capital or financial markets.
Their sequential budget constraint is

Ctnf = wt1 Nt1,nf + wt2 Nt2,nf

(3.6)

The total labor supplied by non-financially included households is:

Ntnf = Nt1,nf + Nt2,nf

3.2.3

(3.7)

Final-good sector

The representative final-good producing firm chooses capital, Kt1 , labor, Nt1 , and commodities Mt , to maximize their profits, Π1t . This is:
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Π1t = Yt1 − wt1 Nt1 − rt1 Kt1 − p̃t (Mt )

(3.8)

Where p̃t is the price at which the final-good producing firm buys commodities. Production of the final good, Yt1 , uses capital, labor and commodity goods, Mt . The production function is a constant returns to scale (CRS) with labor-augmenting technological
progress, which takes the following form:

Yt1 = a1t (Kt1 )α1,K (Mt )α1,M (Xt Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M

(3.9)

Where a1t is the TFP of this sector. Parameters α1,k , and α1,m are, respectively, the
elasticity of output in the final-goods sector with respect to capital stock and, and the
elasticity of output in this sector with respect to commodities.

3.2.4

Commodities sector

Commodities are used for either the production of final goods, or to be traded in international markets. The representative commodity-producing firm chooses capital, Kt2 , and
labor, Nt2 , to maximize their profits, Π2t . This is:

Π2t = p̃t Yt2 − wt2 Nt2 − rt2 Kt2

(3.10)

The relative price of commodities in terms of the final good that firms obtain by selling
one unit of commodities, p̃t , is exogenous and follows a stochastic process described
bellow. As in the final-goods producing sector, the production function of commodities
is a CRS with labor-augmenting technological progress as follows:

Yt2 = a2t (Kt2 )α2,K (Xt Nt2 )1−α2,K

(3.11)

Where a2t is the TFP of this sector, and the parameter α2,k is the elasticity of output in
Chapter 3. Financial participation, hedging, and news shocks

94

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

the commodities-producing sector with respect to capital stock.

Hedging
The representative commodity-producing firm has access to derivatives markets, by selling
a constant share ψ of Yt2 at the previous period’s price, and a share (1 − ψ) at the current
period’s price. I assume that the representative final-good producing firm also has access
to the same derivatives market, hence buying a constant share ψ of Mt at previous
period’s price. Notice that ψ is exogenous.2 Since households are risk averse (i.e., the
utility function is concave), full hedging brings about more welfare than partial hedging.
As a result, the optimal value of ψ chosen by a social planner would be equal to 1. In
the model, assuming an exogenous ψ is akin to having a maximizing social planner that
chooses an optimal share of commodities hedged, ψ∗, subject to the additional constraint
ψ∗ ≤ ψ < 1, and the result of that optimization would be ψ∗ = ψ.
Defining pt as the spot price of commodities, p̃t is the average price at which commodities
are sold by commodity producers and bought by final-good producers each period (i.e.,
the weighted average between the spot price and the previous period’s, or hedged, price),
that is:

p̃t = (1 − ψ)pt + ψpt−1

3.2.5

(3.12)

Foreign interest rate and stochastic processes

Interest rates paid on debt follow a debt-elastic form as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003), expanded to also depend on commodity prices, as in Drechsel and Tenreyro
(2018):

rt = r∗ + ζ[e(Dt+1 /Xt −D̄/Xt ) − 1] + η(ln(pt ) − ln(p)) + (eµt −1 − 1)

(3.13)

2
For simplicity I am assuming that the share of commodity prices that is hedged is the same in both
sectors. One could think about a framework where each sector has different access to hedging. Even
though that would be an interesting extension of the model, it does not add any insight to the purpose
of studying how access to hedging commodity price risk affects the transmission of news shocks.
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Where D̄/Xt is the detrended steady state level of debt, p is the long-run price of commodities, and µt is the stochastic shock to the foreign interest rate.
The motions of the total factor productivity in each sector, a1t and a2t , the gross growth
rate of the technology, gt , the spot price of commodities, pt , and the stochastic component
of the interest rate on debt, µt , are governed by the following stationary processes:

1 ,N ews
ln(a1t ) = ρa1 ln(a1t−1 ) + at 1 + at−1

(3.14)

2 ,N ews
ln(a2t ) = ρa2 ln(a2t−1 ) + at 2 + at−1

(3.15)

ews
ln(gt ) = ρg ln(gt−1 ) + gt + g,N
t−1

(3.16)

pt
pt−1
ews
) + pt + p,N
ln( ) = ρp ln(
t−1
p
p

(3.17)

ews
ln(µt ) = ρµ ln(µt−1 ) + µt + µ,N
t−1

(3.18)

The last two terms of each process correspond, respectively, to the unexpected (i.e.,
contemporary) shock, and the one-period news (i.e., anticipated) shock. Each shock
follows a mean-zero i.i.d distribution with a corresponding standard deviation σ shock ,
with shock being each of the ten shocks described above.

3.2.6

Aggregation and market clearing

Aggregate consumption, supply of capital stock, labor supply, and demand for foreign
debt, are respectively:
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Ct = ΓCtf + (1 − Γ)Ctnf

(3.19)

Kt = ΓKtf

(3.20)

Nt = ΓNtf + (1 − Γ)Ntnf

(3.21)

Dt = ΓDtf

(3.22)

The law of motion of aggregate capital is:

Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt

(3.23)

Where It is the aggregate investment, and δ is the standard rate of depreciation. Supply
and demand of of capital and labor clear in each sector, such that:

Kt1 = ΓKt1,f

(3.24)

Kt2 = ΓKt2,f

(3.25)

Nt1 = ΓNt1,f + (1 − Γ)Nt1,nf

(3.26)

Nt2 = ΓNt2,f + (1 − Γ)Nt2,nf

(3.27)

The resource constraint of the final good is given by:
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φ Kt+1
(
− g)2 Kt + T Bt1
2 Kt

(3.28)

Where T Bt1 is the trade balance of the final good. The resource constraint in the market
for commodities is:

p̃t Yt2 = p̃t Mt + T Bt2

(3.29)

Where T Bt2 is the trade balance in commodities, expressed in terms of final goods. Thus,
the total trade balance of the economy is:

T Bt = T Bt1 + T Bt2

(3.30)

Yt = Yt1 + p̃t Yt2 − p̃t Mt

(3.31)

Finally, aggregate GDP is:

3.2.7

Calibration and solution

To set the parameters Γ and ψ, I assume a benchmark value of 0.5 and 0.1, respectively.
I assume that the standard deviation of each news shock is equal to one half of the
one for its corresponding unexpected shock. I calibrate the value of D̄ to match the a
steady state net foreign debt to GDP ratio of 0.1. The rest of the models’ parameters
follow Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018). Table 3.1 describes all parameters and their values.
After detrending the equilibrium system of equations, I solve the model with standard
perturbation methods using Dynare.3
3

In the Appendix, I provide the first-order conditions for both types of households and sectors, as
well as the the full set of equations corresponding to the stationary equilibrium.
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Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter
Description
θ
Governs the weight on the relative disutility of labor
ω1
Frisch elasticity of labor supply to sector 1
ω2
Frisch elasticity of labor supply to sector 2
σ
Constant relative risk aversion parameter
β
Discount factor
φ
Sensitivity to investment adjustment costs
g
Mean gross growth rate of technology
δ
Depreciation rate
α1,K
Output elasticity to capital stock in sector 1
α1,M
Output elasticity to commodities in sector 1
α2,K
Output elasticity to capital stock in sector 2
Γ
Share of financially included households
∗
r
Foreign interest rate
¯
d
Mean stationary net foreign debt
η
Sensitivity of foreign interest rates to commodity prices
ζ
Sensitivity of foreign interest rates to deviations of long-run debt
ψ
Share of hedged commodity prices
ρa1
Autoregressive parameter for TFP in sector 1
ρa2
Autoregressive parameter for TFP in sector 1
ρg
Autoregressive parameter for the growth rate of technology
ρp
Autoregressive parameter for the spot commodity price
ρµ
Autoregressive parameter for the shock to foreign interest rates
σa1
Std Dev of unexpected TFP shocks in sector 1
σa1,N ews
Std Dev of TFP news shocks in sector 1
σa2
Std Dev of unexpected TFP shocks in sector 2
σa2,N ews
Std Dev of TFP news shocks in sector 2
σg
Std Dev of unexpected shocks to the technology growth rate
σg,N ews
Std Dev of news shocks to the technology growth rate
σp
Std Dev of unexpected (spot) commodity price shocks
σp,N ews
Std Dev of news shocks to (spot) commodity prices
σµ
Std Dev of unexpected shocks to foreign interest rates
σµ,N ews
Std Dev of news shocks to foreign interest rates
a1
Mean TFP in sector 1
a2
Mean TFP in sector 2
p
Mean (spot) price of commodities
µ
Set so the mean of the shock to foreign interest rates is zero

Value
1.6
1.6
1.6
2
0.93
6
1.0117
0.1255
0.32
0.05
0.32
0.5
0.100577301
-0.023228969
-0.199
2.8
0.1
0.8277
0.5887
0.5244
0.806
0.9199
0.0295
0.01475
0.0525
0.02625
0.0261
0.01305
0.1064
0.0532
0.233880311
0.116940156
1
1
0.5244
1

Notes: The value of parameters Γ and ψ is set by assumption. The value of D̄ is calibrated to match a
steady-state debt to GDP ratio of 0.1. The standard deviation of each news shock is assumed to be half
of the variance of its corresponding unexpected shock. The rest of parameters are taken from Drechsel
and Tenreyro (2018).
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Results

The objective of this section is to analyze how changes in financial inclusion, and access
to derivatives markets, affect the variance shares of output and consumption explained by
news shocks to the foreign interest rate and news shocks to (spot) commodity prices. This
is, how changes in Γ and ψ, affect Ωy,rt , Ωc,rt , Ωy,pt , and Ωc,pt , where Ωj,z is the variance
share of variable j explained by shocks to z. I also show the results corresponding to
unexpected shocks.
Figure 3.1: Experiments

Notes: The left-hand panel shows how the variance shares of output (blue) and consumption (orange)
change to increases in financial inclusion. The right-hand panel shows how those shares change to
increases in access to hedging against commodity price risk.

Figure 3.1 shows the results of those experiments. In the first panel, the vertical axis
corresponds to Ωy,rt and Ωc,rt , and the horizontal axis corresponds to Γ. The solid lines
correspond to the effects of news shocks, and the dotted lines correspond to the effects of
unexpected shocks. Here the effect of increasing financial inclusion is reducing the share
of both output (blue) and consumption (orange) variance explained by news shocks to
the foreign interest rate. The mechanism is that, with more households accessing to
capital accumulation and borrowing in international financial markets, a larger share of
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consumers react to anticipated shocks by smoothing consumption via borrowing and altering their supply of capital. However, when households are not financially included,
they can only react to news shocks by altering their labor supply and their demand for
final goods, which makes consumption and output more volatile. Regarding the share of
output and consumption variances explained by unexpected shocks, they have qualitatively the same relationship with financial inclusion than news shocks. Nonetheless, notice
that the slopes of the experiments that correspond to unexpected shocks are smaller and
have lower changes, while the news shocks channel displays larger non-linearities.
The second panel of Figure 3.1 shows in the vertical axis both Ωy,pt , and Ωc,pt , and in the
horizontal axis it shows the share of commodity prices that can be hedged. Here, more
hedging implies a smaller share of output and consumption variances explained by news
shocks to commodity prices. The mechanism is clear: One-period anticipated shocks
have less impact when more firms have access to hedging because there is less reaction of
both the demand for commodities (in the final-good producing sector), and the demand
for inputs in the commodities sector. As in the previous case, the share of variances in
output and consumption explained by unexpected shocks, to commodity prices have the
same qualitative relationship, albeit smoother and smaller, with access to hedging than
news shocks.
The main takeaway is that financial inclusion and hedging are elements that contribute
to lowering volatility of output and consumption driven by news shocks to foreign interest
rates and commodity prices.

3.4

Conclusion

I develop a two-sector SMOE model with financial inclusion and access to hedging. The
model shows how more financial inclusion and a larger share or hedging against commodity price risk, lower the share of output and consumption variances explained, respectively,
by news shocks to foreign interest rates and to commodity prices. These results provide a
rationale to the fact that more financially developed countries have less output variance
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explained by the aforementioned news shocks.
In the experiments, the response to changes in financial inclusion and access to hedging
of the share of variance in consumption explained by news shocks is not symmetrical to
that of the share of variance in output. This is of high relevance, since it implies that
news shocks may contribute explain the higher volatility of consumption with respect to
output exhibited by developing economies, compared to developed. In this context, more
financial inclusion and access to hedging would provide to be welfare-improving through
higher consumption smoothing. In my view, this is the most promising avenue of research
for future work using the model.
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Appendix 3
Model details - First order conditions

Financially included households
The Lagrangian of the financially included households is:

{

L =

∞
X
t=0

(Ctf − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 )1−σ − 1
−σ f 1 1,f
]+Xt−1
λt [rt Kt +rt2 Kt2,f +wt1 Nt1,f
β {[
1−σ
t

+ wt2 Nt2,f + (1 − δ)Ktf +

f
f
Dt+1
φ K
f
− Dtf − Ctf − Kt+1
− ( t+1
− g)2 Ktf ]}
1 + rt
2 Ktf

1,f
2,f
The first order conditions with respect to Ctf , Nt1,f , Nt2,f , Kt+1
and Kt+1
, are, respectively:

−σ f
[Ctf − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 ]−σ = Xt−1
λt

(3.32)

−σ f 1
[Ctf − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 ]−σ θXt−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 −1 = Xt−1
λt w t

(3.33)

−σ f 2
[Ctf − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 ]−σ θXt−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 −1 = Xt−1
λt w t

(3.34)

−σ
λft Xt−1
= β(1 + rt )Xt−σ Et (λft+1 )
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−σ
λft Xt−1
[1 + φ(

f
Kt+1

Ktf

f
Kt+1
f
−σ
λt Xt−1 [1 + φ( f
Kt

1
+ 1 − δ + φ(
− g)] = βXt−σ Et {λft+1 [rt+1

− g)] =
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f
Kt+2
f
Kt+1

f
Kt+2
f
2
−σ
βXt Et {λt+1 [rt+1 + 1 − δ + φ( f
Kt+1

− g)

f
Kt+2

f

φ K
− ( t+2
− g)2 ]}
f
f
2
Kt+1
Kt+1
(3.36)

f
Kt+2

f
φ Kt+2
− g) f − ( f − g)2 ]}
Kt+1 2 Kt+1
(3.37)

Non-financially included households
The Lagrangian of the non-financially included households is:

nf

L

=

∞
X
t=0

β t {[

(Ctnf − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,nf )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 )1−σ − 1
−σ nf
]+Xt−1
λt [wt1 Nt1,nf
1−σ
+ wt2 Nt2,nf − Ctnf ]}

The first order conditions with respect to Ctnf , Nt1,nf and Nt2,nf , are, respectively:

−σ nf
[Ctnf − θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,nf )ω1 − θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 ]−σ = Xt−1
λt

(3.38)

−σ nf 1
[Ctnf −θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,nf )ω1 −θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 ]−σ θXt−1 (Nt1,nf )ω1 −1 = Xt−1
λt wt (3.39)

−σ nf 2
[Ctnf −θω1−1 Xt−1 (Nt1,nf )ω1 −θω2−1 Xt−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 ]−σ θXt−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 −1 = Xt−1
λt wt (3.40)
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Final-good sector
From the profits’ maximization problem of the representative final-good firm, the first
order conditions with respect to Kt1 , Nt1 and Mt , are, respectively:

α1,K a1t (Kt1 )α1,K −1 (Mt )α1,M (Xt Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M = rt1

(3.41)

(1 − α1,K − α1,M )a1t (Kt1 )α1,K (Mt )α1,M (Xt Nt1 )−α1,K −α1,M = wt1

(3.42)

α1,M a1t (Kt1 )α1,K (Mt )α1,M −1 (Xt Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M = p̃t

(3.43)

Commodities sector
From the profits’ maximization problem of the representative firm in the commodities
sector, the first order conditions with respect to Kt2 and andNt2 are, respectively:

3.5.2

α1,K a1t (Kt1 )α1,K −1 (Mt )α1,M (Xt Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M = rt1

(3.44)

(1 − α1,K − α1,M )a1t (Kt1 )α1,K (Mt )α1,M (Xt Nt1 )−α1,K −α1,M = wt1

(3.45)

Model details - Stationary equilibrium

Recall that Xt /Xt−1 = gt . I define the stationary wage in each sector as, respectively,
w̃t1 = wt1 /Xt−1 and w̃t2 = wt2 /Xt−1 . Abusing of the notation, I redefine the rate of returns
to capital in each sector (which are already stationary) as r̃t1 = rt1 for the final-good
sector, and r̃t2 = rt2 for the commodities sector. Regarding the rest of the variables, for
every upper-case variable, Zt , its stationary counterpart is zt = Zt /Xt−1 .4 I detrend the
4
Recall that due to the presence of Xt−1 in the utility function, labor supply to each sector is constant.
Thus, labor does not need to be detrended. Likewise, rt is already stationary, such that Dt+1 /Xt = dt+1 ,
¯
and D̄/Xt = d.
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model and obtain the following system of stationary-equilibrium equations:

Financially included households
f
dft+1
φ k
f
f
f
2 2,f
1 1,f
2 2,f
2 f
1 1,f
N
+(1−δ)k
+
N
+
w̃
k
+
w̃
k
+
r̃
gt
cft +kt+1
gt + ( t+1
g
−g)
k
+d
=
r̃
t
t
t
t
t t
t t
t t
t t
2 ktf
1 + rt
(3.46)

λft [1+φ(

f
kt+1

ktf

ktf = kt1,f + kt2,f

(3.47)

Ntf = Nt1,f + Nt2,f

(3.48)

[cft − θω1−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 ]−σ = λft

(3.49)

[cft − θω1−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 ]−σ θ(Nt1,f )ω1 −1 = λft w̃t1

(3.50)

[cft − θω1−1 (Nt1,f )ω1 − θω2−1 (Nt2,f )ω2 ]−σ θ(Nt2,f )ω2 −1 = λft w̃t2

(3.51)

λft = β(1 + rt )gt−σ Et (λft+1 )

(3.52)

1
+1−δ+φ(
gt −g)] = βgt−σ Et {λft+1 [r̃t+1

f
kt+2
f
kt+1

gt+1 −g)

f
kt+2

f

φ kt+2
g
−
( f gt+1 −g)2 ]}
t+1
f
2 kt+1
kt+1
(3.53)
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f
kt+1

ktf

2
+1−δ+φ(
gt −g)] = βgt−σ Et {λft+1 [r̃t+1

Miguel Acosta Henao

f
kt+2
f
kt+1

gt+1 −g)

f
kt+2

f

φ K
gt+1 − ( t+2
gt+1 −g)2 ]}
f
f
2
kt+1
Kt+1
(3.54)

Non-financially included households
1 1,nf
cnf
+ w̃t2 Nt2,nf
t = w̃t Nt

(3.55)

Ntnf = Nt1,nf + Nt2,nf

(3.56)

1,nf ω1
−1
[cnf
) − θω2−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 ]−σ = λnf
t − θω1 (Nt
t

(3.57)

1,nf ω1
−1
1
[cnf
) − θω2−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 ]−σ θ(Nt1,nf )ω1 −1 = λnf
t − θω1 (Nt
t w̃t

(3.58)

1,nf ω1
−1
2
[cnf
) − θω2−1 (Nt2,nf )ω2 ]−σ θ(Nt2,nf )ω2 −1 = λnf
t − θω1 (Nt
t w̃t

(3.59)

Final-good sector
1−α1,K −α1,M 1 1 α1,K
at (kt )
(mt )α1,M (Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M

yt1 = gt

1−α1,K −α1,M

gt

1−α1,K −α1,M

gt

(1 − α1,K − α1,M )a1t (kt1 )α1,K (mt )α1,M (Nt1 )−α1,K −α1,M = w̃t1

1−α1,K −α1,M

gt

α1,K a1t (kt1 )α1,K −1 (mt )α1,M (Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M = r̃t1

α1,M a1t (kt1 )α1,K (mt )α1,M −1 (Nt1 )1−α1,K −α1,M = p̃1t
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Commodities sector
1−α2,K 2 2 α2,K
(Nt2 )1−α2,K
at (kt )

(3.64)

α2,K a2t (kt2 )α2,K −1 (Nt2 )1−α2,K = r̃t2

(3.65)

(1 − α2,K )a2t (kt2 )α2,K (Nt2 )−α2,K = w̃t2

(3.66)

yt2 = gt

1−α2,K

gt

1−α2,K

gt

Aggregation and market clearing
ct = Γcft + (1 − Γ)cnf
t

(3.67)

kt = Γktf

(3.68)

Nt = ΓNtf + (1 − Γ)Ntnf

(3.69)

dt = Γdft

(3.70)

kt+1 gt = it + (1 − δ)kt

(3.71)

kt1 = Γkt1,f

(3.72)

kt2 = Γkt2,f

(3.73)

Nt1 = ΓNt1,f + (1 − Γ)Nt1,nf

(3.74)
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Nt2 = ΓNt2,f + (1 − Γ)Nt2,nf

yt1 = ct + it +

φ kt+1
(
gt − g)2 kt + tb1t
2 kt

(3.75)

(3.76)

p̃t yt2 = p̃t mt + tb2t

(3.77)

tbt = tb1t + tb2t

(3.78)

yt = yt1 + p̃t yt2 − p̃t mt

(3.79)

Chapter 3. Financial participation, hedging, and news shocks

109

Chapter 4
Sticky capital controls
Authors: Miguel Acosta Henao (CUNY), Laura Alfaro (Harvard Business School), Andres
Fernandez (Central Bank of Chile)

4.1

Introduction

Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, a body of research has taken a closer
look at the use of unconventional policy tools—namely, macroprudential instruments—
aimed at curbing potential imbalances that can trigger financial crises and sudden stops
in cross-border capital flows. Capital controls (or capital flow management policies) are
arguably among the instruments that have drawn the most attention.1
The case for capital controls rests primarily on the volatility of foreign capital inflows.
As macroprudential measures, they are designed to mitigate systemic crises.2 Recent
normative analysis of these policies has argued that their cyclical use can have nontrivial
welfare implications by reducing the probability of financial crises. However, much debate
remains on both the positive and normative aspects of capital controls.
On the positive side, an element that has prevented the shedding of new light on the use
of these policy instruments is a lack of cross-country measures of the intensive margin
of capital controls (i.e., rates) over time. Although there has been important progress in
documenting the extensive margin of capital controls (i.e., whether controls are in place
or not), no analysis has yet documented the behavior of the intensive margin of this
1

Another set of instruments that has received considerable interest is that aimed at curbing imbalances in domestic financial systems: LTV ratios, dynamic provisions, countercyclical buffers, etc. (see
Jiménez et al. 2017; Galati and Moessner 2018; and Lubis et al. (2019), among others). While our work
mostly focuses on capital controls, later we will study the relationships between capital controls and
these other instruments.
2
In addition, controls can have a protectionist or mercantilist motive related to affecting the value
of the currency (Magud et al. 2018, Alfaro et al. 2017).
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policy instrument, its cyclical properties across countries, and its interaction with other
instruments in the macroprudential toolbox.
Related to this shortcoming is a disconnect between the normative implications of models
of optimal capital controls and the data. The normative prescriptions of most of these
models rely heavily on the use of controls along the intensive margin. The optimal policy
tends to involve not just the imposition of controls in certain states of nature (extensive
margin) but, more importantly, an active cyclical use of them (intensive margin); hence
the lack of data on the intensive margin has made it difficult to bring models of optimal
capital controls closer to the data.
Our work makes several contributions to this debate that relate to the aforementioned
shortcomings. First, using textual analysis of official regulations from multilateral and
national sources, we build a novel quarterly dataset on de jure capital controls along
their extensive and, importantly, intensive margins. To our knowledge, this is the first
cross-country panel dataset on the extensive and intensive margins of capital controls.
The dataset covers a panel of 21 well-established emerging market economies (EMEs) for
the period 1995–2014.3
We focus on two types of quantitative capital controls: unremunerated reserve requirement (URRs) rates applicable to cross-border flows, and tax rates applicable to crossborder inflows and outflows. When distinguishing the extensive from the intensive margins, we differentiate controls of a quantitative nature (as the two that we focus on) from
those of a qualitative nature (e.g., authorizations and other kinds of regulations that do
not directly target market prices or volumes). We label the latter type of measures as
non-price-based capital controls. We further complement the dataset with information
on other macroprudential instruments from earlier work by Cerutti et al. (2017), as well
as that in Federico et al. (2014), which we also extend.
We uncover six stylized facts from the new dataset that taken together point to a large degree of “stickiness” of capital controls. First, the intensive margin of both controls (taxes
and URRs) has not been systematically used either across countries or time. Second,
when they have been used, controls display considerable heterogeneity across countries
in terms of the intensity with which they have been used. Third, changes to capital
controls do not occur frequently, and when they do occur, they remain in place for a long
time (i.e., longer than a typical business cycle). As a result, these instruments display
very high serial autocorrelation. Fourth, the cyclicality of capital controls differs sharply
across instruments, with URRs having been used countercyclically during episodes of
large economic booms, and taxes on both inflows and outflows having been used in the
3

During our period of analysis, most developed nations limited their use of capital controls (see
Fernández et al. 2016).
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contractionary phase of the GDP cycle. Fifth, analysis of the joint dynamics of capital
controls and other macroprudential policies reveals little evidence of complementarity. If
anything, they appear to have been substitutes. Sixth, while extensive measures of capital
controls capture more non-price-based policy measures, they also display a considerable
degree of persistence.
We then turn to a normative analysis. Our starting point—which we label our baseline
model—is a small open economy with collateral constrains of the kind introduced by
Mendoza (2002). Subsequent works have documented extensively how such types of
borrowing constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities that in turn are widely viewed as
a benchmark theory for rationalizing the use of capital controls in an dynamic stochastic
environment, implemented as taxes on cross-border flows (see Mendoza and Smith 2006,
Uribe 2006, Lorenzoni 2008, Bianchi 2011, Farhi and Werning 2014, Benigno et al. 2011,
Korinek 2018, Bianchi and Mendoza 2010, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2017, and SchmittGrohé and Uribe 2020, among others).4
The baseline model allows us to build an unregulated economy with no taxes and where
agents do not internalize such externalities, as well as the optimal capital control derived
from the Ramsey planner, who can internalize the pecuniary externality. We argue that
such optimal policy is not designed to account for the stickiness documented in the data
but rather suggests a highly active and cyclical use of these instruments. We then extend
this setup to improve the baseline model along this dimension.
Of course, there are many reasons why positive and normative implications may differ.5
Our exercise attempts to understand if additional considerations or frictions might be
incorporated into the benchmark model, albeit in reduced form, to better account for
the stylized facts that we uncover. In particular, we consider the stickiness of controls
documented in the empirical part of our work. We naturally turn to (S, s) costs, which
have served as a quintessential device for economists seeking to generate inaction regions
in models where consumers and firms make decisions, and which have successfully generated stickiness in variables ranging from prices to investment (Caplin and Leahy, 2010).
Our work extends this concept to a policy variable, namely capital controls.
We modify the baseline model by introducing a fixed cost (of policymaking) in the tradition of (S, s) models, whereby policymakers equate their policy instrument to its optimal
value only when the benefit of doing so surpasses its (S, s) cost. Otherwise the (policy)
cost is large enough to deter policymakers from adjusting the policy instrument, staying
in an inaction region, and inducing stickiness.6
4

The setup of pecuniary externalities can also be used to rationalize the use of domestic macroprudential tools. We do not consider this case.
5
In the last section of the paper, we discuss possible explanations.
6
While the use of (S, s) costs is intuitive, we do consider other types of (convex and concave) costs.
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Our analysis of this extended model begins with a simple illustration of the quantitative
effects of varying levels of (S, s) costs on the equilibrium dynamics in an economy calibrated as in the aforementioned literature, hence taking no stance on the size of such
costs. We document that (S, s) costs allow us to bring the model closer to the data along
four dimensions that characterize the stickiness in capital controls. First, the extended
model has the ability to reduce the share of time during which the tax is active, with
higher (S, s) costs further reducing this share—unlike in the baseline case, where controls
are counterfactually always active. Second, the presence of (S, s) costs is shown to reduce
the frequency of changes in capital controls with values that are more aligned to those
observed in the data. Third, (S, s) costs also generate episodes when capital controls are
used in a highly non-linear way, where taxes remain inactive for a long time, then jump
to high levels with a considerable persistence. Hence, such costs can generate the high
serial autocorrelation of capital controls documented in the data, the fourth dimension
that characterizes stickiness in these policy instruments.
Our work then considers a formal calibration of the (S, s) costs for each of the 21 EMEs
in the dataset. The calibration strategy that we follow is country-specific in the two
endowment processes for tradable and non-tradable incomes that constitute the driving
forces of the model, the parameters that govern the strength of the collateral constraint,
and, importantly, the (S, s) cost that generates the stickiness in capital controls. For the
two endowments processes, we build empirical counterparts that we use to parameterize
the two driving forces in the model. For the latter two parameters, we select values such
that the distance between model and data is minimized along two key moments: the
frequency of adjustment in the intensive margin of capital controls—taken from the new
dataset—and the frequency of occurrence of financial crises in each of these countries
(taken from Reinhart 2010).
The average value for (S, s) costs calibrated is large and allows the extended model to
account for the low frequency of changes in capital controls in the data. In the data,
controls are changed 1.4 times for every 20 years; the extended model matches that quite
closely by generating, on average, 1.6 changes for every 20 years simulated. In contrast,
the calibrated baseline model with no (S, s) costs predicts, on average, 13.8 changes in
capital controls for every 20 years. Importantly, other non-targeted moments are also
much more in line with the data, such as the share of time that controls are predicted to
be active; the value of the tax used; the non-mean reversion observed in episodes when
controls have been used; and their serial autocorrelation.
Calibrated (S, s) costs are also large when we assess their impact on welfare. Using the
Ramsey planner who implements controls at no cost as benchmark, imposing capital
In the Appendix, we document how, when compared with (S, s) costs, such alternative cost specifications
do not help the baseline model in a meaningful way to better replicate the data.
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controls bring about welfare gains for agents in the unregulated economy. However, such
gains for agents in a model with (S, s) costs are about 4/5 of those in the unregulated
economy. This implies that the magnitude of (S, s) costs calibrated is large enough to
eliminate most—though not all—of the welfare gains obtained after imposing controls.
There are several reasons why models of optimal capital controls may be at odds with the
data, and the reduced form specification with which we try to capture several of these
reasons through an (S, s) cost is, at best, a crude approximation for them. We view the
enhanced performance of the modified model as a call for including a richer set of policy
constraints when considering the optimal use of capital controls in the presence of pecuniary externalities. In the last section of the paper, we discuss some of these potential
policy constraints based on previous studies. We discuss at least three alternative deeper
causes for the (S, s) costs. First, such costs may be capturing a more complex costbenefit analysis made by policymakers, incorporating negative effects and/or unintended
consequences of capital controls not picked up by standard models. A second explanation may more generally relate to political economy considerations driving policymaking,
which can also link to credibility and signaling issues related to the use of these tools that
end up shaping policy choices over these instruments in a highly nonlinear form. Third,
model robustness and (perceptions of) lack of ineffectiveness of capital controls may also
play a role in policymakers’ cautious use of these instruments, unless extreme conditions
warrant their use.
This paper relates to several strands of the literature. On the empirical front, seminal
empirical works that have measured capital controls and their use include Quinn (1997),
Chinn and Ito (2006), Schindler (2009), Pasricha (2012), Klein (2012), Aizenman and
Pasricha (2013), Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Eichengreen and Rose (2014), Fernández et al.
(2015), Fernández et al. (2016), Jahan and Wang (2017), and Pasricha et al. (2018),
among others. Klein (2012) casts doubts the use of episodic controls on capital inflows
and concludes that, with a few exceptions, there is little evidence of the efficacy of
capital controls. Glick et al. (2006) find that countries with liberalized capital accounts
experience a lower likelihood of currency crises. Fernández et al. (2013) do not find
evidence of capital controls implemented as macroprudential tools in the period 1995–
2011. We build on these empirical works and complement them by adding an intensive
dimension of capital controls to the analysis.
As mentioned above, a growing theoretical macro literature posits pecuniary externalities
to motivate the use of capital controls. The lack of data on the intensive margin has
precluded evaluating the performance of these models empirically, to which we contribute
in this paper. Our work further complements these theoretical frameworks by adding a
friction—in the form of an (S, s) cost—which is shown to improve the performance of
models relying on these types of externalities. Structural interpretations of the kind of
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(S, s) costs that we put forth can be viewed as a call for future theoretical work to include
a richer set of policy constraints when considering the use of capital controls in models
of pecuniary externalities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the new dataset, while Section 3
documents the stylized facts. Section 4 presents the baseline model of capital controls,
postulates the extension including (S, s) costs, and discusses the solution method used.
Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis by first illustrating the effects of varying (S, s)
costs on the equilibrium dynamics, then calibrating the (S, s) costs for the countries in the
dataset and computing welfare gains. Section 6 discusses possible avenues to rationalize
the (S, s) costs. The last section concludes.

4.2

A New Dataset

We build a novel cross-country panel dataset of de jure measures on capital controls with
both the extensive margin—when controls are active or not—and also, importantly, the
intensive margin (i.e., the rates at which capital controls are set when they are active).
The frequency of observations is quarterly and covers 21 EMEs over the period 1995–
2014. We complement our data with other macroprudential instruments from alternative
data sources. In this section, we describe the set of controls documented in our dataset,
the methodology used to build it, and its coverage. For further details, we refer the reader
to the online dataset’s Technical Appendix.

4.2.1

Definitions and Instruments

In a country’s balance of payments, international purchases and sales of financial assets
are recorded in the financial account. A capital control is a policy designed to limit
or redirect transactions on a country’s financial account. In terms of de jure capital
controls, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) distinguishes between market-based and
administrative restrictions. Market-based controls include price-based measures such as
taxes on cross-border capital movements, unremunerated requirements on cross-border
flows, and dual exchange-rate systems. Administrative controls include, for example,
required prior approvals for certain capital account transactions.
In our analysis, we focus on two de jure price-based measures of capital controls that
capture the intensive margin of these instruments: taxes and unremunerated reserve
requirements on cross-border flows. In addition to these quantitative measures, we add
information documenting quantitative restrictions and prohibitions as well as qualitative
(or non-price-based) administrative measures.7
7

Another way to classify capital controls is according to their direction. Chile, for example, regulated
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Capital Controls: Quantitative and Qualitative Measures
Quantitative Measures. Within the quantitative measures, we focus on two price-based
capital controls.
1. Unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs). These are recorded as rates applicable to cross-border inflows. They are requirements to constitute a compulsory
deposit of a non-zero fraction of the intended transaction for a legally mandated
period. For this measure, we also calculate the tax equivalent cost of the URR as
in De Gregorio et al. (2000).
2. Tax rates on cross-border inflows and outflows. These are compulsory contributions
that are levied on transactions that imply cross-border flows and are payable to the
national tax authorities. We collect this information across various types of assets,
including bonds and stocks.8
For completeness, we include in the analysis restrictions. These measures account for
any limit or restrictions on quantities, maturity or percentages that affect cross-border
flows. We also considerprohibitions when there is an explicit allusion that indicates that
a certain activity was not allowed at all.
Qualitative Measures. We consider two types of qualitative measures or controls.
Authorizations are special permits that are required to perform certain flows. We also
include an Others residual category that includes specific cases for each particular country,
as detailed in the Appendix.
Complementing the Data: Macroprudential Measures
We complement our dataset with macroprudential measures, defined as measures directed
to the domestic financial system. We expand on work by Federico et al. (2014) on reserve
requirements to include additional countries needed to complete those in our dataset, and
we include information about reserve requirements on foreign exchange deposits.
For additional macroprudential measures, we use the dataset in Cerutti et al. (2017)
covering changes across several other macroprudential instruments such as capital buffer
requirements of banks, concentration limits, interbank exposure, and loan-to-value caps.
capital inflows during the 1990s, as did Malaysia in 1994. Controls on capital outflows, in contrast, are
advocated to manage crises as they occur. Thailand imposed controls on capital outflows in 1997 as
a response to the Asian financial crisis, as did Malaysia in 1998. Of course, it is often difficult for
policymakers to separate neatly the effects of controls on inflows and outflows. Restrictions on outflows
may deter inflows as well, since investors are generally less willing to put their money into countries that
restrict their exit. We also explore the direction of flow in the dataset.
8
This comes at a cost. Since we do not have the balance of payments data of each asset class, our
analysis is silent about volumes of flows.
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Note that these are considered macroprudential measures and not capital controls. Section II of the online dataset’s Technical Appendix describes in detail the list of variables
studied with their respective definitions and acronyms.

4.2.2

Methodology

In building the dataset, we followed these steps:
1. Textual analysis. We implemented textual analysis on the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically,
for URRs (which have two specific sections on the AREAER), we systematically
focused on the words “unremunerated ”, “nonremunerated ”, “URR” or “reserve”.
For taxes, the words we systematically identified were “tax ” or “taxable”.
2. Manual sorting. From the policy measures identified in 1, we cleared any regulation
that was not specific to capital controls or did not provide a quantitative measure
of the intensive margin.9
3. National sources. For each country, We analyze legal documentation on capital control regulations (e.g., decrees and any other country-specific economic legislation)
to confirm, complement, or correct information found in 1. and 2. Whenever we
found discrepancies across sources, we made a case-by-case analysis. We recorded
each of those cases in the online dataset’s Technical Appendix.
4. Cross-validation. We cross-validated the data using two previous academic works
on capital controls (Magud et al. 2018 and Ghosh et al. 2018). Additionally, we
consulted with each of the central banks of the EMEs considered in our sample for
them to validate the policy measures recorded in the dataset.1011
Coverage
We cover 21 conventional emerging market countries. Importantly, these were not chosen
by any criteria of ex ante use of capital controls (or other macroprudential instruments).
They are conventional in the sense that they have been classified as emerging economies
9

Trade measures (e.g., tariffs) were a recurrent example of a regulation that was included in 1 but
excluded in 2.
10
More than half of the central banks we contacted responded to our inquires. None objected to the
dataset we had found. In a few cases, they complemented it with additional regulations. For Magud
et al. (2018) and Ghosh et al. (2018), we made a systematic comparison and found a nearly perfect
overlap of 95% of the policy measures in our dataset, conditional on the same countries, years, and types
of controls.
11
Section III in the online dataset’s Technical Appendix explains in detail the general rules and criteria
used for each instrument; Section IV shows how we calculated the tax equivalent of URR; Section V
shows the consistency check with other dataset;, and Section VI documents the cases where we found
discrepancies between multilateral and national sources.
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by multilateral organizations and rating agencies (IMF, WB, MSCI, JP Morgan) or have
been included in the most recent peer-reviewed studies of EMEs’ business cycles (see
Caballero et al. 2019).
Those countries, grouped by region, are:
• Latin America (7): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and
Peru.
• East Asia & Pacific (7): China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Thailand.
• Eastern Europe and Central Asia (5): Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Russia, and Turkey.
• Other Regions (2): South Africa and Israel.
The four-step methodology described above is applied to form an unbalanced panel
dataset with quarterly frequency from 1995 to 2014.12 It begins in 1995, as this is
the year when the IMF´s AREAERs first introduced detailed information about policy
measures on cross-border flows, disaggregated by direction of flows and type of assets,
among other characteristics. To avoid truncation, whenever a policy measure is in place
at the beginning or the end of the dataset, we use national sources to extend the time
series coverage so as to document the enactment of the control or its repeal, hence the
unbalanced structure of the dataset.
There are a total of 1,712 quarterly observations recorded for URRs and 1,680 for taxes on
capital flows across the 21 EMEs during the years covered. From these, 286 observations
(17%) had an active capital control in the form of a URR; 378 (22.5%) had it as a tax
on inflows; and 445 (26.4%) had it in the form of a tax on outflows. The online dataset’s
Technical Appendix presents further descriptive statistics on the coverage of the dataset
(Section VI of this document presents details regarding each country).

4.3

Stylized Facts

In this section, we document six stylized facts on the properties of the intensive margin
of capital controls from the new dataset: (1) use of these instruments across countries
and time; (2) intensity with which they have been used; (3) frequency of adjustment;
(4) cyclicality with other macro variables; (5) complementarity with other macroprudential instruments; and (6) consistency with measures of the extensive margin of capital
controls.
12

Daily frequency is also partially available on some policy measures. Our analysis, however, is
conducted at the quarterly frequency unless otherwise specified.
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Fact 1. The use of capital controls (price-based) has not been systematic across countries
or time
The top panel of Figure 4.1 shows, for each instrument (horizontal axis), the share of
countries that have used the two price-based capital controls in our dataset; that is, rates
have been strictly positive (vertical axis). Out of the 21 EMEs considered in the dataset,
only six countries (29%) used URRs or taxes on inflows at some point during the period
covered, while ten (48%) used controls on outflows.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.1 shows the cross-country average share of time during
which each instrument was active. Their use has been limited to a small fraction of the
period covered by the dataset: taxes on inflows (outflows) were above zero in less than
20% (25%) of the quarterly time series of the dataset, and URRs in less than 10%.
Additional results in the Appendix contrast these findings with the use of other macroprudential instruments such as reserve requirements in domestic and foreign currency
deposits. More than 90% of the countries have imposed reserve requirements on accounts
in domestic currency, 80% on accounts in foreign currency, and have been used 75% and
95% of the time, respectively. Marginal reserve requirements are much less pervasive,
being used by 13% of the countries and less than 5% of the time.
Fact 2. The intensity with which price-based capital controls have been used displays
considerable heterogeneity across countries
The top two panels in Figure 4.2 document the mean intensities of URRs and their tax
equivalent for each country in the sample. Countries with no bars are those for which
no use of capital controls was found along the intensive margin. The bottom two panels
document the same information for taxes on inflows and taxes on outflows, respectively.
Among the countries that did implement capital controls, there is considerable dispersion
of the intensity with which capital controls were used. While URRs have ranged between
10% and 43%, with an equivalent tax rate between 0.2% to 8%, taxes on inflows have
ranged between 0.3% and 20% and those on outflows have been used across more countries
and more intensively, with the average tax variation ranging from 0.3% to 55%.
Other macroprudential tools, documented in the Appendix, have been employed more
homogeneously across countries. For instance, reserve requirements in domestic and
foreign currency deposits display variations between 5%-10% and 4%-10%, respectively.
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Figure 4.1: Use of Capital Controls

Notes: In Panel A, the bars depict the share of countries that have used capital controls (i.e. value of the
instrument is not 0), at least during one quarter of our sample. In panel B, the bars depict the share of
periods in which an instrument was used. The sample was taken from 1995q1 to 2014q4; the maximum
total of quarters is 80 (100%).

Fact 3. Changes to capital controls occur infrequently; and when they do, they remain
in place for long
Figure 4.3 presents the frequency of changes across the three instruments of capital controls in the dataset (URRs and taxes on capital inflows and outflows).13 For the three
instruments, the bulk of the distribution is skewed toward the origin, implying that
changes to capital controls occur infrequently, if at all. Conditional on their use, the average number of changes to capital controls (in the quarterly frequency) is small: between
4 for URRs, and 6 (4) for taxes on inflows (outflows) during the 20 years covered by our
dataset.
13

A change here is simply any instance when the value recorded for an instrument changes from one
quarter to the next.
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Figure 4.2: The Intensive Margin of Capital Controls

Notes: Each panel corresponds to a different instrument (URR, URR-Tax Equivalent, Taxes on Inflows,
and Taxes on Outflows). The bars represent the value of the instrument in each country. Only the
periods in which the instrument was active were considered. Countries with no bars are those for which
the corresponding instrument was never used in the period considered.

Figure 4.4 further documents the time series behavior of capital controls in episodes when
these instruments have been forcefully used, which we define as cases when they display
an increase of more than 10% from one quarter to the next, or when they are activated.
The figure presents the simple averages across all episodes, denoting time index “t” as
the moment this condition is met in each episode. The first panel shows the behavior
of the three instruments at a quarterly frequency, while the second panel shows it at an
annual frequency. The evidence points to a large degree of persistence following these
large movements in capital controls: episodes identified in taxes on inflows (outflows)
display large increases, on average from 1% to 3% (0% to 25%); and 12 quarters later,
they continue to exhibit values above 2.5% (20%). In fact, the annual frequency plot
shows that, on average, these measures remain high after 7 to 8 years following the
episode identified. As a result, capital controls display very high serial autocorrelation,
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as documented in Figure 4.5.14
Figure 4.3: Frequency of Changes in Capital Controls

Notes: A change occurs when the value of an instrument in t was different than in t − 1. The countries
that at the beginning of the sample, 1995-Q1, had the instrument turned on and did not make any
changes until the end of the 2014-Q4 sample are coded in red. The countries that did not use the
instrument at any time in the sample are shown in blue.

Fact 4. The cyclicality of capital controls differs sharply across instrument
Figure 4.6 documents the (demeaned) average deviation of GDP growth (right axis)
around the episodes of capital controls presented in Figure 4.4. While URRs have been
used countercyclically during episodes of large economic booms, taxes on both inflows
and outflows have been implemented in the contractionary phase of the GDP cycle.15
14

In the Appendix, we document how the results in terms of the persistence of changes in capital
controls are robust across different exchange rate regimes.
15
The Appendix extends the results with the current account and real exchange rates instead of the
GDP cycle.
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Figure 4.4: Episodes of Capital Controls

Notes: The beginning of an episode was defined when for a given policy instrument at period t, xt , we
have that: xt > 1.1xt−1 . Then the values of each episode were averaged from t − 2 to t + 10. The first
row shows episodes of activation in the controls at a quarterly frequency, and the second row shows such
episodes at a yearly frequency. There are six episodes for URRs, five for taxes on inflows, and eight for
taxes on outflows.

Fact 5. Complementarity in the use of capital controls and other macroprudential
tools has been negligible; if anything, the two type of instruments tend to be substitutes
Figure 4.7 compares the evolution of domestic macroprudential instruments (right axis)
around the same episodes of capital controls in Figure 4.4 (left axis). The index of macroprudential instruments that we use comes from Cerutti et al. (2017).16 As can be seen,
capital controls do not move in tandem with the other macroprudential instruments, implying no complementarity between the two types of instruments. In fact, as the intensity
16

The index covers the changes across several macroprudential instruments: capital buffer requirements of banks lending mortgages and others types of loans; concentration limits; interbank exposure;
loan-to-value caps; and reserve requirements in foreign and domestic currency.
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Figure 4.5: Serial Correlation of Capital Controls

Notes: The solid line represents the yearly cross-country mean autocorrelation of order t − j of taxes on
inflows. The dashed line represents the same variables on taxes on outflows. The dotted line corresponds
to URRs.

in capital controls falls, the use of macroprudential instruments intensifies, signaling that,
if anything, the two have been substitutes.17
More formal evidence is gathered in the Appendix, where we break down the cyclicality
in macroprudential tools between those countries that have used capital controls and
those that have not (identified in Fact 2). The evidence indicates that the cyclicality of
macroprudential instruments has been stronger in the latter group of countries relative
to that in the former group, reinforcing the substitutability between the two types of
instruments.

17

Indeed, the correlation between macroprudential indices and our measures of capital controls is
relatively low: −0.05 for URRs; 0.03 for controls on inflows; and 0.45 for controls on outflows.
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Figure 4.6: Episodes of Capital Controls and the Business Cycle

Notes: It shows the episodes described in Figure 4 along with the cross-country mean deviation from the
average GDP growth.
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Figure 4.7: Episodes of Capital Controls & Broader Macro Prudential Instruments

Notes: The beginning of an episode (episodes are depicted by red lines) was defined when when for a
given policy instrument at quarter t, xt , we have that xt > 1.1xt−1 . The values of each episode were
then averaged from t − 2 to t + 10. The sample of episodes was restricted from 2000q1 to 2014q4 to
match the time periods in the data of Cerutti et al. (2017). Deviations were plotted against the average
of the accumulated Index of Macroprudential Instruments from the database of Cerutti et al. (2017).
This index (purple line) includes the nine instruments on that database.
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Fact 6. Extensive measures of capital controls, which capture more non-price policy
measures relative to price-based ones, display a considerable degree of stickiness
We now explore the overlap between the intensive margin captured in the new dataset and
standing measures of the extensive margin. For that purpose, we employed the dataset
in Fernández et al. (2016), which measures the evolution of the extensive margin for
several countries along a much wider array of assets, and reclassified all policy measures
accounted in their dataset in terms of price-based, akin to those in our dataset, and nonpriced-based, such as authorization requirements and other bureaucratic measures that
do not directly affect the relative cost of cross-border flows.
Table 4.1 summarizes the results. It documents that priced-based measures, including
URR and taxes (and prohibitions, which implicitly is a tax of 100%) represent on average
less than half (36%) of all instruments. Regarding the remaining 64% of measures that
are non-price-based, a little less than half of those (28%) are authorization requirements
and the rest are classified as other bureaucratic red tape that hinders the cross-border
flow of capital.
Table 4.1: Price-Based and Non-Price-Based Capital Controls

Avg

Price-Based
URRs - Taxes - Quant Prohibitions
27.7 %
8.3 %

Non-Price-Based
Authorizations Others
28.4 %
35.6 %

Notes: The table shows the cross-country average of the share of the use of each instrument over the
total. The first two columns of instruments correspond to price-based capital controls, and the last two
to non-price-based capital controls.

A natural question is thus whether the previous stylized facts documented on the intensive margin are robust to a broader set of regulations captured in the extensive margin
of capital controls, most of which account for non-price-based measures. Figure 4.8 reproduces the methodology in Figure 4.4 by identifying episodes of large increases in the
indices of inflow and outflow controls in Fernández et al. (2016) and reporting the average
time series dynamics around them. Since now we are analyzing the extensive margin, the
vertical axis is not a rate, as in Figure 4.4, but rather a scale that goes from 0 (when
no controls exist in either of the asset categories) and 1 (where controls exist in all categories). Results are quite robust. Indeed, neither of the two indices displays any mean
reversion, and the level of controls is still higher several years after the initial increase in
year “t.”
Taken together, the stylized facts presented in this section point to a large degree of
“stickiness” in capital controls, which materializes in countries not relying on these tools
systematically along the business cycle. When countries have relied on these instruments,
we observe that such policy tools have displayed little mean reversion and, hence, high
Chapter 4. Sticky capital controls

127

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

Figure 4.8: Episodes of Capital Controls: The Extensive Margin

Notes: Here we use the data for the extensive margin of capital controls in Fernandez et al. (2016).
The beginning of an episode was defined when for a given policy instrument at year t, xt , we have that:
xt > (1 + stdev(xt−1 )). The values of each episode were then averaged from t − 2 to t + 10.

persistence over time. This is consistent with broader definitions of capital controls that
include more qualitative/administrative controls in measures of the extensive margin of
these policy tools. Lastly, such stickiness also appears to manifest in these tools being
substitutes with alternative macroprudential measures. It is thus pertinent to explore
whether current state-of-the-art models of optimal capital controls can account for this
stickiness, which we undertake in the next section.

4.4
4.4.1

Models of Capital Controls
Baseline Model

In this section, we present our baseline model of optimal capital controls. Our starting
point is a small open economy with collateral constraints posited in Mendoza (2002),
which gives rise to pecuniary externalities that, in turn, are widely viewed as a benchmark
theory for rationalizing the use of capital controls. Our setup is cast in an infinite dynamic
stochastic environment as in Mendoza and Smith (2006), Uribe (2006), Bianchi (2011),
Benigno et al. (2011), Korinek (2018), Bianchi and Mendoza (2018), Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2017), and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2020), among others.
We briefly present the unregulated economy case, the Ramsey problem and the optimal
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capital control derived from it. We further describe that this optimal policy is not designed to account for the stickiness documented in the data. The next section presents
an extension to this setup, which improves the baseline model along this dimension.
The Unregulated Economy
The economy has a continuum of identical, infinitely lived households of mass one, with
time-separable preferences of the form:

E0

∞
X

β t U (ct )

(4.1)

t=0
c1−σ −1

The utility function has a standard CRRA form: U (ct ) = t1−σ , where σ > 0 is the
constant risk aversion parameter, β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective discount factor, and
E0 is the expectations operator at period t = 0.
Each period’s aggregate consumption, ct , is a composite of tradable (cTt ) and non-tradable
T
N
goods (cN
t ): ct = A(ct , ct ), ∀t ∈ [0, ∞). The aggregator follows an Armington-type CES
1−1/ζ 1/(1−1/ζ)
T 1−1/ζ
]
, where parameters a and ζ
+ (1 − a)(cN
form: A(cTt , cN
t )
t ) = [a(ct )
are, respectively, the weight of tradables in the CES aggregator and the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods.
Households have access to a one-period, internationally traded bond, denominated in
terms of tradable goods. The return of these bonds between periods t and t + 1 is the
exogenous risk-free rate rt . The households’ sequential budget constraint is:
T
N
cTt + pt cN
t + dt = y t + pt y t +

dt+1
1 + rt

(4.2)

where dt+1 represents the amount of debt incurred in period t and due in period t + 1
and pt is the relative price of non-tradables in terms of tradables. Variables ytT and
ytN represent the exogenous endowments processes for tradable and non-tradable goods,
respectively, and are the only source of uncertainty. Notice that debt is equivalent to
negative holdings of the aforementioned internationally traded bond.
The (flow) collateral constraint is given by:

dt+1 ≤ κ(ytT + pt ytN )

(4.3)

with κ > 0 being the fraction of income that can be pledged as collateral, which determines the upper bound of debt that households can take on during the current period
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and (completely) pay in the next one. This constraint is the key to the pecuniary externality: Due to the atomistic nature of households, they take pt as given, although it is
endogenously determined in equilibrium. In other words, households do not internalize
that their collective absorption of tradables may increase the value of collateral through
increases in the relative price of non-tradables. This leads households to borrow more
than they would have had they internalized this externality. The literature refers to this
as overborrowing.18
∞
Households choose a set of processes {cTt , cN
t , ct , dt+1 }t=0 to maximize (4.1) subject to
(4.2) and (4.3) given the initial debt position d0 19 .

The Ramsey Planner
The Ramsey planner internalizes the effects that households’ decisions have over the
relative price, pt . Thus, by replacing pt from the first-order conditions of the unregulated
economy (see Appendix), the recursive planner’s problem in this economy is to choose cT
and d0 such that20 :
0

T
0
0
v(y T , r, d) = max{U (A(cTt , cN
t )) + βE[v(y , r , d) ]}

(4.4)

Subject to:
cT + d 0 = y T +

d0
1+r

1 − a cT 1/ζ N
d ≤κ y +
( ) y
a yN
0



T

(4.5)


(4.6)

Since the planner internalizes the effect that current borrowing has over the collateral
constraint in future periods, she borrows on average less than the household, leading
to a lower frequency of financial crises—defined here as episodes where the constraint
binds—and higher welfare. As an application of the second welfare theorem, there exists
a capital control tax (i.e., a tax on debt) that makes households as well off as those living
under the Ramsey planner, to which we turn next.
18

Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2020) show that, under certain parametrizations, multiple equilibrium
could lead to self-fulfilling financial crisis and underborrowing. As we will explain in the Calibration
section, we abstract from this scenario by following to a large extent the calibration in Bianchi (2011),
which does not exhibit underborrowing. We leave for future research the study of the interaction between
(S, s) costs in this work with the possibility of underborrowing-type dynamics.
19
The Appendix contains a full derivation of the equilibrium in this economy.
20
Henceforth, we use a recursive notation where prime variables denote the next period and the rest
the current period.

Chapter 4. Sticky capital controls

130

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

Miguel Acosta Henao

Optimal Capital Control Tax
With the introduction of a capital control tax, τ , the new budget constraints on households and the government become, in recursive format, respectively:

τ

d0
=l
1+r

(4.7)

and

d0
+ l,
1+r
where l is a lump-sum transfer from the government to the household.
cT + pcN + d = y T + py N + (1 − τ )

(4.8)

As derived in Bianchi (2011), combining the equilibrium conditions of the unregulated
and Ramsey economies yields the optimal capital control tax:
0

Et λR
τ =1−
,
Et λR0 (1 − µR0 Ψ0 )
∗

(4.9)

0

where µR is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint and Ψ =
1 cT 1/ζ−1 21
κ 1−a
( )
.
a ζ yN
The optimal tax depicted in Equation 4.9 provides important insights as to the use of
this instrument within this setup. As can be seen, as long as the probability of a crisis
is not zero, the optimal policy will call for a capital control. Moreover, any change in
the probability, be it small or large, will trigger a change in the intensity with which
this instrument is deployed, implying that controls will actively be called upon along
the business cycle. We therefore conjecture that the baseline model is not designed to
properly account for the stickiness in the data documented above—which we will verify
in the quantitative analysis below. This disconnect between the baseline model and the
stylized facts regarding the dynamic behavior of capital controls suggests that a friction
is needed in the ability with which this instrument is employed. We next postulate an
extension to the baseline model that incorporates such a friction.

4.4.2

Extended Model with (S, s) Costs

This section extends the baseline setup by introducing a friction that, we conjecture, has
the ability to bring the model closer to the data. The friction that we postulate is a cost
of imposing and further adjusting capital controls along the intensive margin. This cost
has an (S, s) structure, which has the ability to induce an inaction region that resembles
that observed in the data.
21

In the Appendix, we provide the first-order conditions in the Ramsey economy, as well as the
derivation of the optimal capital control’s tax.
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There is a long tradition in economics using (S, s)-type costs to explain inertia in durable
goods consumption, investment, and money demand and, perhaps most notably, in providing a rationale for price stickiness (Caplin and Leahy, 2010). We therefore borrow this
rationalization of stickiness in economic decision-making and extend it to the choice of
imposing capital controls, hence the title of our work.
In general terms, with an (S, s)-type framework, agents remain in an inaction region until
their losses generated by this choice surpass a particular threshold, which then triggers an
adjustment to a latent optimal value for their state. The environment that we postulate
is similar but adapted to the Ramsey planner, who internalizes a (reduced-form) cost in
terms of utility when capital controls are adjusted. The planner is thus confronted at
every moment with the choice between setting the level of capital controls to their optimal
level and hence paying the cost, or not adjusting the instrument and not incurring such
cost.
In the next section, we explore the validity of our conjecture by calibrating the model, including the size of the (S, s) cost, and assess the quantitative performance of the extended
model.
While reduced form, we believe the (S, s) cost structure captures deeper trade-offs that
policymakers face when confronted by the choice of using capital controls that are absent
in the baseline model. In the final section, we discuss the possible deep causes that could
give rise to such costs and relate them to the literature.22
Setup
The inclusion of an (S, s) cost into the Ramsey planner problem implies that she now
has to chose between two value functions, one associated with adjusting the value of the
capital control tax and the other associated with not adjusting it. Formally, the recursive
formulation of the planner´s problem in this environment becomes:

V (y T , r, d, τ ) = M ax(V A (y T , r, d, τ ), V N A (y T , r, d, τ ))

(4.10)

subject to:

cT + d = y T +

d0
,
1+r

(4.11)

22

It is natural to ask how other cost structures different from the (S, s) form would perform. We
explore this possibility in the Appendix by assuming that, instead of an (S, s) structure, there is a
continuous convex or concave cost of adjustment C(τt ) paid by the government in terms of tradable
goods. Neither of the two costs features the highly non-linear feature of the (S, s) structure. Our main
takeaway from this exercise is that hardly any other type of reduced-form cost structure different than
an (S, s) setup is able to provide a rationale that explains the observed stickiness in capital controls.
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1 − a cT 1/ζ N
d ≤κ y +
( ) y ,
a yN
0



T

(4.12)

where we define V A as the value of adjusting the capital control tax from its initial value
to the one that is optimal in the absence of (S, s) costs, τ ∗ . This adjustment carries out
a fixed (utility) cost K:

0

0

V A (y T , r, d, τ ) = [U (cT (τ ∗ )) − K] + βE[M ax(V A (y T , r0 , d0 , τ 0 ), V N A (y T , r0 , d0 , τ 0 ))],
(4.13)
NA
and V
captures the value of not adjusting the instrument and hence not incurring the
cost K:
0

0

V N A (y T , r, d, τ ) = U (cT (τ )) + βE[M ax(V A (y T , r0 , d0 , τ 0 ), V N A (y T , r0 , d0 , τ 0 ))]

(4.14)

Note that, under this new environment, the previous period’s capital control tax becomes
a state variable. An inaction region for this instrument exists for states when V N A > V A ,
therefore giving the model a better chance to account for the stickiness observed in the
empirical counterparts of capital controls.
Note also that the extended model encompasses, as two extreme cases, the unregulated
economy and the Ramsey planner cases described in the previous section. On one hand,
the case when K = 0 is equivalent to the Ramsey planner’s world in the baseline model
and yields the largest gains in terms of welfare. On the other hand, Equation 4.13 implies
that there exists a sufficiently large K such that the planner never adjusts τ . This case
is equivalent to the decentralized economy in the baseline model and yields the lowest
possible welfare. As a result, welfare in the extended model is bounded between the
decentralized case in the baseline model and the Ramsey planner without (S, s) costs.
Solution
The lack of a closed-form solution in both baseline and extended models requires us to
solve the models using global methods in order to conduct a quantitative analysis of
them. In the unregulated economy of the baseline model, we use policy function iteration
procedures; in the Ramsey planner version, since there is no pecuniary externality, we
use standard value function iteration procedures. These methods allow us to derive
numerically the policy functions that map states—the two endowment processes and
debt—into decision variables with which we later conduct simulations in the quantitative
analysis presented in the next section (see also the online database’s Technical Appendix
for further details of the models).
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The solution method of the (S, s) model first requires us to solve for the baseline Ramsey
economy to obtain the policy functions of the control variables, including τ ∗ . Then, given
the stochastic process of endowments, we simulate 1 million periods and obtain τt∗ for
each period t (recall that each period corresponds to a state of the pair {ytT , ytN } and dt ).
Using the same simulated endowments, we simulate the decentralized (but regulated)
economy for all of the (1 million) values of τt∗ obtained in the previous step. By doing
this, we obtain all possible combinations of policy functions, given a simulated process
for the endowments, for each state of the economy and for each different τ ∗ and its
correspondent indirect utility at each period. This process facilitates the solution of the
Ramsey planner problem with (S, s) costs. Once this is done, in the (S, s) model we need
to keep track of the state (τt−1 ) and, without loss of generality, assume that the initial
value of the tax is 0 (τ0 = 0). Then for each period in the simulation, given a calibrated
value of K, we obtain VtA and VtN A . In case the former is greater than the latter, we set
τt = τt∗ , otherwise τt = τt−1 .

4.5

Quantitative Analysis

In this section, we run a quantitative analysis of the extended model presented above.
We begin with a simple illustration of the effects that varying levels of (S, s) costs have
on the equilibrium dynamics of the extended model using a standard calibration from the
literature. Next we undertake a formal, more comprehensive exercise where we calibrate
the extended model for each of the 21 EMEs in the dataset and asses the performance of
the model in matching the stylized facts from Section 3.

4.5.1

Illustrating the Effects of (S, s) Costs

To illustrate the effects of varying levels of (S, s) costs in the extended model, we use the
same calibration as in Bianchi (2011) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) and document
the results with alternative values for K. When assessing the results, we pay particular
attention to the dimensions directly linked to the stickiness in capital controls uncovered
in the stylized facts in Section 3.
Employing the policy functions obtained in the solution of the models, we simulate the
model for 1 million periods (years in the calibration) and report the results of the simulation in Figure 4.9.23 The upper left panel shows the average share of time during which
the optimal tax is greater than zero. The first bar (light blue) corresponds to the Ramsey
economy in the baseline model (K = 0); the last bar (yellow) corresponds to the aver23

More precisely, conditional on an initial debt level and simulated series for the two endowment
processes, we use the policy functions obtained in the solution to derive time series for the choice variables
in the model (consumption, next-period debt) for the range of years considered in the simulation.
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age share of time with activated taxes on inflows and outflows in the data (Figure 4.1).
The bars in between (dark blue) show the results in the extended model for arbitrarily
different values of K. While the baseline model implies that capital controls ought to be
active in every period, even relatively small values of (S, s) costs give the extended model
the ability to reduce the share of time in which the tax is active, with higher (S, s) costs
further reducing this share, bringing it more in line with the data.
Figure 4.9: (S, s) Costs in Capital Controls: A Quantitative Illustration

Notes: The figure shows the effects of higher (S, s) costs over the relevant moments regarding stickiness
in capital controls. The first two figures in the upper row show in the blue bars for different values
of K, respectively, the share of time with a positive capital control tax and the number of changes in
it. The yellow bars correspond to the cross-country average between the tax on inflows and the tax on
outflows.The two figures in the lower row show for different values of K, respectively, the episodes of
activation in the controls and their serial autocorrelation. The red lines correspond to the cross-country
averages for the mean between taxes on inflows and outflows.

The upper right plot in Figure 4.9 documents the effects of K over the average frequency
of changes in the tax for every (nonconsecutive) 20 years in the simulation, the same
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duration we observe in the data. While the baseline model predicts a very active use of
the policy instrument (i.e., 20 changes in each of the 20 years), thereby validating our
earlier conjecture that the baseline model would fail in generating stickiness in capital
controls, the extended model features a much lower frequency of changes, ranging from
6 to 1, as the (S, s) costs increase,which is more in line with the empirical moment
documented earlier. In other words, (S, s) costs go a long way toward giving the model
the chance to reproduce the stickiness in the data of capital controls.
The lower left panel reproduces episodes of a forceful use of capital controls in the simulated data, akin to those found in the dataset and presented in Figure 4.4. The results
of the simulation document a strong non-linearity in the behavior of capital controls in
the (S, s) model as K increases. For values of K lower than a certain threshold, episodes
of activation of this tool resemble those in the data: the tax begins the episode at 0% (or
close to that value) and forcefully increases above 10%. However, for values of K above
that threshold, (S, s) costs are so high that capital controls do not activate, which is also
reminiscent of the stylized facts presented above in that capital controls have not been
used by several of the countries considered.
Lastly, the lower right panel documents the effects of varying levels of (S, s) costs on the
serial autocorrelation of capital controls of one and two years. It illustrates how higher
levels of K help increase the autocorrelations of the tax, bringing the simulated moments
closer to the high values in the data.

4.5.2

Calibration

While the results in the previous section are useful for illustrating the quantitative effects
of alternative (S, s) costs, a more formal calibration of these costs is needed in order to
assess their empirical relevance. We now undertake this task by calibrating the extended
model to each of the 21 EMEs in the dataset.
Our calibration strategy is summarized in Table 4.2. It involves fixing a subset of the
parameters equally across countries and then having a country-specific calibration for the
remaining subset. When setting the first subset of parameters equally across countries,
we follow the literature once more: (1) the inverse of the elasticity of substitution (σ) is
set equal to 2; (2) the discount factor (β) is set to 0.91; (3) the annual real interest rate
(r) is set to 4%; (4) the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (ζ) is calibrated to 0.83;
and (5) the share of tradables in the CES aggregator (a) is set at 0.31.
The second subset of parameters that we calibrate on a country-by-country basis comprises the two endowment processes for tradable and non-tradable income {y T ; y N } that
constitute the driving forces of the model and the parameters that govern the strength
of the collateral constraint (κ) and the stickiness in capital controls (K). Regarding {y T
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Table 4.2: Baseline Calibration
Parameter
Mean κ baseline
Mean K baseline
Mean κ S-s
Mean K S-s
σ
β
r
ζ
a

Value
0.3131
0
0.3257
0.0102
2
0.91
0.04
0.83
0.31

Description
Parameter of collateral constraint
S-s cost of policymaking
Parameter of collateral constraint
S-s cost of policymaking
Inverse of intertemporal elast. of subst.
Subjective discount factor
Annual interest rate
Intratemporal elast. of subst.
Weight on tradables in CES aggregator
Targeted Moments
Frequency of Crisis
Number of Changes in τ
Data
18.8
1.4
Baseline Model (Mean)
18.36
13.88
S-s Model (Mean)
19.62
1.64
Notes: The second and third rows in the upper panel of the table show, respectively, the cross-country
mean values of κ and K calibrated in the baseline model (the latter is zero by definition). The third
and fourth rows show, respectively, the same two cross-country mean parameters calibrated in the (S, s)
model. The rest of the parameters are the same as in Bianchi (2011). The lower panel of the table shows
in the row for Data the two targeted moments used to calibrated κ and K in the (S, s) model. The last
two rows show the cross-country means for two two moments generated by both the baseline model and
the (S, s) model.

; y N }, we build tradable and non-tradable time series for each country from World Development Indicators.24 As Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017), we estimate a 2-variable
vector autoregression for both variables, and discretize the process into a 4-state Markov
chain.
Our calibration strategy for κ and K selects values for these two parameters such that
the distance between model and data along two key moments is minimized: the frequency
of adjustment in the intensive margin of capital controls from the new dataset, and the
frequency of occurrence of financial crises. The rationale for this strategy is as follows.
On the one hand, as we illustrated in the previous section, the frequency of changes in
capital controls can be informative about the extent to which (S, s) costs (K) are relevant.
This is akin to the way in which the literature on price stickiness has pinned down the
strength of menu costs (a form of (S, s) costs) by using the frequency of price adjustments
in the data (Golosov and Lucas 2007; Midrigan 2010). On the other hand, the frequency
of financial crises in the data can provide information regarding κ. Indeed, higher values
of this parameter will imply, ceteris paribus, a less restrictive collateral constraint and
therefore fewer states where the constraint binds (a financial crisis in the model). For
24

We followed Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) and defined y T as the sum of manufacturing and
agriculture, while y N was the residual from subtracting y T from total GDP.
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instance, Bianchi (2011) pinned down κ in his calibrated model for Argentina in order to
match the frequency of crises in this country.25
Figure 4.10 further validates our calibration strategy for these two parameters. The
panels document how, in the model, both κ and K relate to the frequency of crisis,
defined as the share of time that the constraint binds in our simulations. Other things
being equal, a higher κ yields a lower frequency of crisis (upper left panel). Likewise,
lower values of K yield a lower share of years in crisis as capital controls can be deployed
with more flexibility, thereby allowing the economy to be more insulated against crises
(lower left panel). This warrants our choice of the two moments to jointly pin down both
parameters.
The upper right panel in Figure 4.10 presents the relationship between our estimates of
intensity in capital controls from the new dataset and the empirical estimates for the
incidence of financial crises that we use in our calibration taken from Reinhart (2010).
While this work provides estimates for the incidence of a variety of crises on a panel of
countries, we focus on their measure of currency crisis (i.e., large depreciations), which we
believe is closest to the kind of financial crises in the extended model, since episodes when
the financial constraint binds are accompanied by large movements in the relative price
of non-tradables. There are two things worth noting in the scatter plot. First, there is a
negative and statistically significant correlation between the intensity of controls and the
incidence of crises. Second, and perhaps more important for the relevance of (S, s) costs,
virtually all countries that did not make use of the intensive margin of capital controls
(i.e., those on top of the vertical axis of the plot) still exhibit a relatively high incidence of
currency crises. It is therefore plausible to argue that, for those countries, an additional
friction may have been present that prevented them from using capital controls despite
the occurrence of crises, which would be captured in our (S, s) cost.26
Table 4.2 presents the average values for K and κ across the 21 EMEs in the dataset,
as well as the performance of the extended model along the two targeted moments. The
Appendix contains the country-by-country results. The table also presents the results of
calibrating the baseline model with no (S, s) costs and its performance along the same
25

Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2020) make a case for multiple equilibrium in this class of models, where
instead of overborrowing, the decentralized economy could display underborrowing (i.e., the central
˜ they show that there is multiple
planner borrows more than private agents). Specifically, for d = d0 = d,
1−a
1 1 T
d˜
˜
˜
˜ 1/ζ−1 > 1. This condition
equilibrium with underborrowing when S(d; d) ≡ κ( a ) 1+r ζ (y + 1+r
− d)
is not met in the calibration of any of our countries.
26
There are three countries/exceptions to this claim. Two of them—Israel and the Czech Republic,
which are included in our dataset—are not in the scatter plot as Reinhart (2010) does not provide data of
the incidence of crises in these two countries. The third, China, is the only country that does not have a
financial crisis, while no use of the intensive margin of capital controls was recorded in our dataset (i.e, it
is the only point in the origin of the scatter plot). This can be explained by recalling that, as documented
in Section 3, a large fraction of the regulations on capital controls in China are non-price-based, as was
further documented in Fernández et al. (2016).
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Figure 4.10: Calibrating (S, s) Costs

Notes: The first figure shows how a higher κ in the collateral constraint leads to, other things being
equal, lower frequency of crisis (measured as share of years in crisis on the vertical axis). The second
figure (first row) shows the mean capital control taxes on inflows and outflows (horizontal axis) for each
country in our sample, compared to the number of currency crisis during the period 1995–2010 taken
from Reinhart (2010). The last figure shows how a higher (S, s) cost of policy-making K leads to, other
things equal, higher frequency of crisis (measured as share of years in crisis on the vertical axis).

two moments. In the latter case, the mean value of κ is 0.31 and the frequency of crisis
is 18.4%, similar to the empirical counterpart of 18.8%. However, the baseline model
predicts a very active use of capital controls by implying that such instruments change,
on average, 13.8 times for every 20 years simulated. This is by an order of magnitude
at odds with the data, where on average, controls are only changed 1.4 times for every
20 years. In contrast, in the extended model, the average κ is 0.33 and the mean value
of (S, s) costs (K) is 0.01. This delivers a much better fit in terms of the number of
changes in capital controls delivered by the model (1.6 times every 20 years) without a
cost in terms of the performance of the model when accounting for the frequency of crisis
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(19.6%).

4.5.3

Results

We assess the performance of the extended model in matching more dimensions in the data
that were not directly targeted in the calibration and that relate to the aforementioned
stickiness of capital controls. For comparison, we also present the results of the baseline
model.27
Figure 4.11 summarizes the results of the various comparisons. Results are averages across
the models calibrated for each of the countries in the dataset (the Appendix contains
country-by-country results). The panel in the upper left corner documents the share of
time that controls are predicted to be active (strictly positive) by each model. It shows
how the presence of (S, s) costs brings the model closer to the data: while the baseline
model continues to assume a very active use of controls, being active at every period in
the simulation, the extended model predicts controls to be active only above 40% of the
time, closer to the 20% in the data.
The upper right panel presents the results in terms of the mean value of the tax, capturing
the intensity with which capital controls were used. The baseline model predicts an
average τ of about 5.5%, far above the 3% in the data. The extended model predicts a
lower τ of about 2%, closer to the cross-country mean for taxes on inflows and outflows
in the data.
The middle left panel represents the number of changes in both the baseline and extended
model—which, as mentioned above, was a moment targeted in the calibration. The
middle right panel depicts episodes of forceful use of controls identified in the simulated
data in the same way that episodes were identified in the new dataset (Figure 4.4), which
we replicate for comparison. Again, results show that (S, s) costs help to account for
the stickiness in capital controls: while the baseline model (dotted line) does not yield
periods of inaction in the use of controls, which change rather frequently, the extended
model with (S, s) costs (dashed line) exhibits initial periods of inactive controls that do
not revert to their mean when they become active.
Lastly, the lower left panel further documents the mean reversion properties of the models
by reproducing the first and second-order serial autocorrelations implied by both frameworks and comparing them with the one in the data presented earlier (Figure 4.5). In
this dimension, the difference between the baseline model (dotted line) and the extended
27

When comparing model and data, for the latter we use the mean of taxes on inflows and outflows
since the model does not distinguish between gross inflows and outflows. However, results are robust
if we compare the model with taxes on inflows and outflows separately. This is due to the fact that,
in our dataset, controls on inflows and outflows comove—a result that was previously documented by
Fernández et al. (2015) using the extensive margin of capital controls over a large panel of countries.
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Figure 4.11: Quantitative Results

Notes: The first figure compares how the share of time with the capital control’s tax is activated in the
data (third bar) with respect to the baseline and (S, s) models (first and second bars, respectively). The
second figure (first row) does the same than the first one, but for the mean value of the capital control
tax. The first figure in the second row shows such comparison for the number of changes in the tax. The
second figure in the second row depicts the episodes of activation of capital controls in the data (solid
line), the baseline model (dotted line), and the (S, s) model (dashed line). The last figure has the same
format of the previous one, and shows the serial autocorrelation of the capital control taxes up to two
years. For all figures, the data is the cross-country average of the mean between taxes on inflows and
outflows.

model (dashed line) is starker. While the former yields a counterfactual negative firstorder serial correlation, the latter more closely resembles the relatively high value in the
data (solid line).

Chapter 4. Sticky capital controls

141

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

4.5.4

Miguel Acosta Henao

Welfare Analysis

We compute the welfare gains of implementing capital controls in the baseline model and
contrast them with those in the extended model, given the calibrated values of (S, s)
costs presented above. As mentioned before, by construction, welfare gains with (S, s)
costs will be lower than those in the frictionless baseline model. It is still relevant to
consider by how much gains are lowered when the calibrated (S, s) costs are used. The
welfare gains that we compute are consumption-equivalent factors that make households
in both the unregulated baseline economy and the (S, s) economy to be as well off as in
the Ramsey economy with frictionless capital controls. Formally, we calculate λU R and
λSs such that:
∞
X

∞
 X
 
 UR
UR
=
β t u CtR
1+λ
β u Ct
t

and

∞
X
t=0

(4.15)

t=0

t=0

∞
 Ss
 
 X
Ss
β u Ct 1 + λ
β t u CtR
=
t

(4.16)

t=0

The cross-country means of λU R and λSs are 0.94% and 0.76%, respectively.28 These
results (summarized in table Table 4.3) document how on the one hand, there are sizable
gains in terms of welfare when implementing capital controls in a frictionless environment.
Indeed, consumption by agents in the unregulated economy would have to be close to one
percentage point higher for them to be as well off as those living under the Ramsey planner
with no (S, s) costs.29 On the other hand, the same consumption equivalent compensation
for agents living in the economy with (S, s) costs is also considerable—about 4/5 that of
agents living in the unregulated economy. This implies that the magnitude of (S, s) costs
calibrated in the previous section is large enough to eliminate most—though not all—of
the welfare gains obtained in an environment where capital controls can be used without
cost.30
28

Country-by-country estimations are reported in the Appendix
This number goes in the same direction as that calibrated for Argentina in Bianchi (2011). However,
our results differ quantitatively, since (1) our results are cross-country means and (2) due to the heavy
computational burden of our algorithm, we use have to use a coarser grid for net foreign debt.
30
An alternative way to measure the welfare implications of (S, s) costs is to derive the consumption
equivalent factor (λU R−alt )P
that makes
in the
 unregulated
 Ss  economy to be as well off
 Uhouseholds
P∞ t baseline
∞
t
R
U R−alt
as in the (S, s) economy:
β
u
C
1
+
λ
=
β
u
Ct . In line with the previous
t
t=0
t=0
result, λU R−alt is relatively small (0.11%).
29
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Table 4.3: Welfare Analysis
Welfare Gains

Unregulated Economy
λU R = 0.94%

S-s Economy
λS−s = 0.76%

Notes: The second column of the table shows the increase in consumption that would be needed for the
household in the unregulated economy to have the same welfare as in the Ramsey economy with no (S, s)
costs, λU R . The third column shows the increase in consumption that would be needed for the household
in the (S, s) economy to have the same welfare as the Ramsey economy with no S-s costs, λU R . Both
values are cross-country means.

4.6

On the Deeper Causes of (S, s) Costs: A Discussion

The (S, s) costs in the extended model are evidently a reduced form to capture the large
set of deeper constraints that policymakers may face when confronted with the choice
of using capital controls, absent from the simple environment in the model. While we
believe that providing complete microfoundations of (S, s) costs is beyond the scope of
this paper, this section offers a discussion of such constraints, relating them to a broader
literature on international finance. There are at least three alternative deeper causes for
(S, s) costs in the extended model that can be related to the literature. First, such costs
may be capturing a more complex cost-benefit analysis that incorporates negative effects
and/or unintended consequences of capital controls not picked up by standard models.
More generally, a second explanation may be related to political economy considerations
driving policymaking, which can be also linked to credibility and signaling from the use of
these tools that end up affecting policy choices. Third, model robustness and (perceptions
of) ineffectiveness of capital controls may also play a role in policymakers’ cautious use
of these instruments.
A potential cost of capital controls can be related to the negative effect on the development
of deeper financial markets. In light of this possibility, and given that most countries aim
to maintain/develop financial markets, they may refrain from imposing capital controls or
other draconian measures on the flow of capital, except under episodes of large volatility of
these flows. Related to this, research has documented that capital controls may negatively
affect liquidity and reduce firms’ financing, particularly those that are small (Forbes 2007;
Alfaro et al. 2017; Andreasen et al. 2019).
Policymakers may also worry about the general perception of capital control policies on
market participants, as well as more broadly defined political economy considerations.
Bartolini and Drazen (1997), for example, argue that countries that lift capital controls
can signal “good behavior,” while those that impose them could be perceived as following
inconsistent policies that would reduce credibility. Research has documented how controls
can be linked to corruption insofar as capital controls can be put in place to benefit
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certain private interests (Johnston and Tamirisa 1998). There may also be spillovers
and interactions across markets (Cole and Kehoe 1998). Thus, even if policymakers are
willing to use controls as the Ramsey planner would, they may be discouraged from doing
so if, given imperfect information, markets view them as signals of possibly inconsistent
policies. Under such circumstances, it is plausible to assume that policymakers may be
deterred from using these tools except under extreme cases. Another set of explanations
as to why countries may opt to impose controls on capital flows centers around the
distributive consequences of policies. While an economy as a whole can benefit from
opening up to international markets, some groups may lose in the absence of necessary
compensating transfers (Alesina and Tabellini 1989; Rodrik and Van Ypersele 2001).
This constraint raises the possibility that the compensatory adjustments in the national
tax rates may not be feasible in the absence of coordination among countries (Alfaro and
Kanczuk 2004). Changes in the political equilibria in these environments can thus yield
non-linearities in capital controls that are captured through reduced (S, s) costs.
Policymakers may be concerned about issues related to model specification, robustness
and effectiveness of capital controls. Indeed, complexities surrounding the transmission
mechanism of capital controls that are not well understood and thus hard to capture
in standards frameworks may inhibit policymakers from actively using these controls.
Regarding model specification, most theoretical frameworks, for example, tend to focus
on consumption smoothing benefits with non-contingent assets while abstracting from
different interactions and variables: debt/equity financing/hedging and contingent assets,
capital accumulation, firm financing, and the development of financial markets. Another
concern is that regulations do not properly discriminate between short-term and longterm capital flows. Short-term loans are often rolled over, while long-term assets can be
sold in secondary markets.
Related to this, there are also concerns regarding model robustness. Policy prescriptions
of models of optimal capital are far from being robust to deviations from the baseline
model in terms of calibration, timing of the collateral constraints, or endogenizing production (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2020; Benigno et al. 2011). Furthermore, optimal
rules have been shown to be time-inconsistent, and simpler rules may even be welfare
reducing (Bianchi and Mendoza 2010; Hernandez and Mendoza 2017).
Evidently, concerns about model specification and robustness are amplified in light of
the inconclusive evidence regarding effectiveness of capital controls (Klein 2012; Baba
and Kokenyne 2011; De Gregorio et al. 2000; Goldfajn and Minella 2005; Carvalho and
Garcia 2008; etc.), with some exceptions—in particular, draconian cases (e.g., Argentina,
Venezuela) or “walls” (China). Hence policymakers may be reluctant to use them unless
macro conditions really warrant extreme measures, acting as if there were costs of using
them in normal times.
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Conclusion

One of the legacies of the of the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis has been a reassessment
of the potential for non-conventional policy tools to curb imbalances that can trigger
financial crises and sudden stops. Capital controls have, once again, been seen as a
policy tool worth considering in the toolbox. Such a view has been backed by theoretical
work that describes environments in which, by reducing the probability of financial crises,
cyclical capital controls are desirable for their welfare implications. This view, however,
is far from being accepted by the profession, and much debate remains in terms of the
effectiveness of these policy instruments.
In this paper, we have aimed to contribute to this debate by addressing both positive
and normative features of capital controls. On the positive front, our efforts were devoted
to describing the key stylized facts observed from a brand new dataset that we build on
the use of de jure controls for a panel of EMEs along the intensive margin so as to get a
better picture of how these policy tools have been used. Our view is that any meaningful
test for a theory of capital controls needs to able to account for these stylized facts.
The key empirical finding in our work is that controls display certain statistical properties
that makes us label them as “sticky.” Changes to capital controls do not occur frequently,
and when they do, they remain in place for a long time. Overall, they have not been used
systematically across countries or time, and there has been considerable heterogeneity
across countries in terms of the intensity with which they have been used.
On the normative side, we extend a model of capital controls relying on pecuniary externalities augmented to include an (S, s) cost of implementing such policies. We illustrate
how this friction goes a long way toward bringing the model closer to the data. When the
extended model is calibrated for each of the countries in the new dataset, we find that
the size of these (S, s) costs is large, thus substantially reducing the welfare-enhancing
effects of capital controls compared with the frictionless Ramsey benchmark.
Our broad view of this result is not that the workhorse model of pecuniary externalities
is unsuitable for empirical analysis. Instead, we subscribe to a view that calls for a richer
set of policy constraints when considering an optimal use of optimal capital controls in
models that rely on such externalities.
Our work has, nonetheless, been silent about the formal microfoundations of such costs
and goes only as far as to discuss some of the possible deeper causes. In that regard, an
obvious further avenue that comes out of our work is the formal modeling of the primitive
frictions that can give rise to the stylized facts documented of capital controls.
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Appendix 4
Models’ derivations

Unregulated economy
Defining λt and µt as, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers on the sequential budget
constraint and the collateral constraint, the Lagrangian is:

L = E0

∞
X

T
N
β t {U (A(cTt , cN
t ))+λt [yt +pt yt +

t=0

dt+1
T
N
−cT −pt cN
t −dt ]+λt µt [κ(yt +pt yt )−dt+1 ]
1 + rt t
(17)

The first-order conditions are (2), (3), and:
T
N
[cTt ] : U 0 (A(cTt , cN
t ))A1 (ct , ct ) = λt

(18)

0
T
N
T
N
[cN
t ] : U (A(ct , ct ))A2 (ct , ct ) = pt λt

(19)

[dt+1 ] : (

1
− µt )λt = βEt λt+1
1 + rt

(20)

µt ≥ 0

(21)

µt [dt+1 − κ(ytT + pt ytN )] = 0

(22)

and

Combining (18) with (19) and using the functional forms for the utility function and the
consumption aggregator, we obtain:

pt =

1 − a cTt 1−ζ
( )
a cN
t

(23)

The market for non-tradables clears in equilibrium:

N
cN
t = yt

(24)
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We can use the results from (18) and (23), respectively, into (20) and (4.3) and the
market-clearing condition into all the first-order conditions to define the competitive
equilibrium:
Definition 6.1. Competitive equilibrium - Baseline economy. Given the exogenous
endowments and interest rate: rt , ytT , y2N , and the initial debt position d0 , a competitive
equilibrium in the baseline economy is a set of processes cTt , cN
t , dt+1 , µt , satisfying:

(

1
N
N
− µt )U 0 (A(cTt , ytN ))A1 (cTt , ytN ) = βEt U 0 (A(cTt+1 , yt+1
))A1 (cTt+1 , y+1
)
1 + rt
dt+1
1 + rt

(26)

1 − a T 1/ζ N 1−1/ζ
(ct ) (yt )
]
a

(27)

µt ≥ 0

(28)

cTt + dt = ytT +

dt+1 ≤ κ[ytT +

(25)

and

µt [κ(ytT +

1 − a T 1/ζ N 1−1/ζ
(ct ) (yt )
) − dt+1 ] = 0
a

(29)

Baseline Ramsey planner economy
For the Ramsey planner, the Lagrangian is:

L = E0

∞
X

R T
β t {U (A(cTt , cN
t ))+λt [yt +

t=0

dt+1
1 − a cTt 1/ζ N
R
T
−cTt −dt ]+λR
( ) yt )−dt+1 ]}
t µt [κ(yt +
1 + rt
a ytN
(30)

The first-order conditions are:
R
[cTt ] : U 0 (A(cTt , ytN ))A1 (cTt , ytN ) + λR
t µt κ

1 − a 1 cTt 1/ζ−1
( )
= λR
t
a ζ ytN

(31)

1
R
R
− µR
t )λt = βEt λt+1
1 + rt

(32)

Chapter 4. Sticky capital controls

147

[dTt+1 ] : (

Essays in Macroeconomics of Emerging Markets

T
µR
t κ[yt
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(33)

(34)

and

κ[ytT +

1 − a cTt 1/ζ N
( ) yt ] − dt+1 ≥ 0
a ytN

(35)

By comparing the first-order conditions of the decentralized economy and the Ramsey
planner’s economy shown in equations (18) and (31), we get the first remark obtained
by Bianchi (2011): When the constraint binds, private agents undervalue wealth (equivalently, when the constraint binds, households overvalue consumption).
The result above emerges from the fact that, as shown by the second term of the left-hand
side in equation (31), an additional unit of tradable consumption reduces its marginal
utility when the constraint binds, due to the fact that the agent will have to deleverage
down to the point where the collateral constraint is not violated (i.e., a binding constraint
implies less future consumption of tradable goods). As a result, private agents in the decentralized economy consume more by borrowing from abroad than the Ramsey planner,
which leads to the standard result of overborrowing31 .
Given the overborrowing result, a direct application of the second welfare theorem is to
implement a capital control tax (i.e., a tax on debt) such that the decentralized economy
reaches the same allocations of the Ramsey Planner (which dominate in welfare)32 .
Regulated economy - Optimal tax
The optimality conditions (25)- (29) are unchanged except for the debt Euler Equation
(25), which now takes the form:

(

1 − τt
− µt )λt = βEt λt+1
1+r

31

Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) make a case for multiple equilibrium in this class of models, where
instead of overborrowing, the descentralized economy could display underborrowing (i.e., the central
˜ they show that there is multiple
planner borrows more than private agents). Specifically, for d = d0 = d,
˜
˜ d)
˜ ≡ κ( 1−a ) 1 1 (y T + d − d)
˜ 1/ζ−1 > 1. However, we use
equilibrium with underborrowing when S(d;
a
1+r ζ
1+r
the same calibration as in Bianchi (2011), where such condition is not met; hence the economy has a
unique equilibrium with overborrowing.
32
This capital control tax is designed to reach a constrained first-best allocation in terms of welfare.
However, clearly an economy without the financial friction represented by the collateral constraint welfare
dominates that of the Ramsey planner.
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Definition 4.8.1. Competitive equilibrium - Economy with capital control taxes. A competitive equilibrium in the economy with capital control taxes is then a set of processes
cTt , dt+1 , λt , µt and pt satisfying:
cTt + dt = ytT +

dt+1
1 + rt

(36)

T
dt+1 ≤ κ[ytT + pt yN
]

(37)

λt = U 0 (A(cTt , ytN ))A1 (cTt , ytN )

(38)

1 − τt
− µt )λt = βEt λt+1
1 + rt

(39)

(

pt =

A2 (cTt , ytN )
A1 (cTt , ytN )

(40)

µt [κ(ytT + pt ytN ) − dt+1 ]

(41)

µt ≥ 0

(42)

and

Given a policy process τt , the exogenous process for endowments ytT , ytN , interest rate rt
and the initial level of debt d0 .
The difference between the equilibrium described in definition 3.1 and the one described
in 3.2 relies on (39), which is the first-order condition with respect to dt+1 and now has
τt reducing the marginal utility of debt.
Alternative costs of policy making - First-order conditions
The first-order conditions of the Ramsey planner’s problem become (now we need to take
directly the derivative with respect to τt ):
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[cTt ] : U 0 (A(cTt , ytN ))A1 (cTt , ytN )−
θtR (

−σ+1/ζ
1/ζ
−σ + 1/ζ
1 − τt
a
){(cTt )−1/ζ (
)[a(cTt )1/(1−1/ζ) +(1−a)(ytN )1/(1−1/ζ) ] 1−1/ζ −1 (
)(cTt ) 1−1/ζ
1+r
1 − 1/ζ
1 − 1/ζ
−σ+1/ζ
1 T −1/ζ−1
[a(cTt )1/(1−1/ζ) + (1 − a)(ytN )1/(1−1/ζ) ] 1−1/ζ }
− (ct )
ζ
T
R 1 − a 1 ct 1/ζ−1
+ λR
µ
κ
(
)
= λR
(43)
t t
t
N
a ζ yt

[dt+1 ] :

0
[τt ] : −λR
t C (τt ) +

λR
1
R R
= βλR
t+1 + λt µt
1+r

−σ+1/ζ
1
1
θ1R
[(cTt )−1/ζ [a(cTt ) 1−1/ζ + (1 − a)(ytN ) 1−1/ζ ] 1−1/ζ ] = 0
1+r

T
µR
t κ[yt

1 − a cTt 1/ζ N
+
( ) yt − dt+1 ] ≥ 0
a ytN
µR
t ≥ 0

(44)

(45)

(46)

(47)

and
1 − a cTt 1/ζ N
( ) yt ] − dt+1 ≥ 0
a ytN

(48)
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Additional figures
Figure 4.12: Use of capital controls: All instruments

Notes: In Panel A, the bars depict the share of countries that have used (i.e., value of the instrument is
not 0), even for a single quarter, any of the instruments out of the 21 countries in the sample. In panel
B, the bars depict the share of periods in which an instrument was used. The sample was taken from
1995q1 to 2014q4, the maximum total of quarters is 80 (100%). Here we include capital controls (URRs,
Taxes on Inflows, and Taxes on Outflows), and macroprudential instruments (Reserve Requirements and
FX Reserve Requirements).
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Figure 4.13: Episodes of activation in capital controls: Country by country

Notes: The beginning of an episode was defined as when, for a given policy instrument at period t, xt ,
we have that: xt > 1.1xt−1 . Then the values of each episode were averaged from t − 2 to t + 10. The
first row shows episodes of activation in the controls at a quarterly frequency, and the second row shows
such episodes at a yearly frequency. Here we show for each capital control instrument -URRs (first row),
Taxes on Inflows (second row), and Taxes on Outflows (third row)- the episodes of activation in each
country.
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Figure 4.14: Serial correlation of capital controls: Country by country

Notes: The figure shows for each capital control instrument -URRs (first row), Taxes on Inflows (second
row), and Taxes on Outflows (third row)- the t−order serial autocorrelation for each country.
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Figure 4.15: Episodes of capital controls & The macroeconomy: All Capital Controls

Notes: The figure shows the episodes described in Figure 4 along with the cross-country mean deviation
from the average GDP growth. The plots shown the following number of episodes: URRs (7), Taxes on
Inflows (6) and Taxes on Outflows (11). We also include the URRs Tax Equivalent (7 episodes).
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Figure 4.16: Episodes of activation in capital controls & Macroprudential instruments

Notes: The beginning of an episode (episodes are depicted by red lines) was defined when for a given
policy instrument at quarter t, xt , we have that: xt > 1.1xt−1 . Then the values of each episode were
averaged from t − 2 to t + 10. Here we included the macroprudential instruments from our data base:
Reserve Requirements (and the Marginal Reserve Requirements) and Reserve Requirements on Foreign
Exchange (and the Marginal FX Reserve Requirements).
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Figure 4.17: Capital controls, macroprudential instruments, and the business cycle

Notes:The figure shows the serial correlation of the Macroprudential Instruments’ Indexes and the GDP
growth for each category, broken down into countries that have not used the instruments (left column of
graph) and countries that have (right column). The episodes of boom and bust correspond to the period
from 2000q1 to 2014q4 given the availability of data from macroprudential instruments.
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Figure 4.18: Price-based and Non-price-based capital controls

Notes: The bars show what share of instruments corresponds to non-price-based measures (dark shade)
and to price-based measures (light shade) for each country. This is based on data for the extensive
margin of all instruments.
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Figure 4.19: Serial correlation of capital controls: The extensive margin

Notes: The solid line represents the cross-country mean autocorrelation of order t − j of the extensive
margin (considering both price-based and non-price-based instruments) of taxes on inflows. The dashed
line represents the same variable on taxes on outflows.
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Figure 4.20: Capital controls with alternative cost functions

Notes: The top row of the figure shows in a three-period framework a recursive simulation of the capital
control’s tax with convex costs of adjustment in period 1 (left panel) and period 2 (right panel). The
horizontal axis displays different values for the endowment of the tradable good in period 2. Periods 1
and 3 are assumed to have a fixed endowment of 1. The bottom row shows in a three-period framework
a recursive simulation of the capital control’s tax with concave costs of adjustment in period 1 (left
panel) and period 2 (right panel). The horizontal axis displays different values for the endowment of the
tradable good in period 2. Periods 1 and 3 are assumed to have a fixed endowment of 1. This simulation
is constraint to real and non-negative values of the tax.
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Additional tables

Table 4.4: Share of each capital control instrument over the total amount of instruments
per country
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech Republic
Ecuador
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Israel
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Mexico
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Russia
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey
All (Average)

URR
16.40%
0.00%
5.68%
0.00%
7.05%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
4.35%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.52%

Price-Based
Taxes Quantitative
0.00%
27.87%
13.20%
15.40%
8.65%
21.89%
0.00%
14.40%
0.00%
18.27%
0.00%
23.63%
32.29%
27.08%
0.00%
15.00%
0.00%
28.15%
0.00%
29.01%
0.00%
36.23%
0.00%
27.71%
1.41%
34.81%
0.00%
25.75%
37.50%
37.50%
0.00%
16.78%
0.00%
21.78%
0.00%
15.65%
0.00%
28.04%
0.00%
33.98%
0.00%
32.88%
1.63%
24.45%

Prohibitions
0.00%
8.56%
16.49%
19.15%
3.21%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
10.18%
25.00%
14.49%
3.03%
3.53%
9.51%
0.00%
9.80%
3.51%
3.67%
2.17%
7.04%
7.80%
8.29%

Non-Price-Based
Authorizations Others
28.31%
27.42%
17.85%
44.99%
32.97%
14.32%
30.33%
36.12%
28.53%
42.95%
15.38%
60.99%
0.00%
40.63%
30.00%
55.00%
28.38%
33.30%
4.94%
41.05%
18.84%
26.09%
36.36%
32.90%
32.86%
27.39%
18.79%
45.94%
0.00%
25.00%
30.07%
43.36%
38.41%
36.30%
36.92%
43.77%
40.43%
29.35%
36.62%
22.36%
11.86%
47.46%
28.35%
35.77%

Notes: The table corresponds to Stylized Fact 6. It shows for each country the share of each instrument
over the total. Thus, for each country, the sum of each row is equal to 1. The first four instruments
correspond to price-based capital controls, and the last two to non-price-based controls.
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Table 4.5: Baseline calibration: Country results
TARGETED MOMENTS
Number of
Country
Currency Crisis
Name
1995–2010
Argentina
1
Brazil
5
Chile
1
China
0
Colombia
6
Czech Republic
0
Ecuador
6
Hungary
4
India
4
Indonesia
1
Israel
0
Korea, Rep.
2
Malaysia
3
Mexico
1
Peru
1
Philippines
2
Poland
5
Russia
6
South Africa
2
Thailand
8
Turkey
5
Mean
3.0

CALIBRATED PARAMETERS

Number of crisis
Frequency of changes
every 100-Y
in tau (avg Inf-Out)
Sovereign+External Debt Crisis = Number of Changes in 20 Years
6.3
5.0
31.3
7.0
6.3
0.5
0.0
0.0
37.5
2.0
0.0
0.5
37.5
2.5
25.0
0.0
25.0
0.0
6.3
1.0
0.0
0.0
12.5
2.5
18.8
2.5
6.3
0.0
6.3
0.5
12.5
0.0
31.3
0.0
37.5
1.5
12.5
2.0
50.0
0.0
31.3
1.5
18.8
1.4

SIMULATED MOMENTS

SIMULATED K=0

CALIBRATED PARAMETERS
WITH K=0

κ

K

Simulated Crisis

Simulated Changes

K=0 simulated crisis

K=0 simulated changes

κ

K

0.3250000
0.3050000
0.3300000
0.3500000
0.3250000
0.3400000
0.3200000
0.3270000
0.3200000
0.3290000
0.3400000
0.3240000
0.3151600
0.3290000
0.3250000
0.3260000
0.3240000
0.3200000
0.3263000
0.3200000
0.3200000
0.3257

0.0120000000000000
0.0169300000000000
0.0004000000000000
0.0001000000000000
0.0095000000000000
0.0000000000000001
0.0155300000000000
0.0190000000000000
0.0180000000000000
0.0000000001000000
0.0000000000000001
0.0156000000000000
0.0156000000000000
0.0000000000050000
0.0140000000000000
0.0040000000000000
0.0150000000000000
0.0189000000000000
0.0051000000000000
0.0170000000000000
0.0166000000000000
0.0102

2.88
32.92
2.38
0.00
28.08
0.00
59.52
1.99
48.55
1.66
0.00
3.43
48.37
1.60
25.75
1.75
21.44
17.39
47.68
39.22
27.35
19.62

4.02
4.09
0.62
0.00
2.38
0.00
7.34
0.00
0.00
2.00E-05
0.00
3.21
2.64
0.00
0.71
0.00
0.00
1.58
4.67
0.00
3.16
1.64

1.87
18.92
2.38
0.00
28.04
0.00
32.60
1.57
1.59
1.66
0.00
1.63
25.39
1.60
1.28
0.09
12.67
16.97
1.54
38.78
27.35
10.28

13.16
16.30
12.93
11.77
16.10
10.27
10.59
10.73
13.70
13.63
9.60
12.08
12.42
12.03
11.62
10.97
13.71
13.39
13.41
13.13
16.50
12.76

0.3200
0.2950
0.3100
0.3300
0.3250
0.3400
0.3200
0.3220
0.2950
0.3270
0.3300
0.2915
0.3152
0.3281
0.3150
0.2950
0.3220
0.3100
0.3200
0.2500
0.3150
0.3131

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

SIMULATED MOMENTS
CALIBRATED
κ=0 AND K=0
Simulated Crisis Simulated Changes
1.90
30.29
2.48
0.00
28.04
0.00
32.60
18.62
28.89
1.97
0.00
15.68
25.39
2.70
11.50
27.80
29.40
29.59
17.79
50.09
30.92
18.36

13.14
17.12
12.98
11.77
16.10
10.27
10.59
14.65
17.94
13.72
9.79
12.05
12.42
12.08
14.21
16.80
16.41
15.41
16.42
11.05
16.49
13.88

Table 4.6: Welfare analysis: Country results
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech Republic
Ecuador
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Israel
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Mexico
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Russia
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey
Mean

Welfare Des Welfare Ramsey
-1.92
-1.718712896
-1.73
-1.574422556
-1.84
-1.652840017
-1.76
-1.759292411
-1.83
-1.731663447
-1.76
-1.764315351
-1.88
-1.718662970
-1.92
-1.730591078
-1.71
-1.585714260
-1.76
-1.747010307
-1.76
-1.761844890
-1.69
-1.558136423
-1.85
-1.688853810
-1.75
-1.751031894
-1.86
-1.663182555
-1.71
-1.585963020
-1.91
-1.728568142
-1.83
-1.679795452
-1.90
-1.707596649
-1.43
-1.350117202
-1.85
-1.675946863
-1.79
-1.67

Consumption Eq SS to Rams
1.53%
1.24%
1.50%
0.00%
0.78%
0.00%
1.22%
1.48%
0.97%
0.11%
0.00%
1.08%
1.24%
0.00%
1.53%
0.98%
1.44%
1.21%
1.49%
0.64%
1.33%
0.94%

Welfare S-s
-1.88
-1.81
-1.77
-1.76
-1.83
-1.76
-1.88
-1.76
-1.88
-1.76
-1.76
-1.90
-1.85
-1.75
-1.85
-1.78
-1.89
-1.93
-1.80
-1.88
-1.87
-1.83

Chapter 4. Sticky capital controls

Welfare Ramsey Consumption Eq S-s to Rams
-1.746985316
1.01%
-1.624850886
1.45%
-1.766147372
0.06%
-1.753570251
0.04%
-1.726008275
0.82%
-1.758273023
0.05%
-1.717366716
1.23%
-1.748411373
0.12%
-1.711029946
1.34%
-1.758236699
0.03%
-1.755737458
0.05%
-1.722211523
1.42%
-1.692457802
1.21%
-1.746979382
0.02%
-1.718132555
1.03%
-1.742702211
0.30%
-1.733108336
1.24%
-1.729221194
1.53%
-1.736873046
0.47%
-1.721024266
1.23%
-1.706515464
1.27%
-1.73
0.76%
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